DARFUR - FIGHTING IN GEREIDA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002420 SIPDIS AIDAC SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NAIROBI FOR SFO NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY USUN FOR TMALY BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MOPS EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU SUBJECT: DARFUR - FIGHTING IN GEREIDA REF: KHARTOUM 02225 KHARTOUM 00002420 001.2 OF 003 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) On September 29, unknown assailants attacked the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Minawi faction based in Gereida, South Darfur. Despite hosting the largest concentration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Darfur, the humanitarian impact of the attack in Gereida appears to be minimal at this time. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the area have not reported significant casualties or displacements. Most NGOs, however, have evacuated Gereida and temporarily suspended humanitarian activities. The ability of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC),which is the Gereida camp coordinator, to operate in Gereida is directly threatened by the evacuation, as many expect that the Sudanese government Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) will not allow the NGO to return. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (U) Gereida is a town of 30,000 to 50,000 people located 105 km south of Nyala, South Darfur, that is currently host to 131,000 IDPs - making Gereida the largest IDP camp in all of Darfur. Gereida is in an area dominated by the non-Arab Massalit ethnic group and is controlled by the Minni Minawi faction of the SLA (SLA/MM), affiliated primarily with the Zaghawa ethnic group. Gereida lies along the Nyala to Buram road, an area the Sudanese Armed Forces have previously pledged to clear of all SLA presence. -------------- Conflict in Gereida -------------- ¶3. (U) UN sources report that an attack by unidentified assailants resulted in heavy fighting in Gereida town from approximately 0630 to 1630 on September 29. The violence was concentrated on the northern side of town near to the wadi, and appears to have targeted the SLA/MM compound. According to USAID partners, the fighting is believed to have involved heavy machine gun and mortar fire. ¶4. (SBU) The identity and motives of the attackers have not yet been confirmed. Initial reports indicated that Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) forces perpetrated the attack; however, this explanation is unlikely given that JEM was not known to have a presence in the area and has no plausible motivation for attacking Gereida. ¶5. (SBU) The most likely scenario is that the recent fighting in Gereida was between Massalit and Zaghawa portions of the SLA controlling the area. The first report of this tension between these groups was on September 1, when the Massalit attacked the Zaghawa motivated by the belief that the Zaghawa were sidelining the Massalit within the movement and not acting in the interests of the local population. Such reports have continued to accumulate since that time. The tensions are reportedly due to frustration among the Massalit that the Zaghawa-dominated SLA is not protecting the people of Gereida effectively from attacks by Arab nomads on the outskirts of town. ¶6. (SBU) According to UN sources, other possible explanations include attacks by Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories, such as National Redemption Front (NRF) or SLA Free Will. Finally, SLA/MM representatives have alleged Sudanese government involvement in, or support for, the attack. -------------- The Humanitarian Impact -------------- ¶7. (U) Solid information about the humanitarian impact of this skirmish is not yet available. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is working with the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) to organize an assessment mission as soon as safety permits. ¶8. (SBU) According to one NGO, no war wounded have been seen in either the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) clinic or KHARTOUM 00002420 002.2 OF 003 the local hospital, and this may suggest an active attempt to conceal the facts of the situation from international actors. While another NGO staff member reported seeing one dead and two injured, USAID has received no reports of large numbers of civilians or combatants injured by the fighting. ¶9. (SBU) No lasting displacements appear to have occurred as a result of the skirmish. Indications are that civilians residing on the north side of Gereida near the scene of conflict temporarily moved closer to the center of town for safety. UN sources also report that Gereida town residents moved into IDP centers in the eastern and southern portions of town to avoid the fighting. It is worth noting that the people of Gereida are primarily Massalit and support the Massalit SLA forces. If this group is in fact responsible for the military offensive against the Zaghawa SLA, it is not expected to create displacement among either the Gereida town or camp population. -------------- Implications for Humanitarian Programs -------------- ¶10. (SBU) On September 29, a combination of UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) helicopters transported 55 NGO and UN staff from Oxfam, American Refugee Council (ARC),ZOA Refugee Care, Merlin, Action Contre la Faim (ACF),NRC, the International Organization for Migration, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and the UN Population Fund. The UN sent an additional flight on September 30 to relocate two remaining Merlin staff members and some employees of the Sudanese government Office of Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES). The UN followed up with a final evacuation flight on October 1 for the remaining WES staff. ¶11. (SBU) The September 29 to October 1 evacuation of Gereida left only two agencies with response capacity on the ground. ICRC has retained its full team in Gereida, and ACF has left a smaller team of approximately nine people. ZOA and Oxfam evacuated Gereida and temporarily suspended activities. Staff members of the three UN agencies were only visiting the area, as the UN does not maintain a presence in Gereida. Program status on each of the three USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance partners is as follows: --ACF-- ¶12. (SBU) ACF conducted only a partial evacuation on September 29, leaving a team of two expatriate and seven national staff. The agency reports the intention to return all staff as soon as local SLA commanders give the agency an assurance of safety. As the UN World Food Program cooperating partner in Gereida, ACF reports having adequate stocks for October rations, but has delayed plans to conduct general food distributions from October 1 - 8. --ARC-- ¶13. (SBU) ARC withdrew seven staff members that were originally from Nyala. While ARC has 32 locally recruited clinic staff still in Gereida, ARC management reports that the ability for the program to continue will depend on the general security situation. ARC will participate in the upcoming OCHA-led humanitarian assessment mission and make a determination to return based on mission findings. --Merlin-- ¶14. (SBU) Merlin withdrew all of the agency's 17 staff members, leaving the program in a state of complete suspension. Security permitting, Merlin is planning to send in an advanced team by road on October 3 to assess the situation and depending upon the team's findings will return a medical team on October 9 via the next regularly scheduled UNHAS helicopter flight. -------------- Gereida Camp Coordination -------------- ¶15. (SBU) In late August, NRC officially assumed camp coordination responsibilities for Gereida. On September 19, however, the HAC announced that the suspension of NRC's camp coordination role in Kalma camp (reftel) also extends to Gereida. Since that time, HAC has prevented the movement of NRC staff and supplies into Gereida, but has not had the authority to force the departure of NRC staff KHARTOUM 00002420 003.2 OF 003 because the area is under the control of the SLA/MM. ¶16. (SBU) Since NRC evacuated Gereida with other NGOs on September 29, the HAC may use this opportunity to prevent NRC from returning to Gereida. Therefore, it is probable that NRC will be unable to continue camp coordination activities in Gereida. USAID field staff will monitor NRC's ability to return, the humanitarian implications of the lack of camp coordination, and the response of the international community. HUME