JANJAWEED ATTACKS IN BURAM SOUTH DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002229 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, S/CRS, AND INIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016 TAGS: PGOV KPKO SU SUBJECT: JANJAWEED ATTACKS IN BURAM SOUTH DARFUR Classified By: P/E CHIEF E. WHITAKER, REASON SECTION 1.4 (b) AND (b) ¶1. (C) Summary: SLM/A Minawi officials continue to actively draw international partner,s attention to what they describe as the first significant Janjaweed attack since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Regardless of their efforts, no official investigation has yet occurred. Reports indicated attacks on up to 47 villages and a potential for 10,000 to 25,000 displaced in the southern areas of South Darfur. Lack of support from AMIS, UNMIS, or UNOCHA and international attention on the Government offensive in the north spurred Minawi to seek the aid of Vice President Taha. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Initial reports of a significant Janjaweed attack were passed to the Embassy in early September. Reports indicated that 12 villages were attacked by Fallata (non-Arab) Janjaweed forces in the vicinity of Buram in the far south of Darfur. The population is mostly Zaghawa, mixed with a few Bergit and Massilit villages. Initial claims by Minawi officials included 20 deaths, more than 50 wounded, and up to 8,000 displaced persons. Sporadic attacks continued through the first week of September. On Sept. 10, SLM/A Minawi militia gathered wounded women and children for an expected evacuation by AMIS. The evacuation did not materialize, and Janjaweed forces attacked the assembled civilians as well as additional villages. Minawi officials claim that up to 47 villages have been attacked, and some burned. UNOCHA estimates between 10,000 and 25,000 displaced, but have not confirmed any information to date. ¶3. (C) In meetings with UNOCHA South Darfur Regional Director, Wael Ibrahim (strictly protect),he bitterly complained that he could not get UNMIS to provide OCHA with a helicopter, indicating that scheduled UNMIS flights took priority over OCHA emergencies. He stated that the area was restricted for ground movement and OCHA had a standing request for a helicopter for the past week to assist in a potential humanitarian disaster. A small amount of Government assistance was provided to areas under their control, but no humanitarian assistance has been provided to the victims in the SLM/A-M areas of control for over two weeks. Embassy Khartoum instructed our US observer to press for a CFC investigation at his first opportunity, and AMIS has agreed to send a team on Sept. 12. Unfortunately, the U.S. observer was apparently denied permission by CJTF HOA to accompany the investigation, which further postponed their departure. Embassy Khartoum is attempting to arrange for an alternative U.S. observer to depart with the CFC team on Sept. 14. Embassy has also contacted UNOCHA director in Khartoum to request his facilitation of initial humanitarian assistance and assessment of the situation. An exacerbated Minawi called on Vice President Taha for assistance on Sept. ¶12. He requested Government intervention and or appropriate response to what he considers is a grave violation of the DPA. He also requested Taha,s assistance to delay the Government,s offensive, while he seeks to make progress engaging with non-signatories. ¶4. (U) Comments: While there have been continued reports of limited Janjaweed attacks and harassment throughout Darfur over the past months, there have been no Janjaweed attacks of this reported scope or magnitude since the signing of the DPA. If the allegations hold true, the Government,s reaction will provide an accurate indicator of their intention to implement of the DPA, which calls for the immediate disarmament and demobilization of any Janjaweed/armed militia that break the ceasefire. The inability of our USG observer to accompany the CFC is troubling. We will work with CJTF HOA to determine the basis for his non-participation and ensure appropriate coordination in the future. End comment. POWERS