A/S FRAZER MEETING WITH GOS NISS D/G GHOSH ON 25

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000239 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/FA, AF/SPG, AND AF/RSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR US AU SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER MEETING WITH GOS NISS D/G GHOSH ON 25 JANUARY 2006 REF: 05 KHARTOUM 01941 Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: A/S Frazer met with NISS D/G Saleh Ghosh on January 25 following the AU Summit in Khartoum. This was A/S Frazer,s second meeting with Ghosh, the first was in late November 2005. Ghosh emphasized his and his government,s desire to make the Darfur issue go away, noting that active U.S. engagement was essential to achieving peace in the region. Ghosh offered material on the situation in Eritrea and Chad; Libya,s role in Darfur; and his assessment of how to neutralize the LRA threat. A/S Frazer outlined U.S. expectations for Sudan and offered comment on how Sudan needed to improve its security situation and how it could improve its standing with the world community. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On January 25, 2006, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer, Charge d,Affaires Cameron Hume, and Regional Affairs Counselor met with Government of Sudan (GOS) National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director General Dr. Saleh Ghosh at NISS Headquarters for a one-hour meeting. The meeting was a follow-up to A/S Frazer,s initial meeting with Ghosh in late November 2005 (see reftel). Ghosh: Darfur on My Mind -------------- ¶3. (C) Ghosh opened by emphasizing that the GOS had the most to lose from continuing problems in Darfur. Ghosh believed a solution for Western Sudan was needed sooner rather than later. He said President Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir made these same points in his speech during the Africa Union Summit in Khartoum. Ghosh said the role of the USG was imperative for solving the crisis and he appealed for continued U.S. engagement in the peace talks and added that the U.S. should apply pressure to Sudan,s neighbors (read Chad, Eritrea, and Libya) that have been attempting to perpetuate the problems in Darfur. ¶4. (C) Ghosh offered his understanding that the State Department and the Administration faced pressure from the Congress and the American public to do something about Sudan, and, as a result, that Sudan received a number of signals from the U.S., all of them negative. He said he understood why the State Department had to take the positions it did. Ghosh, who said he had been briefed on A/S Frazer,s other meetings with Sudanese Officials, expressed a need for continued dialogue on the array of issues facing Sudan and stated again that the GOS &wanted the (Darfur) issue off the table.8 Keys to Change: Engagement and Trust -------------- ¶5. (U) A/S Frazer, commenting on the dynamics of the talks in Abuja, said the GOS sat back and then allowed the rebels to demonstrate their clear inability for neither organizing nor putting forth any meaningful proposals for progress. A/S Frazer appealed to the GOS to initiate active engagement on the peace process and to make efforts to try to generate a solution that all parties would find reasonable, workable, and attractive. She explained how her team likewise would do all it could to advance the effort; adding that CDA Hume would take the lead in Khartoum, Special Representative for Sudan Roger Winter in Abuja, and she in Washington. A/S Frazer commented that the key was to work quickly on the matter. ¶6. (C) A/S Secretary again emphasized that efforts by President Bashir both to reach out and attempt to build trust with President Bush would be important, if not imperative, for creating a new way forward. President would have confidence in Bashir if Bashir first sent a letter outlining his intentions AND if he actually followed through on what he said he would do. A/S Frazer emphasized that the U.S. had KHARTOUM 00000239 002 OF 004 both strategic interests in Sudan and a need to ensure that Sudan was a stable nation in which all citizens could live together in peace. The key for gaining momentum with U.S. Policy and with President Bush was to build trust. Two Suggestions for any GOS Proposal on Darfur -------------- - ¶7. (C) A/S Frazer stressed that there were two points that should be included in any GOS proposal for peace in Darfur. First, that the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) not be required to disarm prior to the full implementation of the agreement because the SLM would not agree to such an idea. A/S Frazer explained that SLM Leaders believed they would have to preserve the ability to defend themselves during the period of negotiations, which could last up to two years. ¶8. (C) Second, A/S Frazer said she hoped the GOS would respond positively to the transition of the African Union (AU) Mission in Sudan,s (AMIS) security program in Darfur to the United Nations. A/S Frazer said AMIS was operating at, or possibly beyond, its maximum capacity and that the deteriorating security situation in Darfur was a result of this. Most believed, she said, the GOS would react negatively to a proposed UN deployment even though such a transition would be a natural progression for achieving lasting peace in the region. She added that the GOS would succeed if it could, for once, get ahead of the likely international political backlash that will come if the GOS did not support the deployment. The GOS could show true leadership and demonstrate to the world community that it wanted, and was ready for, peace in Darfur by supporting the UN deployment plan. A/S Frazer suggested that if President Bashir were to write a letter to President Bush as she suggested, Bashir should consider stating his full support for the UN deployment. State Sponsors of Terrorism List -------------- ¶9. (S) While nothing was certain, A/S Frazer said, there were feelings/intimations in Washington that the U.S. may fully normalize relations with Libya. She then commented that if Libya could do what was needed to normalize its relations with the U.S., then by all means, Sudan should desire and be able to do the same. This was particularly true since the U.S. and Sudan had a more substantive relationship with more interests than the U.S. and Libya. The onus for change, however, was with President Bashir, not the U.S., just in the same way that the onus for changing course was with Libyan President Khadafi. Khadafi, unlike Bashir to date, however made the conscious decision and took action to change the dynamic between the two countries. ¶10. (S) While discussing Khadafi, Ghosh added that Libya also played an active role in Darfur, but that he did not believe that Libya provided weapons to the Darfurian rebel groups, only logistical support. Khadafi wanted to build and maintain an image of peacemaker/statesman by keeping an influential hand on the rebel groups, thereby appearing to be guiding the rebels toward a peaceful solution. While Khadafi has not provided weapons to the rebels, the GOS was aware that Libya provided automobiles/SUVs, food, petroleum, and other logistical support to them. Ghosh believed that supporting the rebel movements in any capacity was detrimental to lasting security in the region. Ghosh: Changing Goal Posts? Frazer: Different Arenas -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Ghosh commented that the U.S. appeared to change the goal posts each time the GOS reached an objective set by the U.S./Int,l Community. This was the case when the GOS believed it was on course for normalized relations with U.S. upon the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the appointment of John Garang as First Vice President. Neither action improved relations as much as GOS was led to KHARTOUM 00000239 003 OF 004 believe they would. A/S Frazer acknowledged that the GOS had made advances on issues concerning Southern Sudan, but at the time these negotiated efforts were underway, no one expected, or could have expected, that the flashpoint problems in Darfur would complicate further Sudan,s progress. It was for this reason, A/S Frazer added, that the GOS should not allow an escalation of Beja problems to set back progress if we ever reached a peace agreement on Darfur. No Desire to Follow Somalia Model for Progress -------------- - ¶12. (C) Ghosh said the U.S. and the Int,l Community continued to apply pressures on Sudan and that internal stability continued to suffer, in large part, due to these external pressures. The security failings continued even though the interested parties were attempting to develop lasting solutions for the problems. He acknowledged that much was being lost by the GOS by the failure to achieve a lasting solution. He said that Sudan faced the risk of becoming fractionalized and factionalized much like Somalia. That is, he added, that Sudan could face an eventual collapse like Somalia if too much pressure were applied with no means for Sudan to address the internal security issues that it faced )- he pointed to Darfur as an example. Ghosh said the U.S. could soon find itself in the position of losing both the CPA and the whole of Sudan if internal security continued to degrade. A/S Frazer agreed that many issues appeared to be getting worse not better, and then used the issue to re-emphasize that Sudan needed to find a solution sooner rather than later. Eritrea, Chad, and the LRA -------------- ¶13. (C) Ghosh said Sudan was trying to normalize relations with Eritrea and added that he accompanied Second Vice President Taha for a meeting with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki to discuss the problems that existed between the two neiehbors. Ghosh sa)d er)trei was0an astivgpmAs%r r"$iFqrQQi.t pa4.bwrh0EewZo@QiQ^zw2s$`zd!ikQxnmroxJecjQ`u2 Qthm%1AafB1Q2Q. (C) Ghosh said Chadian President Deby was under intense internal pressure as the population was not happy with him or his stewardship of the country. Deby had lost support of his own tribe, the Zaghawa, and of most Chadian citizens, and, as such, Deby had all but lost his country. Ghosh denied Deby,s allegations that Sudan played an active role in the recent rebel attacks/attempted coup d,etat in Eastern Chad. He noted that the GOS attempted several times to advance reconciliation efforts by arranging meetings in Chad between Deby and disaffected Chadians, only to find out that Deby would soon have the opposition figures killed. ¶15. (S) Following-up on a topic discussed at their first meeting, Ghosh said LRA leader Joseph Kony needed to be removed from the region and that it would be impossible to capture him. Ghosh believed that the only way to neutralize the LRA threat was for the SPLA, Ugandan, and GOS forces to unite and to take the fight to the LRA. A negotiated and individualized approach would yield nothing. To this end, the GOS had been cooperating with the GOU, but noted that their efforts, to date, had not yet advanced significantly. A/S Frazer reiterated the U.S., interest in neutralizing Kony and the LRA, and asked what support Ghosh/GOS needed from the U.S. to achieve success. Ghosh did not state a specific need, but instead added that the LRA required logistical support in Sudan (i.e., to transnavigate the river) and that the LRA continued to exploit the local population in northern Uganda to survive. RAO will raise the needs question separately. KHARTOUM 00000239 004 OF 004 Comment -------------- ¶16. (C) With his second meeting with A/S Frazer, Ghosh has demonstrated his willingness to be, at least, a cordial interlocutor. Although Ghosh does not hold a ministerial position, he maintains a close relationship with most senior government officials, President Bashir in particular. It remains to be seen how much movement Ghosh can generate on the political issues the Assistant Secretary outlined during the meetings, but Embassy will continue to meet with him periodically to reiterate the points. ¶17. (U) A/S Frazer has cleared this message HUME