DARFUR: REALIGNMENTS AND FRAGMENTATION OF DPA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002264 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY - CORRECTING CLASSIFICATION FROM CONFIDENTIAL TO SECRET SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PINR AU US UN SU SUBJECT: DARFUR: REALIGNMENTS AND FRAGMENTATION OF DPA NON-SIGNATORY FORCES KHARTOUM 00002264 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: An effective and successful organizational conference for Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories in the near-term appears unlikely. Fur commanders have splintered into three or four groups with a new breakaway faction splitting from Ahmed Abdul Shafi. Abdel Wahid appears to be consolidating control over his remaining commanders in west Jebel Marra. General Terada, second in command of the SLM/A Wahid faction, is rumored to have joined the National Redemption Front (NRF). The NRF has begun to fragment, but has sufficient forces available to conduct counterattacks against Government forces. Minawi,s engagement has reportedly gained positive results with a few of Abdul Shafi,s commanders, and talks with G-19 commanders are positive, but inconclusive. As the security environment permits, more engagement is necessary to clarify the dynamics between non-signatory commanders. End summary. ¶2. (C) Embassy Senior Security Advisor Tod Wilson visited SLM/A-Wahid commanders in Jebel Marra and SLM/A Wahid leaders and Minawi commanders in South Darfur from early to mid-September with UK, UN, and EU counterparts. Security conditions, however, precluded travel to meet NRF and Abdul Shafi commanders. -------------- Non-Signatory Dynamics Fluid and Complex -------------- ¶3. (C) G-19 and other former SLM/A-Minawi commanders that joined the NRF in June 2006 are having second thoughts. With the withdrawal of most Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) forces to the Chadian border, these commanders have been left to face the Government offensive with little additional Chadian support and an insistence by the JEM to be the only political voice of the NRF. Rumors are rampant, but there are common currents that indicate NRF commander Osman Bushara has apparently joined forces with deputy SLM/A Wahid senior commander Terada in eastern Jebel Marra. Hussein Bejo, brother to Jar al Nabi, has reportedly joined Minni,s forces with several lesser commanders. Minawi confirmed that a JEM commander was in Jebel Marra with this group, but reconsidered and left before the current fighting started. Adam Bekheit, Sadiq Burra, and Abdul Yahia met with a delegation from Minni and agreed to follow up discussions scheduled over the next several days with a Minawi military delegation to discuss an "SLM/A United Military Wing." Jar al Nabi is conducting "phone negotiations" with Minawi, but did not meet Minni,s recent delegation to the NRF. ¶4. (S) Meanwhile, Adam Bakheit obtained eight trucks of weapons and munitions from Chad from profits obtained in the sale of captured AMIS fuel. Reinforced with these arms, he attacked Umm Sidr and captured additional vehicles, munitions, food, and medical supplies. Rumors indicate that he has offered non-military logistics captured from Umm Sidr to SLM/A Minawi forces in the area, which could point to a possible merger of NRF forces with Minni,s or an attempt to lure Minawi forces away and into the NRF. ¶5. (C) Abu Basit, Abu Ghasim Imam, Mohammad Yousif Abdallah, and Dr. Sanoussi along with several other Abdul Shafi commanders have formed a new breakaway faction set to sign the DPA. Reports indicate that after three months of negotiations, the group has achieved a promise from the Government to increase the compensation fund by $100 million and a promise to disarm all Janjaweed in the three Darfur states. Abdul Shafi has distanced himself publicly from this group, but there are claims by other Fur commanders that he backed the negotiations and only withdrew when the proposed signing of the DPA became an open secret among the SLM/A Wahid commanders. General Gureda, Senior Commander of SLM/A Wahid, accused this group of leading Government forces and Janjaweed against General Terada in east Jebal Marra, whom he still considers loyal to himself and SLM/A Wahid. -------------- --- Concepts for a Leadership Conference Proliferate -------------- --- ¶6. (C) Western Jebel Marra commanders stood firmly behind Abdel Wahid in their discussion with the engagement group. Wahid commanders and many civilian supporters continue a hardlined, non-productive, stance on moving towards signing of the DPA. In Dady, senior SLM/A-W northern commander Yousef Abdul Karim, his deputy Murah Abdul Karim, and Dr. Mutiwakel Adam Abu Elgasim all professed solid support for Abdel Wahid. They supported the idea of a conference and KHARTOUM 00002264 002.2 OF 003 welcomed all other commanders to the conference if Abdel Wahid called and led the process. In Buri Marra, General Gudera stated he would only attend a conference arranged by Wahid, and would refuse to sit with Abdul Shafi and his commanders at any conference, denouncing them as worse than the Janjaweed. General Rokoro maintained a more neutral stance in the discussions, but declined to translate several broadly voiced remarks of dissent from the assembled field commanders. Several of these commanders vocally differed, and appeared to be more open to a broader conference, but were summarily cut short by General Gudera. ¶7. (C) Fur leaders in Nyala, including Mohammad Yousef Abdullah, Abdel Rahman Hussein, Mohamad Ahmed Abdul Abacker, and Issa Mustafa, were less hardline. However, their concept for a conference involved 12 categories of civil and political leaders. They opined that the military commanders should also have a separate conference. The Nyala leaders agreed that it was not wise to re-open the DPA, but then outlined their &supplemental8 demands for a Darfur region, a vice presidential position in the national government, 70 percent of the legislative assembly seats for the three Darfur states, improved mechanisms to completely disarm the Janjaweed, international "power" to implement the DPA, and a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process controlled by a neutral body and not a rubber stamp of the DPA. After considerable discussion, there appeared to be a better understanding of what a DPA supplemental agreement could entail, and how they could better craft issues that could improve the DPA without re-opening specific points of contention. -------------- -------------- Comment: Fur Understanding of DPA Lacking, More Work Needed -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Discussions over the last several months with the Fur leadership indicate that they do not have a good grasp of what the DPA already provides, nor do they have the political sophistication to craft their requirements into different arguments than those provided by Abdel Wahid. There is a great need for continued engagement in small group discussions and practical workshops to help develop their political acumen. End Comment. -------------- -------------- Minawi: Upbeat Despite Reports of Zaghawa Divisions -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Minni Minawi appeared upbeat and positive in discussions with Embassy Security Advisor. He claims that his recent delegations to Abdul Shafi and NRF commanders were making positive progress. However, several of Minawi,s inner circle continue to argue that Minni has already lost and will continue to lose the support of field commanders if he cannot garner more non-military logistic support for them. Adam Bekheit,s reported offer of supplies to some of Minawi,s commanders is a potential two- edged sword. Recent inter-factional fighting in Gereida reportedly was a result of tensions arising from lack of sufficient resource for SLM/A-M forces in the area. Two key South Darfur commanders, Adam Salih, a Birgit, and Ahmed Kubir, a Rezeigat, have clashed with Zaghawa commanders in the Muhajariya region. ¶10. (S) Minawi has also confirmed that he has a follow up meeting with Vice President Taha and Minister of Defense Hussein to discuss the military situation in Darfur and the potential for a pause of the Government offensive to give Minni time to convince the NRF commanders to join him and the DPA. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Both the UK and EU representatives were negative about the potential for a near-term leadership conference. The EU still believes that an SPLM-sponsored conference to gain broader support for the DPA might be successful in the future; however, it is doubtful that such a conference could succeed without a prior SLM/A Wahid leadership conference. With the apparent splintering of this faction, an effective leadership conference will take considerable preparation and engagement with numerous leaders and commanders to assure success. Embassy Security Advisor will attempt to arrange additional meetings for the UK, EU, and U.S. group through UNMIS with Abdul Shafi and NRF commanders over the next week or two. Travel to these commanders will nonetheless depend on an improved security environment in their areas of KHARTOUM 00002264 003.2 OF 003 control. End comment. HUME