UNSR PRONK BRIEFS HEADS OF MISSION MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002423 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SP REP NATSIOS AND AF A/S FRAZER NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO PHUM EAID PGOV AU UN SU SUBJECT: UNSR PRONK BRIEFS HEADS OF MISSION MEETING REF: KHARTOUM 02240 Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On September 28, UN Special Representative (UNSR) to Sudan Pronk provided the international community an overview of his recent UN discussions with key partners in Sudan and his briefings to the Security Council and senior UN officials in New York. He laid out his vision of how the international community should proceed on Darfur, stating that there needed to be more than one track focused on UN transition and indicating that the Government was becoming even harder to work with, as UN requests went into a "Bermuda triangle." Pronk favors an AMIS-Plus or AMIS-Plus-Plus incentive package to address the need for security in Darfur in lieu of a UN PKO, and labeled a Chapter VIII PKO a non-starter. In sidebars, he declined to assist the international community,s engagement group with further helicopter support and claimed that Suleiman Jamoush was under UN control based on the premise that UNSR Pronk &trusted him.8 End summary. -------------- -------------- Pronk: CPA Implementation Slow, UNMIS Under Pressure -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) UNSR Pronk provided a one hour plus overview of his recent consultations in New York. Key themes included: 1) CPA implementation is on track, but slow, with increased tensions and a widening popular expectation/confidence gap; 2) institutions are not willing to find compromises to CPA issues; 3) UNMIS was under increased pressure and harassment from GoS and watched closely for any attempt to shift UNMIS assets to Darfur; 4) Darfur security will not improve by long-term sledgehammer diplomacy pressing for a UN PKO transition; and 5) concrete short-term efforts ("intensive care") must be made to keep a comatose Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) alive. -------------- -------------- Pronk: UN Transition Important, IC Needs to Look at Goal -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) UNSR Pronk stated that transition to a UN PKO was important, but the international community must get off its current collision course with the Government of Sudan, rely on old fashioned diplomacy, and focus on important short-term requirements to provide the DPA with life support. These efforts include engaging with non-signatories to broaden support for the DPA, pressing the Government for a truce or at least a pause in its military campaign, propping up SLM/A-Minawi to increase his chances of resisting Government pressure, working towards a better DPA with some type of supplemental agreement, and reforming the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to the point where it functions effectively. At this point, UNSR Pronk lambasted the EU CFC observer and Second Vice Chair for not supporting the UN and U.S. observers, efforts to press the AU and Government CFC members towards quick and effective responses to reported ceasefire violations. ¶4. (C) Comment: After urging the international community to engage with the DPA non-signatories, the UNSR informed the UK Charge and Embassy Security Advisor in a sidebar that the UN would not continue to provide helicopter support to the international engagement group. Later, Security Advisor conversations with an SLM leader Abdul Shafi representative indicated that UNSR Pronk is planning his own engagement trip on October 5 and that his staff is desperately seeking commander contact information to arrange the trip. End comment. -------------- Pronk Outlines "AMIS-Plus" Options -------------- ¶5. (C) While UNSR Pronk publicly supported continued efforts to achieve a UN transition, he spent considerable time complaining about how the international community was going about the process, stating that any UN transition would require 7 to 10 months. He outlined what he called "AMIS-Plus" and "AMIS-Plus-Plus" options. Pronk confirmed that the Government had given the UN a political go-ahead for what could be the first portion of an AMIS-Plus option, beginning with a provision of 21 million dollars for personnel and in-kind support to AMIS, but cautioned that the Government,s capacity to slow-roll implementation was considerable. He continued implying that his preferred option was an AMIS-Plus-Plus scenario, which would entail KHARTOUM 00002423 002 OF 002 considerable support from the UN, other international organizations, and bilateral efforts (Note: specific bilateral measures went unspecified. End note.) -------------- -------------- Pronk: Chapter VIII PKO a Non-Starter, Jamoush Supports DPA -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) After his lengthy briefing, UNSR Pronk opened the floor for questions. His responses included considerable elements of revisionist history and selective memory. He side-stepped questions concerning the consistency of his approach with the international community,s efforts to achieve a UN transition. He stated that a fallback option of a Chapter VIII UN PKO mission was a non-starter. Pronk rebuffed an effort by the UK ambassador to delve deeper into ongoing international efforts to reach out to non-signatories. Concerning reports that the activities of Suleiman Jamoush in Kadugli were contrary to the international community,s efforts to broaden support for the DPA, UNSR Pronk provided a history of Jamoush,s humanitarian efforts; when pushed for a specific answer, he indicated that he had been promised by Jamoush that he was working to bring non-signatories into the DPA and asserted that he trusted Jamoush. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The UNSR requested that the Embassy Security Advisor remain for a sidebar with the Egyptian Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) and himself. The Egyptian DCM indicated that Cairo was concerned for Jamoush and its own hospital staff in Kadugli due to several credible death threats against Jamoush. He claimed to be working with the Government to move Jamoush out of the country for further medical treatment. Privately, the DCM stated that there was little control of Jamoush, who was free to roam the hospital and portions of the UN compound. UNSR ended the sidebar indicating that he was looking for any assistance in moving Jamoush outside of Sudan. End Comment. HUME