DARFUR: MINAWI MILITARY DELEGATION TO MEET G-19

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002312 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2026 TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO SU AU SUBJECT: DARFUR: MINAWI MILITARY DELEGATION TO MEET G-19 COMMANDERS Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request - see para. 10. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: Associates of Senior Assistant to the President and Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) leader Minni Minawi believe they are close to an agreement with G-19/ National Redemption Front (NRF) commanders. However, this conclusion may be overly optimistic. They also believe the recent lull in fighting will not last long, but may portend increased use of Popular Defense Forces (PDF) to carry out the Government,s offensive. The international community,s lack of focus on implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is a growing concern of the SLM/A Minawi organization. End Summary. -------------- Minawi Continues Outreach to Non-Signatories -------------- ¶3. (C) SLM Minawi Senior Military Advisor Ramadan Jaber briefed Embassy Senior Security Advisor on his plans for the SLM's second delegation to complete negotiations with key G-19/National Redemption Front commanders. (Note: Ramadan is a founding member of the SLM and knows most of the commanders from his previous responsibilities of coordinating SLM/A military activities. He is leading Minawi,s effort currently to engage with former SLM/A colleagues/commanders. End note.) The delegation will consist of six members from Khartoum who will combine with six field commanders in Darfur and proceed to Birmaza and Umm Mahriya on Sept 20. They plan to meet with Adam Bekheit, Abdallah Yahia, Saddiq Burra, Jar al Nabi, and Osman Bushara. With minor exceptions, all SLM/A and DPA positions will be up for negotiation. Ramadan expects the negotiations to last for about three days, but was cautiously optimistic about a successful mission. ¶4. (C) Ramadan also indicated that Minawi was talking to SLM/A-Wahid commanders General Geruda and General Terada in Jebel Marra, and confirmed that Abdul Shafi would like to return to Jebel Marra to meet with key SLM/A Wahid commanders in the next several weeks. Minawi has promised Abdul Shafi complete safety/security for the meeting. He asked if the USG would assist Abdul Shafi,s return. The Security Advisor indicated there was sufficient support in the international community to assist Abdul Shafi if he could leave Asmara. However, whichever country chooses to assist will need to know specifics for the venue and timing. The USG would help find support from an appropriate source when we had more details. (Comment: Both the UK and EU are skeptical of Abdul Shafi,s intent. The UK has offered to arrange &official meetings8 with their High Commissioner in Nairobi to facilitate visas and pay for Abdul Shafi,s trip to pre-position him for further travel, but he wanted a meeting in London, more likely to raise his profile and stature than for serious discussion. End Comment.) -------------- -------------- Numerous Reasons for Sudden Cessation of Gov't Offensive -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Ramadan surmised that there could be several reasons for the sudden cessation of the Government,s offensive late last week (circa Sept. 14-16). He was aware that Minawi had pressed both Vice President Taha and the Minister of Defense to pause the offensive while he was negotiating with the non-signatories, but was dubious about Minawi,s success. He concurred that President Bashir may have wanted to reduce fighting prior to his attendance at the UN General Assembly. However, Ramadan believed that the main issues were the need to resupply Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the increased discontent within the ranks of the newly arrived reinforcements. ¶6. (C) He indicated that his staff estimated the SAF has brought in seven or eight battalion task forces of about 7,500 soldiers since July. Most of these forces had been transferred from Southern Sudan over the last year. The battalions were populated heavily with soldiers from Darfur, Blue Nile, and Nuba Mountains. The Darfurians and some of the other southern soldiers were not enthused about fighting their brothers, and were dissatisfied that they were carrying the brunt of the fight against the NRF. He confirmed that there was significant discontent in the ranks of these newly arrived units and that several internal incidents had resulted in physical violence between SAF soldiers and officers over the past few days. He also confirmed that they had heard of disenchantment within the Ministry of Defense concerning the way the Government offensive was being KHARTOUM 00002312 002 OF 002 executed. However, he noted that the SAF had trained over 6,000 PDF forces, mostly in Kordofan, over the last year, and was concerned that the Government might be forced to use the less disciplined PDF in the continuation of the offensive, which he predicted would be relatively soon. -------------- -------------- International Partner Activity Key to DPA Survival -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) According to Ramadan, the perception in Minawi,s camp is that the international community was willing to put more effort into engaging DPA non-signatories than bolstering the chance of the DPA signatories to succeed. He saw little to no condemnation of NRF actions or continued Janjaweed attacks in the south. There was continued talk of supporting a non-signatory conference while they are still benefiting through violence, but there was no offer of support to the main signatory. Ramadan acknowledged that it was essential for the non-signatories to join the DPA and international engagement was an important aspect of encouraging them to join, but insisted that the SLM/A needed some visible signs and tangible evidence of DPA support for their members in the very near future. ¶8. (U) He continued, asking why the international community was not following up on its pledges made in Abuja. He acknowledged that without improved security, DPA implementation was difficult, but noted that there were large areas of Darfur that were neither restricted nor no-go areas. He also admitted that the SLM/A should be more proactive in pressing the Government to establish basic services in areas that had been secured from the NRF, but complained that the international community should also be testing the Government,s DPA intentions by pressing it for proof that its stability offensive was meant to jump start DPA implementation. ¶9. (C) Ramadan was particularly interested in support to the Darfur Security Assessment and Implementation Commission (DSAIC),which he was nominated to chair. Ramadan stated that he would like representatives from the United States, South Africa, the European Union, and the African Union to form the Security Advisory Team (SAT) that will support the DSAIC. He is looking for officers that had Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) experience in post-conflict situations. He admitted that they had not approached anyone to date, but stated that they would start reaching out soon, asking if the U.S. would provide an officer. Embassy Senior Security Advisor informed him that his query would be passed to Washington. Apparently Ramadan is starting to reach out now because the Government had recommended Egypt fill the SAT director position and that Libya fill another advisor position. ¶10. (C) Action request: Embassy requests consideration by the Department for the provision of a senior U.S. military officer to serve on the SAT based on a long-term rotation schedule (one year minimum tour). While the Government may not agree to a U.S. military advisor for the SAT, any offer of a military advisor would provide tangible evidence of our support for the DPA and may encourage others from the international community to come forward. HUME