DARFUR - SOUTH DARFUR SITUATION REPORT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002225 SIPDIS AIDAC SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS GENEVA FOR NKYLOH NAIROBI FOR SFO NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY USUN FOR TMALY BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU SUBJECT: DARFUR - SOUTH DARFUR SITUATION REPORT REF: KHARTOUM 1625 KHARTOUM 00002225 001.2 OF 002 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Though security in South Darfur remains relatively stable, humanitarian organizations are anxious about the potential for increased insecurity as the dry season approaches. Decreasing security and increased fighting in North Darfur may already be affecting South Darfur. Additionally, problems in the health sector and with camp coordination concern USAID field staff. End Summary. -------------- Security -------------- ¶2. (SBU) South Darfur is currently experiencing a period of relative calm that creates a generally permissive atmosphere for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. For example, the UN World Food Program (WFP) reached 99 percent of targeted beneficiaries in South Darfur during the month of August. The feeling on the ground, however, is that this may only be a temporary window of opportunity. The arrival of the dry season in early October could trigger the resumption of military operations, which are currently inhibited by the high water levels in wadis (seasonal rivers) and washed-out dirt roads. WFP is preparing for such events by instructing cooperating partners to distribute double or even triple rations during the month of September in potentially insecure areas of South Darfur. By doing so, WFP aims to allocate food to beneficiaries who may not be accessible in October/November if conflict renews and decrease warehouse stocks that are vulnerable to looting. ¶3. (SBU) As early as August 3, the UN security officials and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) announced unconfirmed reports of a National Redemption Front (NRF) presence in Adula village, located east of Shaeria. On August 24, UN sources reported an attack by armed men in the village of Songo, located 160 km southwest of Buram in the extreme south of the state. Finally, reports indicate that a clash occurred in Muhajariya, South Darfur, on August 26. ¶4. (SBU) The most notable recent conflict in South Darfur is that between the two Arab ethnic groups of Habanya and the Reizegat, though this dispute is not believed to be related to the larger conflict. Fighting that took place in the localities of Ferdus and Buram started at the beginning of 2006 and reignited in early July. The fighting in July caused the displacement of an unknown number of Reizegat to Ed Daein and the relocation of more than 32,000 Habanya into Buram town for safety. By July 31, more than 20,000 of the Habanya internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Buram returned to their villages of origin. On August 9, the South Darfur State Wali presided over a ceremony in which the Habanya and Reizegat signed a peace agreement. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Wali gave the groups SD 150 million (approximately USD 700,000) to be used to pay compensation for losses incurred during the fighting. Recently, UN sources have reported attacks on Al Amoud Al Akdar village and other surrounding villages, located south of Buram on September 9 and August 29. As of September 12, humanitarians have been unable to reach the village to confirm reports of civilian casualties, burned villages, and other damage. The UN plans to travel to the village within the coming days. USAID's Darfur Field Office (USAID/DFO) staff will continue to closely monitor this situation and report on the outcomes of the assessment mission. -------------- Health -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Cholera continues to be the focus of the health sector in South Darfur. USAID reports that State Ministry of Health (SMOH) officials insist on referring to it as "acute watery diarrhea" despite national level officials' utilization of the term "cholera." The UN World Health Organization (WHO) began reporting cases in Nyala town on May 24, which spread initially to other areas of the state including Ed Daein, Kass, and Gereida. However, since mid-June, the cases have been concentrated primarily in Nyala town and Kalma camp. The official SMOH/WHO surveillance system shows that the epidemic peaked in week 30 at 143 cases and that the current number of new cases has declined to 68 in week 35. Although KHARTOUM 00002225 002.2 OF 002 this surveillance system has considerable flaws including limited geographic coverage and low reporting rates, this general downward trend is also supported anecdotally by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). By the end of August, the two cholera treatment centers in Nyala town and Kalma camp had a daily average of only 10 patients each. ¶6. (SBU) USAID/DFO has noticed that the lack of coordinated leadership in the South Darfur cholera response is a matter of concern. Three months after the first reported cases of cholera WHO and SMOH have yet to present a comprehensive or actionable response plan. Health promotion, hygiene education, water chlorination campaigns, and oral rehydration therapy programs have proceeded in fits and starts with little effective coverage or coordination with NGOs providing volunteers and supplies. The lack of overall leadership from WHO and SMOH has led NGOs to create a parallel coordination structure for exchange of information. USAID/DFO staff noted that the UN Children's Fund resumed coordination of the Nyala town water chlorination campaign in late August, which is being implemented relatively well by USAID partner CARE and the Sudanese government Office of Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES). -------------- Camp Coordination -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Camp coordinators work to identify gaps within the response, facilitate dialogue between the camp residents and the NGOs working there, register new arrivals, and respond to crises. The absence of designated camp coordinating agencies had created noticeable humanitarian gaps leaving community grievances unaddressed in some of the IDP camps surrounding Nyala including Otash, Dereig, and Al Salaam. To solve this problem, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) took the lead in working with the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) to encourage the naming of camp coordinators for these locations. In June, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) mobilized staff in anticipation of filling these roles. ¶8. (SBU) On July 20, HAC designated the German NGO Humedicas to coordinate Al Salaam camp. In mid-August, after long delays, HAC named two local NGOs, Sudanese Red Crescent Society and Rehad al Fursan, as the coordinators for Otash and Dereig camps, respectively. OCHA has expressed reservation as to whether the two local NGOs have the capacity and resources effectively to fulfill the camp coordination role and plans to conduct a capacity building workshop for the organizations on September 16. ¶9. (SBU) On July 27, OCHA named NRC as the camp coordinator for Gereida, where an estimated 128,000 IDPs now live, making it the largest camp in all of Darfur. OCHA was able to make this determination without the involvement of HAC because Gereida is in SLA-controlled territory. NRC is expected to help address immediate needs, such as the replacement of more than 600 latrines that recently collapsed due to sandy soil and heavy rains, identifying community priorities, and filling the gap in the information flow of events in Gereida back to the humanitarian community in Nyala. ¶10. (SBU) On September 3, Kalma camp coordinator NRC was stopped at the HAC checkpoint outside of Kalma camp and not allowed to enter the camp. Upon conferring with HAC in Nyala town, NRC was told that there was a HAC investigation underway and that they would not be allowed into the camp until a three-day investigation was completed. However, as of September 13, NRC has still not been allowed to return to Kalma camp. The lack of camp coordination in Kalma is preventing USAID/OFDA partner CARE from returning to the camp to resume water and sanitation activities. CARE was relying on NRC to facilitate a meeting with sheiks in Kalma camp to negotiate guarantees for the security of their staff; without NRC present, the meeting has not taken place. POWERS