DARFUR: REALIGNMENTS AND FRAGMENTATION OF DPA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002264

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY - CORRECTING CLASSIFICATION
FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO SECRET

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PINR AU US UN SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: REALIGNMENTS AND FRAGMENTATION OF DPA
NON-SIGNATORY FORCES


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Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: An effective and successful organizational
conference for Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories
in the near-term appears unlikely. Fur commanders have
splintered into three or four groups with a new breakaway
faction splitting from Ahmed Abdul Shafi. Abdel Wahid
appears to be consolidating control over his remaining
commanders in west Jebel Marra. General Terada, second in
command of the SLM/A Wahid faction, is rumored to have joined
the National Redemption Front (NRF). The NRF has begun to
fragment, but has sufficient forces available to conduct
counterattacks against Government forces. Minawi,s
engagement has reportedly gained positive results with a few
of Abdul Shafi,s commanders, and talks with G-19 commanders
are positive, but inconclusive. As the security environment
permits, more engagement is necessary to clarify the dynamics
between non-signatory commanders. End summary.


2. (C) Embassy Senior Security Advisor Tod Wilson visited
SLM/A-Wahid commanders in Jebel Marra and SLM/A Wahid leaders
and Minawi commanders in South Darfur from early to
mid-September with UK, UN, and EU counterparts. Security
conditions, however, precluded travel to meet NRF and Abdul
Shafi commanders.

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Non-Signatory Dynamics Fluid and Complex
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3. (C) G-19 and other former SLM/A-Minawi commanders that
joined the NRF in June 2006 are having second thoughts. With
the withdrawal of most Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
forces to the Chadian border, these commanders have been left
to face the Government offensive with little additional
Chadian support and an insistence by the JEM to be the only
political voice of the NRF. Rumors are rampant, but there
are common currents that indicate NRF commander Osman Bushara
has apparently joined forces with deputy SLM/A Wahid senior
commander Terada in eastern Jebel Marra. Hussein Bejo,
brother to Jar al Nabi, has reportedly joined Minni,s forces
with several lesser commanders. Minawi confirmed that a JEM
commander was in Jebel Marra with this group, but
reconsidered and left before the current fighting started.
Adam Bekheit, Sadiq Burra, and Abdul Yahia met with a
delegation from Minni and agreed to follow up discussions
scheduled over the next several days with a Minawi military
delegation to discuss an "SLM/A United Military Wing." Jar
al Nabi is conducting "phone negotiations" with Minawi, but
did not meet Minni,s recent delegation to the NRF.


4. (S) Meanwhile, Adam Bakheit obtained eight trucks of
weapons and munitions from Chad from profits obtained in the
sale of captured AMIS fuel. Reinforced with these arms, he
attacked Umm Sidr and captured additional vehicles,
munitions, food, and medical supplies. Rumors indicate that
he has offered non-military logistics captured from Umm Sidr
to SLM/A Minawi forces in the area, which could point to a
possible merger of NRF forces with Minni,s or an attempt to
lure Minawi forces away and into the NRF.


5. (C) Abu Basit, Abu Ghasim Imam, Mohammad Yousif Abdallah,
and Dr. Sanoussi along with several other Abdul Shafi
commanders have formed a new breakaway faction set to sign
the DPA. Reports indicate that after three months of
negotiations, the group has achieved a promise from the
Government to increase the compensation fund by $100 million
and a promise to disarm all Janjaweed in the three Darfur
states. Abdul Shafi has distanced himself publicly from this
group, but there are claims by other Fur commanders that he
backed the negotiations and only withdrew when the proposed
signing of the DPA became an open secret among the SLM/A
Wahid commanders. General Gureda, Senior Commander of SLM/A
Wahid, accused this group of leading Government forces and
Janjaweed against General Terada in east Jebal Marra, whom he
still considers loyal to himself and SLM/A Wahid.

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Concepts for a Leadership Conference Proliferate
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6. (C) Western Jebel Marra commanders stood firmly behind
Abdel Wahid in their discussion with the engagement group.
Wahid commanders and many civilian supporters continue a
hardlined, non-productive, stance on moving towards signing
of the DPA. In Dady, senior SLM/A-W northern commander
Yousef Abdul Karim, his deputy Murah Abdul Karim, and Dr.
Mutiwakel Adam Abu Elgasim all professed solid support for
Abdel Wahid. They supported the idea of a conference and

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welcomed all other commanders to the conference if Abdel
Wahid called and led the process. In Buri Marra, General
Gudera stated he would only attend a conference arranged by
Wahid, and would refuse to sit with Abdul Shafi and his
commanders at any conference, denouncing them as worse than
the Janjaweed. General Rokoro maintained a more neutral
stance in the discussions, but declined to translate several
broadly voiced remarks of dissent from the assembled field
commanders. Several of these commanders vocally differed,
and appeared to be more open to a broader conference, but
were summarily cut short by General Gudera.


7. (C) Fur leaders in Nyala, including Mohammad Yousef
Abdullah, Abdel Rahman Hussein, Mohamad Ahmed Abdul Abacker,
and Issa Mustafa, were less hardline. However, their concept
for a conference involved 12 categories of civil and
political leaders. They opined that the military commanders
should also have a separate conference. The Nyala leaders
agreed that it was not wise to re-open the DPA, but then
outlined their &supplemental8 demands for a Darfur region,
a vice presidential position in the national government, 70
percent of the legislative assembly seats for the three
Darfur states, improved mechanisms to completely disarm the
Janjaweed, international "power" to implement the DPA, and a
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process
controlled by a neutral body and not a rubber stamp of the
DPA. After considerable discussion, there appeared to be a
better understanding of what a DPA supplemental agreement
could entail, and how they could better craft issues that
could improve the DPA without re-opening specific points of
contention.

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Comment: Fur Understanding of DPA Lacking, More Work Needed
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8. (C) Discussions over the last several months with the Fur
leadership indicate that they do not have a good grasp of
what the DPA already provides, nor do they have the political
sophistication to craft their requirements into different
arguments than those provided by Abdel Wahid. There is a
great need for continued engagement in small group
discussions and practical workshops to help develop their
political acumen. End Comment.

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Minawi: Upbeat Despite Reports of Zaghawa Divisions
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9. (C) Minni Minawi appeared upbeat and positive in
discussions with Embassy Security Advisor. He claims that
his recent delegations to Abdul Shafi and NRF commanders were
making positive progress. However, several of Minawi,s
inner circle continue to argue that Minni has already lost
and will continue to lose the support of field commanders if
he cannot garner more non-military logistic support for them.
Adam Bekheit,s reported offer of supplies to some of
Minawi,s commanders is a potential two- edged sword. Recent
inter-factional fighting in Gereida reportedly was a result
of tensions arising from lack of sufficient resource for
SLM/A-M forces in the area. Two key South Darfur commanders,
Adam Salih, a Birgit, and Ahmed Kubir, a Rezeigat, have
clashed with Zaghawa commanders in the Muhajariya region.


10. (S) Minawi has also confirmed that he has a follow up
meeting with Vice President Taha and Minister of Defense
Hussein to discuss the military situation in Darfur and the
potential for a pause of the Government offensive to give
Minni time to convince the NRF commanders to join him and the
DPA.

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Comment
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11. (C) Both the UK and EU representatives were negative
about the potential for a near-term leadership conference.
The EU still believes that an SPLM-sponsored conference to
gain broader support for the DPA might be successful in the
future; however, it is doubtful that such a conference could
succeed without a prior SLM/A Wahid leadership conference.
With the apparent splintering of this faction, an effective
leadership conference will take considerable preparation and
engagement with numerous leaders and commanders to assure
success. Embassy Security Advisor will attempt to arrange
additional meetings for the UK, EU, and U.S. group through
UNMIS with Abdul Shafi and NRF commanders over the next week
or two. Travel to these commanders will nonetheless depend
on an improved security environment in their areas of

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control. End comment.
HUME