UNSR PRONK BRIEFS HEADS OF MISSION MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002423

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SP REP NATSIOS AND AF A/S FRAZER
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PHUM EAID PGOV AU UN SU
SUBJECT: UNSR PRONK BRIEFS HEADS OF MISSION MEETING

REF: KHARTOUM 02240

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary: On September 28, UN Special Representative
(UNSR) to Sudan Pronk provided the international community an
overview of his recent UN discussions with key partners in
Sudan and his briefings to the Security Council and senior UN
officials in New York. He laid out his vision of how the
international community should proceed on Darfur, stating
that there needed to be more than one track focused on UN
transition and indicating that the Government was becoming
even harder to work with, as UN requests went into a "Bermuda
triangle." Pronk favors an AMIS-Plus or AMIS-Plus-Plus
incentive package to address the need for security in Darfur
in lieu of a UN PKO, and labeled a Chapter VIII PKO a
non-starter. In sidebars, he declined to assist the
international community,s engagement group with further
helicopter support and claimed that Suleiman Jamoush was
under UN control based on the premise that UNSR Pronk
&trusted him.8 End summary.

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Pronk: CPA Implementation Slow, UNMIS Under Pressure
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2. (SBU) UNSR Pronk provided a one hour plus overview of his
recent consultations in New York. Key themes included: 1)
CPA implementation is on track, but slow, with increased
tensions and a widening popular expectation/confidence gap;
2) institutions are not willing to find compromises to CPA
issues; 3) UNMIS was under increased pressure and harassment
from GoS and watched closely for any attempt to shift UNMIS
assets to Darfur; 4) Darfur security will not improve by
long-term sledgehammer diplomacy pressing for a UN PKO
transition; and 5) concrete short-term efforts ("intensive
care") must be made to keep a comatose Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) alive.

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Pronk: UN Transition Important, IC Needs to Look at Goal
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3. (C) UNSR Pronk stated that transition to a UN PKO was
important, but the international community must get off its
current collision course with the Government of Sudan, rely
on old fashioned diplomacy, and focus on important short-term
requirements to provide the DPA with life support. These
efforts include engaging with non-signatories to broaden
support for the DPA, pressing the Government for a truce or
at least a pause in its military campaign, propping up
SLM/A-Minawi to increase his chances of resisting Government
pressure, working towards a better DPA with some type of
supplemental agreement, and reforming the Ceasefire
Commission (CFC) to the point where it functions effectively.
At this point, UNSR Pronk lambasted the EU CFC observer and
Second Vice Chair for not supporting the UN and U.S.
observers, efforts to press the AU and Government CFC
members towards quick and effective responses to reported
ceasefire violations.


4. (C) Comment: After urging the international community to
engage with the DPA non-signatories, the UNSR informed the UK
Charge and Embassy Security Advisor in a sidebar that the UN
would not continue to provide helicopter support to the
international engagement group. Later, Security Advisor
conversations with an SLM leader Abdul Shafi representative
indicated that UNSR Pronk is planning his own engagement trip
on October 5 and that his staff is desperately seeking
commander contact information to arrange the trip. End
comment.

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Pronk Outlines "AMIS-Plus" Options
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5. (C) While UNSR Pronk publicly supported continued efforts
to achieve a UN transition, he spent considerable time
complaining about how the international community was going
about the process, stating that any UN transition would
require 7 to 10 months. He outlined what he called
"AMIS-Plus" and "AMIS-Plus-Plus" options. Pronk confirmed
that the Government had given the UN a political go-ahead for
what could be the first portion of an AMIS-Plus option,
beginning with a provision of 21 million dollars for
personnel and in-kind support to AMIS, but cautioned that the
Government,s capacity to slow-roll implementation was
considerable. He continued implying that his preferred
option was an AMIS-Plus-Plus scenario, which would entail

KHARTOUM 00002423 002 OF 002


considerable support from the UN, other international
organizations, and bilateral efforts (Note: specific
bilateral measures went unspecified. End note.)

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Pronk: Chapter VIII PKO a Non-Starter, Jamoush Supports DPA
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6. (C) After his lengthy briefing, UNSR Pronk opened the
floor for questions. His responses included considerable
elements of revisionist history and selective memory. He
side-stepped questions concerning the consistency of his
approach with the international community,s efforts to
achieve a UN transition. He stated that a fallback option of
a Chapter VIII UN PKO mission was a non-starter. Pronk
rebuffed an effort by the UK ambassador to delve deeper into
ongoing international efforts to reach out to
non-signatories. Concerning reports that the activities of
Suleiman Jamoush in Kadugli were contrary to the
international community,s efforts to broaden support for the
DPA, UNSR Pronk provided a history of Jamoush,s humanitarian
efforts; when pushed for a specific answer, he indicated that
he had been promised by Jamoush that he was working to bring
non-signatories into the DPA and asserted that he trusted
Jamoush.

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Comment
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7. (C) The UNSR requested that the Embassy Security Advisor
remain for a sidebar with the Egyptian Deputy Chief of
Mission (DCM) and himself. The Egyptian DCM indicated that
Cairo was concerned for Jamoush and its own hospital staff in
Kadugli due to several credible death threats against
Jamoush. He claimed to be working with the Government to
move Jamoush out of the country for further medical
treatment. Privately, the DCM stated that there was little
control of Jamoush, who was free to roam the hospital and
portions of the UN compound. UNSR ended the sidebar
indicating that he was looking for any assistance in moving
Jamoush outside of Sudan. End Comment.
HUME