SUDAN: ENSURING A LEGITIMATE PEACE FOR THE EAST

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002430 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL SU SUBJECT: SUDAN: ENSURING A LEGITIMATE PEACE FOR THE EAST REF: A. STATE 164613 (NOTAL) ¶B. KHARTOUM 2409 Classified By: DCM R. Powers, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) On October 2, Pol/Econ Chief discussed East issues with SPLM Deputy Secretary General for the North and National Assembly Minority Chair Yassir Arman per Ref A. Yassir said that the SPLM had done much to smooth relations between the National Congress Party (NCP) and Eritrea, and had served an important role in initiating negotiations between the eastern Front and the GNU. The NCP, however, decided what to cede to the Eastern Front, whereas the SPLM had little power in the process. Urging stronger SPLM participation in negotiations, Pol/Econ Chief noted the view that the Eastern Front was operating in isolation and left vulnerable to exploitation, with an unjust peace agreement likely to unravel. ¶2. (C) Yassir said that the SPLM believed the talks would not result in an agreement that met the aspirations of the Eastern Front, but would nonetheless provide a political foundation necessary for it to build an alliance with the SPLM. He said that both security arrangements and wealth sharing portions of the talks had concluded, with power sharing remaining to be resolved. The Eastern Front regards regional status for the three Eastern states as essential to an agreement. Pol/Econ Chief pointed out USG concerns over the strengthening of the Popular Defense Forces in the East; Yassir replied that the ceasefire had held and that this was not seen by the SPLM as a major threat to stability. Yassir added that the East deserved substantial assistance from the international community, as it remained one of the poorest areas of the country. ¶3. (C) Embassy Khartoum is requesting additional appointments to engage a broader target audience on this issue, but notes that appointments with NCP officials, difficult to obtain previously, are rendered even more challenging by Ref B's conditions. ¶4. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. HUME