DARFUR - MASS DISPLACEMENT NOT ANTICIPATED

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002443 SIPDIS AIDAC SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NAIROBI FOR SFO NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY USUN FOR TMALY BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID EAGR PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU SUBJECT: DARFUR - MASS DISPLACEMENT NOT ANTICIPATED REF: A) KHARTOUM 2254, B) KHARTOUM 2225, C) KHARTOUM 2223, D) KHARTOUM 2167, E) KHARTOUM 2382 KHARTOUM 00002443 001.2 OF 003 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. Despite the reported fighting and reduced access for humanitarian assistance, none of the sources available to USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) anticipate massive population movements within Darfur, towards other states in Sudan, or across the border to Chad, as of September 28. The UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) and the UN World Food Program (WFP) reported that as of mid-September warehouses in Darfur and other states had stocks to assist up to 100,000 people. However, the prevailing sentiment of the humanitarian community in Sudan is that the current and anticipated levels of fighting will not cause 100,000 new displacements. The situation in the three Darfur states remains unpredictable with reports of improvement followed by other information indicating deteriorating conditions. End Summary. -------------- Major Concerns for All Three States -------------- ¶2. According to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, 50,000 people have been displaced since the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in May 2006. In September, a new round of fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and other armed groups, causing many to fear that more displacements were to come. However, the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO), the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID),and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Khartoum paint a picture of general concern but do not anticipate mass displacements within Darfur, to neighboring states within Sudan, or to Chad. ¶3. In USAID/OFDA led contingency planning sessions (REF D),staff of UN agencies and NGOs in Khartoum and Darfur stated that they do not see any indications on the ground that mass population displacements either to Chad or to neighboring states in Sudan will occur in the near future. Experience shows that continued localized fighting and violence may cause populations to migrate towards urban areas, internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, or further up into the mountains, in the case of Jebel Marra. IDPs perceive camps as relatively safe places because witnesses are present in the camp, including UN agencies, NGOs, as well as other IDPs. IDPs are not expected to move from camps to rural communities. (Comment: One NGO representative noted that Arab groups who have taken over control of land that previously belonged to farmers would not attack a camp because they would rather hold on to the land they are occupying. End Comment.) ¶4. Insecurity is the predominant apprehension expressed by humanitarian agencies in all three Darfur states. Lack of road access limits the ability of humanitarian organizations (REF C) to reach remote populations and significantly increases program expenses due to the high costs of helicopter transport. In areas with a high concentration of beneficiaries, runway rehabilitation for fixed wing aircraft could improve service delivery, reduce costs, and expand air services into new areas. NGOs noted that in the unlikely scenario of "total melt-down" in Darfur, people might move towards Northern Kordofan State, Southern Kordofan State, and Khartoum. The NGOs commented that contingency plans for this type of mass population movement have not been well coordinated or recently discussed. USAID/OFDA has taken steps internally to develop contingency plans for this scenario by coordinating Darfur, Southern Sudan, and northern Sudan programs. In a September 28 meeting, USAID inventoried potential NGO responders by sector and location, and outlined a contingency plan for the scenario described above. ¶5. Both UN agencies and NGOs consider the availability of commercial ground transport as a good indicator for conditions on the ground. Agencies noted that if private transporters are no longer willing to take on contracts, communities will be truly inaccessible. Another concern voiced by NGOs is that the rising fuel prices and surcharges for deliveries to insecure areas will affect program costs. ¶6. The Darfur Humanitarian Access Map that is published regularly by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) indicates an improvement in humanitarian access from August to KHARTOUM 00002443 002.2 OF 003 September. This access has enabled NGOs, particularly in North Darfur, to reach vulnerable populations who have not received food for over three months. -------------- North Darfur -------------- ¶7. Considerable achievements in humanitarian coverage made up to April 2006 are currently threatened by the deterioration of security, reduced access to target populations (REF A),and the likelihood of reduced funding in 2007. ¶8. Aerial bombardments on non-SAF held territories have created an unstable environment. Lack of access to many areas in August and September 2006 (REF A) resulted in a lack of credible estimations of new displacements. From September 23 to 27, German Agro Action (GAA) negotiated with commanders from the National Redemption Front (NRF) safe passage to Kutum and Mellit localities from El Fasher. GAA distributed food rations to target communities on the road between Kutum and Um Baru, and in Sayeh and Mellit towns, reaching 100 percent of the NGO's 271,000 targeted beneficiaries. GAA had not been able to reach any of these beneficiaries for three months. IDPs in Fata Borno and Kassab camps received the standard one month ration, beneficiaries living in communities, not camps, received a half-ration. NRF senior commanders assured the humanitarian community that its workers and assets would be safe and invited them to resume work in the areas they control, which currently include Muzbat, Birmaza, Abu Shakur, and Um Sidir. ¶9. According to GAA, the communities reached did not show infrastructure damage and the population did not appear to have suffered visibly during the period of isolation from the humanitarian community. Although GAA reported that humanitarian assistance was needed, they did not see signs of malnutrition or extreme deprivation. In the coming days, GAA will travel to Disa and Birmaza, which are located north of Kutum town, to continue distribution of general food rations for WFP. To access this area, GAA will again have to negotiate with commanders of the NRF. -------------- West Darfur -------------- ¶10. Save the Children/US (SC/US),a USAID partner that has operated in West Darfur since 2004, informed USAID staff that in their opinion the worst case scenario does not include migration out of state or into Chad. In general, population movements as a result of localized fighting are anticipated from small rural communities towards urban centers or IDP camps. Attacks on IDP camps and urban centers are not expected and mass displacement from those areas towards rural communities or across state lines or into Chad are not anticipated. In late 2005, UN predictions for population movements of 50,000 to 100,000 persons in West Darfur did not materialize. According to SC/US, only 6,000 persons were eventually displaced during this time period. ¶11. The operating environment for humanitarian actors varies significantly within the state. Despite recent access restrictions (REF C),some NGOs are able to negotiate with local sheiks safe passage when the sheiks want assistance for their communities. Other NGOs, however, reported that the current tensions around the proposed UN peacekeeping force deployment has mobilized IDPs and communities, particularly in Zalingei, against the humanitarian community. ¶12. Both NGOs and UN agencies based in El Geneina, West Darfur, reported a high level of coordination, collaboration, and experience in operating under the tight security restrictions of UN Phase Four. (Note: The UN lowered West Darfur from Phase Four to Phase Three in September. End Note.) UN and NGO partners expressed concern that contingency plans for displacement to Zalingei are not well understood, coordinated, or planned, and stocks have not been pre-positioned in sufficient quantities. NGOs reported that they will work together to address these concerns. Pending resolution on the current 25 mile limitation on travel by U.S. Government (USG) staff (REF E),USAID staff plans to follow-up with a site visit to Zalingei in October. ¶13. In contingency planning meetings with USAID, NGOs noted that they would consider any unilateral decision taken by the UN or the U.S. to bring in a peacekeeping force, blockade Port Sudan, or KHARTOUM 00002443 003.2 OF 003 establish a no-fly zone as triggers for NGOs to withdraw their staff and scale back programs. In that context, they noted that program implementation solely based on community volunteers (i.e. relief committees) is a viable option for only two to three months after which time the quality of programs would deteriorate rapidly. -------------- South Darfur -------------- ¶14. Following several months of relative calm, South Darfur is currently experiencing a renewed spate of violence against non-Arab civilians by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Arab militias. Intra-Arab violence could also resume on a larger scale, potentially destabilizing South Darfur. Low-level conflict within the ranks of the SLA appears to be occurring along ethnic lines, as SLA fighters belonging to other ethnic groups attempt to reject the domination of Zaghawa in areas under control of SLA/MM. This appears to be a probable explanation of recent fighting in Gereida and Muhajariya. These incidents have significantly curtailed access for humanitarian actors but have not generated significant civilian casualties or displacements. ¶15. SC/US noted that Arab ethnic groups felt betrayed by the Abuja negotiations and have no reason to attack IDP camps. However, Arab militia violence against villages continues, causing displacement of civilians such as the approximately 10,000 IDPs that gathered in Al Amud Al Akdar on August 29 as the result of Arab militia destruction of approximately 35 villages. This population was then attacked again and fled to a number of locations including Buram town, Seisebana village, and Nyala town camps. Renewed intra-Arab ethnic conflict-including the recent Habaniya/Reizegat conflict and Habaniya/Fullata conflict-could also have a destabilizing effect in South Darfur (REF B). -------------- WFP Food Stocks for Darfur -------------- ¶16. As of September 12, 2006, WFP reported a total of 135,300 metric tons (MT) of assorted commodities for Darfur stored in warehouses in Sudan. The most significant amounts are located in Port Sudan with 52,617 MT, El Obeid has 14,197 MT, Khartoum has 13,091 MT, and Kosti has 11,423 MT. In Darfur, the most significant amounts are located in Nyala with 18,783 MT, El Geneina has 11,562 MT, El Fasher has 8,528 MT, and Mornei has 2,204 MT. WFP stated that this stock would cover an additional 100,000 persons for two to three months. -------------- UNJLC Non-Food Item (NFI) Stocks for Darfur -------------- ¶17. While the amount of NFI stocks for Darfur varies greatly among items, UNJLC stated that up to 100,000 new displacements could be covered with in-country stocks. Additionally, UNJLC expects to receive 102,500 blankets, 47,000 pieces of plastic sheeting, and 68,883 sleeping mats at the end September. -------------- Comments -------------- ¶18. The recent success of GAA in Kutum and Mellit in reaching all targeted beneficiaries with food rations for October illustrates that some improvements in humanitarian deliveries are possible despite the unpredictability of the security situation. USAID will closely monitor to see if this improved access in North Darfur holds. ¶19. UN agencies and NGOs have made substantial progress in their contingency planning in all three states. ¶20. Air assets continue to be critical for assessments and service delivery in West and North Darfur and are becoming increasingly important in South Darfur. ¶21. South Darfur is considered stable relative to the other two states with no likely substantial displacements in the near future. HUME