SITUATION IN DARFUR CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE;

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002100 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2026 TAGS: PREL KPKO PREF SOCI US UN AU SU SUBJECT: SITUATION IN DARFUR CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE; SIGNIFICANTLY MORE FIGHTING ON THE HORIZON Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) AND (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Without political intervention, the government offensive will continue, resulting in increased displacement and hardship for the people of Darfur and lack of progress in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) over the near to mid-term. Numerous attacks by the National Redemption Front (NRF) and the inability of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to reduce the violence have made it more likely that an emboldened Government of Sudan will continue to execute the military elements of its plan to "stabilize" Darfur over the next few months. Offensive military operations by the government, in clear violation of the DPA, have started, and additional operations appear imminent. It is too early to tell if the offensive will affect wide swaths of Darfur or be localized against specific NRF targets, although reportedly government-sponsored tribal fighting has also broken out in the south. Likewise, the NRF reaction is unknown. The level of Chadian and Eritrean near-term support to the NRF may well determine if it folds or has the capability to expand the conflict. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The government "stability" plan appears to have been approved for execution even before transmittal to the United Nations (UN). It was conceived by officials in the Ministries of Interior and Defense and sold to Bashir as a Government of National Unity (GNU)-approved effort. It was not coordinated with SLM leader and Senior Assistant to the President Minnie Minawi, other factions of the GNU, or AMIS. The government began its military buildup called for in the plan even before delivering it to the UN and commenced combat operations without waiting for a response, potentially in an early effort to make UN transition impossible. In mid-July, the SAF began building up troops and supplies in El Geneina and El Fasher. Both Mellit and Umm Baro have since been reinforced with SAF elements, introducing a total of six additional SAF battalions into Darfur. ¶3. (C) US Embassy Khartoum continues to receive almost daily reports of troop and munitions being moved into El Fasher and El Geneina. They are transported to Darfur mostly at night by air. On July 26, the SAF attacked Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) elements of the NRF in the Jebel Moon area of Western Darfur. Failing to dislodge the rebels from the mountainous region, SAF and Janjaweed elements moved into the Kulbus-Girgira-Tine area along the Sudanese-Chadian border to cutoff reported rebel supply lines into Jebel Moon and prepare for another assault, which appears to have begun in the last days of August. However, they have not attempted to cut the supply corridor north of Tine that is heavily used by NRF forces attacking SLM/A Minawi militia throughout the central and eastern areas of North Darfur. Significant additional SAF forces will be needed to close this corridor. ¶4. (C) Since the end of July, the SAF has kept the NRF off balance with multiple ground and air attacks near Kutum, Korma, Kulkul, and Sayeh, most likely in an effort to prevent the NRF from massing sufficient forces to threaten garrison towns or vulnerable targets in South Darfur. The SAF have also lent some support to Minawi forces in the form of air support against NRF attacks in North Darfur. On August 28, after a month of sporadic fighting, the SAF captured NRF positions near Kutum, Abu Sakin, and Kulkul. Casualties are reported to be light, which may indicate NRF repositioning to gain better tactical advantage before seriously taking on a major SAF force. Their repositioning will likely take them west towards central strongholds and may open up tempting targets north of Kulkul to the SAF that would force Minawi to react to a Government incursion into his area of control. ¶5. (C) The Embassy has seen no indication that Minawi's forces have joined SAF operations. It is unclear from the Government plan if Minawi's forces are to fight with the SAF or merely control their own areas. Minni has claimed that he has laid a marker on the table with the Government that the SAF will not move through or occupy Minawi areas of control. However, Arab militias, which are presumed to be aligned with the Government, began attacks against a reported twelve Zaghawa villages in the vicinity of Graida, South Darfur, on August 28, resulting in heavy civilian casualties and several thousand displaced. ¶6. (S) The NRF's capacity to take on significant SAF forces will depend heavily on Chadian support. Much of the NRF success to date has been with the reported assistance of Chadian forces, achieved with significantly increased mobility, manpower, and firepower, to include confirmation of the provision of SA-7 missiles. Recent announced improvements in relations between Chad and Sudan could lead KHARTOUM 00002100 002 OF 002 to a postponement of significant Chadian support in the near-term. However, it is too early to determine if Chad will permanently reduce support to the NRF or if the NRF will attempt to fight a more conventional campaign, attempt to pull other factions into the fighting, or reduce pressure on the base of operations by attacking targets in South Darfur. Minawi has sent a delegation of elders and NRF relatives to meet previous SLM/A commanders within the NRF. If the NRF factures, the SAF campaign could be localized and contained. However, if the NRF gains support from Minawi or Wahid factions, fighting could become widespread, with devastating results for the population of Darfur. ¶7. (S) Embassy Khartoum continues to receive reports that the SAF is prepared to start the next stage of buildup outlined in its plan with an even larger offensive operation over the next few weeks, and may use the newly gained ground as a launching pad. The plan appears to call for additional forces deployed to El Geneina to reinforce current border interdiction forces and expand its presence further north past Tine to Bahai. So far, Embassy Khartoum has not received any credible evidence to indicate this buildup has begun. Minawi has told the Embassy that SAF's primary effort is to attack north and west from El Fasher to clear the NRF from North Darfur population centers and simultaneously attack north from El Geneina to seal the border. Embassy Khartoum has also received unconfirmed information that the Janjaweed could be used to attack IDP camps to draw JEM out of its mountain strongholds. ¶8. (C) AMIS has no capacity to affect the situation on the ground, nor does it have the will to challenge the Government offensive. The Ceasefire Commission (CFC) remains dysfunctional and does not even serve as a mechanism to engage or leverage members. Even with a UN Security Council resolution mandating a transition to UN command, it is doubtful the UN would deploy any capacity without negotiations with Sudan, and even command and control headquarters and logistics units would not be on the ground for a considerable period. The SAF has no constraints to its operations other than the NRF forces and will likely continue executing its "stabilization" plan to clear NRF elements from North Darfur and regain control over large swaths of area previously under the control of Minawi's forces. There are a number of reports that the government will continue to use tribal animosity to force the Zaghawa population out of the south and into North Darfur. ¶9. (C) Comment: All indications suggest that without strong political opposition, the SAF will press for continuation of its offensive and the humanitarian situation in North Darfur will continue to deteriorate. There is potential for the fighting to spread to South Darfur either through an attempt by the NRF to expand the fighting or through continued attacks against southern Zaghawa elements. The GoS believes it can militarily defeat the NRF, but it is unlikely the SAF has the strength or capacity to regain total control of North Darfur. Incursions into Minawi's areas of control could bring renewed fighting between Minawi and the SAF. There is little reason to hope that any measurable progress in DPA implementation, absent for nearly four months, could prosper in the above environment. Continued and potentially increased displacement bode ill for the future. End comment. HUME