JANJAWEED ATTACKS IN BURAM SOUTH DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002229

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, S/CRS, AND INIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV KPKO SU
SUBJECT: JANJAWEED ATTACKS IN BURAM SOUTH DARFUR


Classified By: P/E CHIEF E. WHITAKER, REASON SECTION 1.4 (b) AND (b)


1. (C) Summary: SLM/A Minawi officials continue to actively
draw international partner,s attention to what they describe
as the first significant Janjaweed attack since the signing
of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Regardless of their efforts,
no official investigation has yet occurred. Reports
indicated attacks on up to 47 villages and a potential for
10,000 to 25,000 displaced in the southern areas of South
Darfur. Lack of support from AMIS, UNMIS, or UNOCHA and
international attention on the Government offensive in the
north spurred Minawi to seek the aid of Vice President Taha.
End Summary.


2. (C) Initial reports of a significant Janjaweed attack
were passed to the Embassy in early September. Reports
indicated that 12 villages were attacked by Fallata
(non-Arab) Janjaweed forces in the vicinity of Buram in the
far south of Darfur. The population is mostly Zaghawa, mixed
with a few Bergit and Massilit villages. Initial claims by
Minawi officials included 20 deaths, more than 50 wounded,
and up to 8,000 displaced persons. Sporadic attacks
continued through the first week of September. On Sept. 10,
SLM/A Minawi militia gathered wounded women and children for
an expected evacuation by AMIS. The evacuation did not
materialize, and Janjaweed forces attacked the assembled
civilians as well as additional villages. Minawi officials
claim that up to 47 villages have been attacked, and some
burned. UNOCHA estimates between 10,000 and 25,000
displaced, but have not confirmed any information to date.


3. (C) In meetings with UNOCHA South Darfur Regional
Director, Wael Ibrahim (strictly protect),he bitterly
complained that he could not get UNMIS to provide OCHA with a
helicopter, indicating that scheduled UNMIS flights took
priority over OCHA emergencies. He stated that the area was
restricted for ground movement and OCHA had a standing
request for a helicopter for the past week to assist in a
potential humanitarian disaster. A small amount of
Government assistance was provided to areas under their
control, but no humanitarian assistance has been provided to
the victims in the SLM/A-M areas of control for over two
weeks. Embassy Khartoum instructed our US observer to press
for a CFC investigation at his first opportunity, and AMIS
has agreed to send a team on Sept. 12. Unfortunately, the
U.S. observer was apparently denied permission by CJTF HOA to
accompany the investigation, which further postponed their
departure. Embassy Khartoum is attempting to arrange for an
alternative U.S. observer to depart with the CFC team on
Sept. 14. Embassy has also contacted UNOCHA director in
Khartoum to request his facilitation of initial humanitarian
assistance and assessment of the situation. An exacerbated
Minawi called on Vice President Taha for assistance on Sept.

12. He requested Government intervention and or appropriate
response to what he considers is a grave violation of the
DPA. He also requested Taha,s assistance to delay the
Government,s offensive, while he seeks to make progress
engaging with non-signatories.


4. (U) Comments: While there have been continued reports of
limited Janjaweed attacks and harassment throughout Darfur
over the past months, there have been no Janjaweed attacks of
this reported scope or magnitude since the signing of the
DPA. If the allegations hold true, the Government,s
reaction will provide an accurate indicator of their
intention to implement of the DPA, which calls for the
immediate disarmament and demobilization of any
Janjaweed/armed militia that break the ceasefire. The
inability of our USG observer to accompany the CFC is
troubling. We will work with CJTF HOA to determine the basis
for his non-participation and ensure appropriate coordination
in the future. End comment.
POWERS