A/S FRAZER MEETINGS IN KHARTOUM: DARFUR VERDICT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002045

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM SU AU
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER MEETINGS IN KHARTOUM: DARFUR VERDICT
STILL UNKNOWN, BUT CRACKS IN GOS HARD-LINE BEGINNING TO
APPEAR

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME: REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: After a hostile welcome at the airport,
Assistant Secretary Frazer fought to advance the three
overarching goals of her visit to Khartoum: the U.S. seeks to
address the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, to support
implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),and to
foster an improvement in the bilateral relationship. A/S
Frazer also carried a personal letter from President Bush to
President Bashir, which she only intended to deliver in
person, despite requests otherwise. Frazer said her goal was
to understand the Sudanese perspective and explore ways of
moving the relationship forward. A/S Frazer emphasized,
however, that any improvement in the bilateral relationship
depended on a resolution of the Darfur crisis. In order to
do so, Sudan must accept a UN force, and must do so now.
All, except Minawi and Kiir, backed the official Government
of Sudan line refusing to accept a transition of the African
Union peacekeeping mission to UN command. However, Foreign
Minister Akol and Presidential Advisor Ismail were willing to
consider how we might bridge the gap to strengthen AMIS and
work with the international community on efforts to bring
onboard non-signatories to the DPA. A/S Frazer expects to
meet with President Bashir August 29. End summary.


2. (U) A/S Frazer met with the following Government of Sudan
officials in a series of meetings August 27-28: Salva Kiir,
First Vice President; Minni Minawi, Senior Assistant to the
President; Lam Akol, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Maghzoub
Al-Khalifa, Presidential Advisor; and Mustafa Osman Ismail,
Presidential Advisor and former Foreign Minister. The
meetings below are reported in sequential order.

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Foreign Minister Akol
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3. (C) The Foreign Minister acknowledged the positive role
played by the U.S. in both the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) and DPA, in addition to its generous humanitarian
assistance to Sudan. Dr. Akol also looked forward to a
meeting at the most senior level between their respective
Presidents, an upgrade in their envoys to Ambassadorial rank,
relaxation of the sanctions and the removal of Sudan from the
list of state sponsors of terrorism. A problem of
communication, however, remained between their two countries;
neither understood the other and serious matters were being
discussed in public. This had served to harden feelings on
the Sudanese side. A/S Frazer noted the fundamental
divergence of opinion between their two countries on Darfur;
while the U.S. favored a transition from AU to UN
peacekeeping troops, the Government of Sudan seemed convinced
that a military solution was possible.


4. (C) The Foreign Minister noted an additional complication:
press reports of the Assistant Secretary's comments that
"Sudan must stop the genocide" and accept UN troops had
poisoned the atmosphere. If this was the message she carried
from President Bush, then it had already been delivered via
the press. This dynamic had to change if the two countries
were to improve the bilateral relationship. Akol understood
that neither U.S. nor European troops would deploy to Darfur,
but the issue had transcended to a political plane. A/S
Frazer concurred the bilateral dialogue was strained but
pointed out that it is a matter of official U.S. policy that
genocide has occurred in Darfur and AMIS should transition to
a UN operation. She noted that publicly-stated policy is
clearly not the private message she was sent to deliver to
President Bashir. Moreover, she cited unhelpful rhetoric
that goes back for months on the Sudanese side, such as
President Bashir's pledges to "wage jihad versus the U.S."
and promises to "go to the grave" before approving a
transition to UN command in Darfur. She recommended as we go
forward to improve bilateral relations that we not allow
public rhetoric to distract us from private and serious
policy discussion.

--------------
Presidential Advisor Maghzoub Al Khalifa
--------------


5. (C) Presidential Advisor Maghzoub Al Khalifa claimed that
implementation of the DPA was progressing well in the South
and the East, with only lingering trouble in the North. He
said that 18 of Darfur's 23 municipalities, comprising 85
percent of the region's population, were secure and that the
AU must be given the opportunity to stabilize the region. Al
Khalifa emphasized the benefit of proceeding with the

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Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. When asked about
the Sudanese government's preferred method of dealing with
non-signatories, he said he preferred to try to bring onboard
the DPA non-signatories rather than sanction them. Then Al
Khalifa said that the passage of a UN Security Council
resolution on re-hatting of the AU force would indicate that
"Africans aren't capable." While thanking Al Khalifa for the
Government's efforts to bring together the disparate factions
in Darfur, Frazer reminded him of the USG's long-stated
interest in bolstering the AU, but explained that a juncture
had been reached where continued failure in Darfur would
undermine the organization's potential for future operations.
Only the UN had the organizational capacity to defuse the
conflict, and the model for UN re-hatting of African forces
had been successful in the past in Liberia, Burundi, Sierra
Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. Frazer said that the UNSCR, which
would pass within days, accounted for Sudanese concerns on
sovereignty and was not intended to disarm the Sudanese Armed
Forces, nor arrest Sudanese officials that might be
ICC-indicted. She also warned that Sudanese plans to deploy
10,500 troops would further destabilize Darfur and lead to an
even greater humanitarian crisis.

--------------
Presidential Advisor Ismail
--------------


6. (C) In two separate meetings with A/S Frazer, Presidential
Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail initially complained that the
U.S. had not adequately consulted with the Government of
Sudan on a transition to UN command and predicted that
passage of the UNSCR would lead to an explosion of violence
throughout the country. To avoid this, he detailed a
four-point plan for the way forward: 1) remove the Darfur
issue from the international spotlight by "freezing"
deliberations in the Security Council and allow for quiet,
back-room negotiation; 2) explore an increase in the AU-force
level by soliciting troop contributions from Nigeria, South
Africa, Egypt, and Algeria and for financial contributions
from the Arab League; 3) give the necessary mandate to the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to protect humanitarian convoys;
and 4) support implementation of the DPA with Minawi as the
head of the Darfur Transitional Authority. He proposed that
a six-month assessment period be allowed for discussions
between the U.S. and the Sudan on Darfur and other
outstanding bilateral issues. According to Ismail, Sudanese
opposition to a UN force in Darfur derived from the lack of a
serious U.S. effort to improve relations with Sudan despite
cooperation on counterterrorism, the CPA, and the DPA. A/S
Frazer disputed any contention that previous bilateral
dialogue on the UN force was insufficient, saying that we had
been in consultations since 2005, the time for consultation
was over, and emphasized that the UNSC would pass the
resolution in the near future. She also reiterated the
importance of President Bush's message that she intended to
deliver personally to Bashir.


7. (C) By their second meeting, Ismail had used his
influence as a former foreign minister to secure an August 29
meeting between A/S Frazer and Bashir, noting again the value
he placed on continued consultation. A/S Frazer explained
that the SAF mobilization of 10,500 troops in preparation for
an offensive in Darfur made dialogue more difficult,
particularly as such actions were in clear violation of
previous UNSCRs and Sudanese commitments, such as the DPA.
She explained that as a matter of practicality UN forces
would not deploy without Sudanese consent. She reminded
Ismail that the timeline was short and the UNSC would pass a
resolution in the next few days. There was not six months
left for consultation, but there might be a space between the
UN starting to re-hat AMIS forces at the end of its mandate
October 1 and the UN Secretariat's plan to deploy non-African
forces into Darfur from January 2007. She urged Ismail to
consider this timeline as a way forward based on his original
proposal of a six-month assessment period and encouraged
Sudan to become involved in the negotiations currently
underway in New York to influence both the composition and
the timing of the UN deployment.

--------------
First Vice President Kiir
--------------


8. (C) First Vice President Salva Kiir and A/S Frazer
discussed Darfur, CPA implementation, and the status of talks
between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government
of Uganda. Kiir said that in Darfur, there were two separate
issues: the question of UN-rehatting, and the problem of the

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non-signatories. Kiir said that he plans to go to Asmara on
August 29 in an effort to urge the various players to
cooperate. The Abdul Wahid and Ahmed Abdul Shafi factions
are open to dialogue, can re-unite, and he is working to
bring them to Southern Sudan for a meeting. President Bashir
has blessed this course of action. Regarding Darfur, the
SPLM favors transition from AU to UN command. He drew a
parallel with the CPA process, noting that once the CPA was
signed, the UN deployed. Now that the DPA has been signed,
the UN should come in. Kiir said that opposition to the UN
deployment comes from advisors surrounding President Bashir.
Kiir feels the NCP has isolated itself, as all the opposition
parties favor a UN transition. Bashir's position risks
splitting the Government of National Unity. The official
line claiming the unity of the government, espoused by Akol,
Al-Khalifa, and Ismail was a "lie."


9. (C) On the LRA, Kiir was hopeful the recent cessation of
hostilities between the LRA and Uganda would build momentum
toward a long term solution. He claimed that Museveni agreed
to the cessation after Kiir's visit and only on the condition
the LRA agree to be encamped. Turning to the CPA
implementation process, he noted that progress has been slow.
Several commissions have yet to be properly established,
including the Human Rights and the Land Commissions. The
National Petroleum Commission and the Border Commission have
yet to become operational.

--------------
Senior Assistant Minawi
--------------


10. (C) Minawi thanked A/S Frazer for her visit and U.S.
support to the people of Darfur. Minawi outlined his two key
issues: DPA implementation and improving security. He
acknowledged that bringing in other SLM commanders was a top
priority. He was actively engaging Darfur leaders, including
Abdul Wahid and Ahmed Abdul Shafi, as well as reaching out to
National Redemption Front (NRF) commanders. Minawi said his
delegation in El Fasher was poised to meet senior NRF
commanders soon. He noted there were still key differences
between leaders and thought it better that Wahid and Shafi
meet first to achieve a unified position prior to any larger
conference. He was willing to play whatever part was
required, finding positions within the DPA framework (within
his capabilities),as well as working any political efforts
outside the DPA. However, it was unlikely that the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM) would come to the table unless
Chad first withdrew its soldiers and they were convinced that
improved relations between Chad and Sudan would permanently
weaken their position. In addition, the SPLM is making a
good faith effort to assist, pursuing the possibility of a
meeting of non-signatories in Yei, Southern Sudan. Septel
will report in greater detail the status of efforts to
convene a conference of non-signatories.


11. (C) Regarding security, Minawi said that AMIS capacity to
address the needs of Darfur was nonexistent. Senior
officials in the Ministries of Defense and Interior had
convinced President Bashir that he could succeed in his
efforts to thwart a UN transition and that a military
solution could be successful. Minawi did not support the
Government security plan. He had requested that any
offensive be postponed during his efforts to reach out to the
NRF, but admitted that if he did not succeed with the NRF,
the SAF would most likely attack within the next few weeks,
with dire consequences. Minawi fully supported a quick UN
transition and had counseled President Bashir to cease his
rhetoric and start negotiating. He said that Bashir did not
have the support of the entire government on the issue nor
had he built popular support for his position. Septel will
report on the deteriorating security situation and the likely
impact of renewed conflict on humanitarian access.


12. (U) A/S Frazer has cleared this message.
HUME