MEETING WITH SLA,S MINAWI AND AU,S IBOK ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001987 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV AU CH UN SU SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SLA,S MINAWI AND AU,S IBOK ON DARFUR Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On August 21, CDA Hume met SLA leader Minni Minawi and AU Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) implementation chief Sam Ibok, at their urgent request. Ali Traio (SLA) and Amb. Boubou Nhiang (AU) also attended the two-hour session. Ibok and Minawi expressed both fear about the deteriorating security situation in Darfur and insistence on an early transition to UN peacekeepers. Neither was confident how to persuade President Bashir to accept a UN transition. CDA Hume said USG insistence on an early transition to the UN was firm, and he urged both Minawi and the AU to work more actively for that outcome. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Ibok: No Coordination, Security Crumbling, AU Attacked -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) While waiting for Minawi to arrive, Ibok shared a gloomy assessment of the situation. On the political side, President Bashir,s government was dealing with DPA implementation issues without any coordination with Minawi, now the senior person in the government with a specific responsibility for Darfur. There was no sign Minawi had inserted himself into policy-making. Security in Darfur was crumbling, with the AU forces now under direct attack from the National Redemption Front (NRF),who were armed and assisted by Chadian army elements. The requirements for DPA implementation were too complex for the AU to administer, and without a UN transition the operation would eventually collapse. He said it was more likely than not that the Sudanese government, at some point, would agree to a UN transition, but he did not see what to do now to bring that about. -------------- -- UN Transition Essential, Despite Bashir Refusal -------------- -- ¶3. (C) CDA Hume agreed that there was no constructive option other than transition to the UN. Nevertheless, President Bashir had steadfastly refused that option and now given to the UN Sudan,s unilateral plan to stabilize Darfur and to implement the DPA. The USG had insisted directly with Bashir on an early UN transition and was working for adoption of a UN SC resolution. If the AU shared the position that an early transition was essential to avoid disaster, the AU needed to make their own efforts with Khartoum authorities. �00A; -------------- -------------- Cease-fire Commission, Joint Commission, Disarmament Key -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) When Minawi and Ali Traio arrived, Ibok raised the issue of Cease-fire Commission participation. The AU decision to exclude DPA non-signatories was now widely opposed and was simply not working. It was essential to adjust the rules to permit some participation by non-signatories. ¶5. (C) Minawi acknowledged the issue and said his main concern was security. He wanted to see what the government was planning for security in Darfur. The first step to gain popular support for the DPA had to be real progress in disarming the janjaweed. Arrangements had to be made so that the Joint Commission would function to resolve issues of implementation. Moreover, the government would have to agree to accommodations with other parties to broaden support for the DPA. If these steps were not taken, the peace in Darfur would collapse. -------------- -------------- Minni: No. Darfur Troubled, NRF Attacks with Chadian Aid -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Minawi,s analysis of the security situation in Darfur was straightforward. For the time-being, West Darfur and South Darfur were calm, but North Darfur was troubled by renewed fighting. Chad had sent in arms and troops across the border to support NRF forces (N.B. a USC journalist was arrested in North Darfur accompanied by two individuals wearing Chadian military clothing. End note.) Chad had supplied the NRF with SA-7 missiles. The NRF had attacked positions held by SLA/Minawi troops, without any response by AU peacekeepers or the UN; when Minawi allowed his troops to counter-attack, the UN criticized him. -------------- Minawi Lobbies President Bashir for a UN PKO -------------- ¶7. (C) Minawi recalled he had promised President Bush that he KHARTOUM 00001987 002 OF 002 would work for transition to UN forces. The previous day he had met President Bashir and urged him to reconsider his rejection of UN forces. When Bashir said that many of his advisers agreed on keeping the UN out, Minawi pointed out that others, including FVP Salva Kiir, did not. Minawi said he expected to meet Bashir on August 22, and he would again push the issue. -------------- -------------- Both AU, SLM Unaware of Gov't Plan for Darfur Security -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) CDA Hume asked Minawi and Ibok if either had reviewed the security plan for Darfur that President Bashir had submitted to UN SYG Annan. Neither had seen a copy of the plan. Hume said he would provide a copy of the plan, which was circulating at the United Nations, to both. Minawi should note well that the plan affirms that 2,000 of his own forces will deploy as early as this month with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in operations in Darfur. Minawi said no one had talked to him yet about the plan, and it could not possibly work. The most important element in countering the NRF would be stopping support from Chad. Given the role played by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in organizing the NRF and the ties between Islamist leader al-Turabi and JEM, Minawi wondered if all elements of the Sudanese government wanted to destroy the NRF or whether Islamist hardliners wanted the NRF to attack Minawi,s forces. -------------- -------------- Keys: Broader DPA Support, Urgent AU Call for UN PKO -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Hume asked how Minawi and Ibok saw the chances of getting President Bashir to agree to UN peacekeepers. Minawi said he wanted to be able to talk with Bashir one-on-one. The two key elements needed now were to broaden support for the DPA and to arrange for UN peace-keeping. He knew Bashir had received contrary advice, but he thought it was still possible to change his mind. Ibok said that without an early transition to UN peace-keeping, the AU mission would simply fail. African leaders had been ignoring the risks for too long. He was trying to arrange for an AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Addis before the end of August to discuss the urgency of the need for transition to the UN. He urged Minawi to attend any such meeting and to take a leading role in the discussions. HUME