DARFUR: CHAD AND SUDAN STILL PLAYING IN ONE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002451 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2026 TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO SU CH AU SUBJECT: DARFUR: CHAD AND SUDAN STILL PLAYING IN ONE ANOTHER,S BACKYARDS Classified By: DCM R. Powers, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Notwithstanding the August resumption of full diplomatic relations between Sudan and Chad, and promises to expel rebel groups from their respective territories, both countries appear to be continuing support for opposition movements as a means of maintaining political and military leverage over the other. Fighting on both sides of the border indicates that neither government is serious in its commitment to halt interference in the other's internal affairs. Any viable prospects for peace in Darfur will clearly have to take into account the regional nature of the conflict, with particular focus on Chad's role in supporting Sudanese rebels. End summary. ¶2. (C) In meetings with ARC Officer September 21-24 in El Geneina, West Darfur state, a complex picture emerged of ongoing Sudanese and Chadian support to opposition rebel movements in each others' territory. The security landscape in West Darfur is particularly complicated by the continued presence of Chadian opposition groups. UN officials pointed out to ARC Officer on numerous occasions Chadian rebels congregated near El Geneina's main market. Notwithstanding the Government's claims that it no longer harbors Chadian opposition members, UN officials asserted that these groups' presence is both well-known throughout West Darfur and that they continue to receive logistical support from the Sudanese government. UNDSS estimated that four to five thousand Chadian opposition members remain in West Darfur, and, of these, roughly ninety percent are Sudanese nationals. (Note: In contrast, the head of UNMIS in El Geneina, Annamaria Laurini, later asserted that most of the rebels were "of Chadian origin." End Note). ¶3. (C) UNDSS and UNMIS officials, as well as Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) Minawi representatives, affirm continued overt Government assistance to Chadian rebels, who receive transportation, armament, and communications support from National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) officers. UNDSS described the Chadian opposition's strategy as persistent, small-scale, attacks into Chad with the objective of harassing Chadian border forces and Sudanese refugees and demonstrating a continued presence. Chadian rebels have engaged in hit-and-run attacks, rather than seizing and holding key terrain within Chad. Larger scale engagements, however, have occurred, including fighting in mid-September in which Chadian opposition groups reportedly "destroyed 4 Chadian regular army tanks and numerous vehicles and captured 26 vehicles and 60 Chadian soldiers." Several NGO contacts mentioned to ARC Officer that it is not uncommon to see Chadian opposition groups, sometimes escorted by Government police or SAF, driving west toward the Chad border in armed convoys. ¶4. (C) The size and scale of Chadian opposition attacks across the border are difficult to judge given AMIS' lack of visibility in the area and the UN's limited access. Nonetheless, according to UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) officers in El Geneina, refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs) moving across the border continue to report harassment from both Chadian opposition groups and armed Arabs. UNDSS noted that NISS, while remaining slightly more discreet in their association with the Arab militia, continues to provide them arms in clear violation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). One UN security official that has served in the region for more than two years speculated that the Government strategy is to encourage Chadian rebels to create a buffer zone on the Chadian side of the border, from which both Chadian rebels and, potentially, Arab militia might be called upon to launch proxy attacks against UN peacekeepers. ¶5. (C) Responding to ARC Officer's queries regarding Chadian support to the National Redemption Front (NRF) and other rebels inside Sudan, UNDSS held that logistical and military assistance continued, despite SAF efforts to seal the border. More than two Sudanese Army brigades are deployed along the border north of Tine and have partially succeeded in intercepting and deterring cross-border re-supply, according to UNDSS and NGOs with contacts in the area. They added that Sudanese rebels in West Darfur remain concentrated around Jebel Moon, with roughly 150 Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) fighters located in the northern portion of the mountainous area and approximately 450 SLM/Abdel Wahid personnel in the south. (Note: According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) and NGOs working in West Darfur IDP camps, Abdel Wahid continues to enjoy the popular support of much of the IDP community, KHARTOUM 00002451 002 OF 002 comprised primarily of Masalit and Fur. End Note.) ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Following significant fighting between SAF and Sudanese rebels in early September around Jebel Moon, Government forces succeeded in pushing JEM and SLM/Abdel Wahid elements into defensive positions in the mountainous terrain. There have been few large-scale attacks since mid-September, and the SAF, which deployed a reinforced company along with a Popular Defense Forces (PDF) unit of up to 100 personnel and three helicopter gunships to the area in late August, is "laying siege" to Jebel Moon. Although the World Food Program (WFP) is delivering food in the area, UNOCHA and UNHCR contacts noted to ARC Officer that humanitarian access was otherwise severely limited. They relayed IDP reports that the rebels are running low on supplies and will increasingly be forced to leave their mountain stronghold to procure them, facing the prospect of confrontation with Government troops. UNDSS highlighted that the Jebel Moon JEM ) composed of the African tribe Mesiriya Jebel ) was most vulnerable to military defeat, given their low levels of equipment and training. The SAF and PDF forces in Jebel Moon have time, equipment, and troop strength on their side, which bodes poorly for the rebels, prospects, especially with only a trickle of re-supply from Chad. END COMMENT. HUME