DARFUR: MINAWI MILITARY DELEGATION TO MEET G-19

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002312

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: MINAWI MILITARY DELEGATION TO MEET G-19
COMMANDERS


Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is an action request - see para. 10.


2. (SBU) Summary: Associates of Senior Assistant to the
President and Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)
leader Minni Minawi believe they are close to an agreement
with G-19/ National Redemption Front (NRF) commanders.
However, this conclusion may be overly optimistic. They also
believe the recent lull in fighting will not last long, but
may portend increased use of Popular Defense Forces (PDF) to
carry out the Government,s offensive. The international
community,s lack of focus on implementation of the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA) is a growing concern of the SLM/A
Minawi organization. End Summary.

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Minawi Continues Outreach to Non-Signatories
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3. (C) SLM Minawi Senior Military Advisor Ramadan Jaber
briefed Embassy Senior Security Advisor on his plans for the
SLM's second delegation to complete negotiations with key
G-19/National Redemption Front commanders. (Note: Ramadan
is a founding member of the SLM and knows most of the
commanders from his previous responsibilities of coordinating
SLM/A military activities. He is leading Minawi,s effort
currently to engage with former SLM/A colleagues/commanders.
End note.) The delegation will consist of six members from
Khartoum who will combine with six field commanders in Darfur
and proceed to Birmaza and Umm Mahriya on Sept 20. They plan
to meet with Adam Bekheit, Abdallah Yahia, Saddiq Burra, Jar
al Nabi, and Osman Bushara. With minor exceptions, all SLM/A
and DPA positions will be up for negotiation. Ramadan
expects the negotiations to last for about three days, but
was cautiously optimistic about a successful mission.


4. (C) Ramadan also indicated that Minawi was talking to
SLM/A-Wahid commanders General Geruda and General Terada in
Jebel Marra, and confirmed that Abdul Shafi would like to
return to Jebel Marra to meet with key SLM/A Wahid commanders
in the next several weeks. Minawi has promised Abdul Shafi
complete safety/security for the meeting. He asked if the
USG would assist Abdul Shafi,s return. The Security Advisor
indicated there was sufficient support in the international
community to assist Abdul Shafi if he could leave Asmara.
However, whichever country chooses to assist will need to
know specifics for the venue and timing. The USG would help
find support from an appropriate source when we had more
details. (Comment: Both the UK and EU are skeptical of
Abdul Shafi,s intent. The UK has offered to arrange
&official meetings8 with their High Commissioner in Nairobi
to facilitate visas and pay for Abdul Shafi,s trip to
pre-position him for further travel, but he wanted a meeting
in London, more likely to raise his profile and stature than
for serious discussion. End Comment.)

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Numerous Reasons for Sudden Cessation of Gov't Offensive
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5. (C) Ramadan surmised that there could be several reasons
for the sudden cessation of the Government,s offensive late
last week (circa Sept. 14-16). He was aware that Minawi had
pressed both Vice President Taha and the Minister of Defense
to pause the offensive while he was negotiating with the
non-signatories, but was dubious about Minawi,s success. He
concurred that President Bashir may have wanted to reduce
fighting prior to his attendance at the UN General Assembly.
However, Ramadan believed that the main issues were the need
to resupply Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the increased
discontent within the ranks of the newly arrived
reinforcements.


6. (C) He indicated that his staff estimated the SAF has
brought in seven or eight battalion task forces of about
7,500 soldiers since July. Most of these forces had been
transferred from Southern Sudan over the last year. The
battalions were populated heavily with soldiers from Darfur,
Blue Nile, and Nuba Mountains. The Darfurians and some of
the other southern soldiers were not enthused about fighting
their brothers, and were dissatisfied that they were carrying
the brunt of the fight against the NRF. He confirmed that
there was significant discontent in the ranks of these newly
arrived units and that several internal incidents had
resulted in physical violence between SAF soldiers and
officers over the past few days. He also confirmed that they
had heard of disenchantment within the Ministry of Defense
concerning the way the Government offensive was being

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executed. However, he noted that the SAF had trained over
6,000 PDF forces, mostly in Kordofan, over the last year, and
was concerned that the Government might be forced to use the
less disciplined PDF in the continuation of the offensive,
which he predicted would be relatively soon.

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International Partner Activity Key to DPA Survival
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7. (SBU) According to Ramadan, the perception in Minawi,s
camp is that the international community was willing to put
more effort into engaging DPA non-signatories than bolstering
the chance of the DPA signatories to succeed. He saw little
to no condemnation of NRF actions or continued Janjaweed
attacks in the south. There was continued talk of supporting
a non-signatory conference while they are still benefiting
through violence, but there was no offer of support to the
main signatory. Ramadan acknowledged that it was essential
for the non-signatories to join the DPA and international
engagement was an important aspect of encouraging them to
join, but insisted that the SLM/A needed some visible signs
and tangible evidence of DPA support for their members in the
very near future.


8. (U) He continued, asking why the international community
was not following up on its pledges made in Abuja. He
acknowledged that without improved security, DPA
implementation was difficult, but noted that there were large
areas of Darfur that were neither restricted nor no-go areas.
He also admitted that the SLM/A should be more proactive in
pressing the Government to establish basic services in areas
that had been secured from the NRF, but complained that the
international community should also be testing the
Government,s DPA intentions by pressing it for proof that
its stability offensive was meant to jump start DPA
implementation.


9. (C) Ramadan was particularly interested in support to the
Darfur Security Assessment and Implementation Commission
(DSAIC),which he was nominated to chair. Ramadan stated
that he would like representatives from the United States,
South Africa, the European Union, and the African Union to
form the Security Advisory Team (SAT) that will support the
DSAIC. He is looking for officers that had Security Sector
Reform and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
(DDR) experience in post-conflict situations. He admitted
that they had not approached anyone to date, but stated that
they would start reaching out soon, asking if the U.S. would
provide an officer. Embassy Senior Security Advisor informed
him that his query would be passed to Washington. Apparently
Ramadan is starting to reach out now because the Government
had recommended Egypt fill the SAT director position and that
Libya fill another advisor position.


10. (C) Action request: Embassy requests consideration by
the Department for the provision of a senior U.S. military
officer to serve on the SAT based on a long-term rotation
schedule (one year minimum tour). While the Government may
not agree to a U.S. military advisor for the SAT, any offer
of a military advisor would provide tangible evidence of our
support for the DPA and may encourage others from the
international community to come forward.
HUME