MEETING WITH SLA,S MINAWI AND AU,S IBOK ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001987

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV AU CH UN SU
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SLA,S MINAWI AND AU,S IBOK ON DARFUR


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On August 21, CDA Hume met SLA leader Minni
Minawi and AU Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) implementation
chief Sam Ibok, at their urgent request. Ali Traio (SLA) and
Amb. Boubou Nhiang (AU) also attended the two-hour session.
Ibok and Minawi expressed both fear about the deteriorating
security situation in Darfur and insistence on an early
transition to UN peacekeepers. Neither was confident how to
persuade President Bashir to accept a UN transition. CDA
Hume said USG insistence on an early transition to the UN was
firm, and he urged both Minawi and the AU to work more
actively for that outcome. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Ibok: No Coordination, Security Crumbling, AU Attacked
-------------- --------------


2. (C) While waiting for Minawi to arrive, Ibok shared a
gloomy assessment of the situation. On the political side,
President Bashir,s government was dealing with DPA
implementation issues without any coordination with Minawi,
now the senior person in the government with a specific
responsibility for Darfur. There was no sign Minawi had
inserted himself into policy-making. Security in Darfur was
crumbling, with the AU forces now under direct attack from
the National Redemption Front (NRF),who were armed and
assisted by Chadian army elements. The requirements for DPA
implementation were too complex for the AU to administer, and
without a UN transition the operation would eventually
collapse. He said it was more likely than not that the
Sudanese government, at some point, would agree to a UN
transition, but he did not see what to do now to bring that
about.

-------------- --
UN Transition Essential, Despite Bashir Refusal
-------------- --


3. (C) CDA Hume agreed that there was no constructive option
other than transition to the UN. Nevertheless, President
Bashir had steadfastly refused that option and now given to
the UN Sudan,s unilateral plan to stabilize Darfur and to
implement the DPA. The USG had insisted directly with Bashir
on an early UN transition and was working for adoption of a
UN SC resolution. If the AU shared the position that an
early transition was essential to avoid disaster, the AU
needed to make their own efforts with Khartoum authorities.

-------------- --------------
Cease-fire Commission, Joint Commission, Disarmament Key
-------------- --------------


4. (C) When Minawi and Ali Traio arrived, Ibok raised the
issue of Cease-fire Commission participation. The AU
decision to exclude DPA non-signatories was now widely
opposed and was simply not working. It was essential to
adjust the rules to permit some participation by
non-signatories.


5. (C) Minawi acknowledged the issue and said his main
concern was security. He wanted to see what the government
was planning for security in Darfur. The first step to gain
popular support for the DPA had to be real progress in
disarming the janjaweed. Arrangements had to be made so that
the Joint Commission would function to resolve issues of
implementation. Moreover, the government would have to agree
to accommodations with other parties to broaden support for
the DPA. If these steps were not taken, the peace in Darfur
would collapse.

-------------- --------------
Minni: No. Darfur Troubled, NRF Attacks with Chadian Aid
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Minawi,s analysis of the security situation in Darfur
was straightforward. For the time-being, West Darfur and
South Darfur were calm, but North Darfur was troubled by
renewed fighting. Chad had sent in arms and troops across
the border to support NRF forces (N.B. a USC journalist was
arrested in North Darfur accompanied by two individuals
wearing Chadian military clothing. End note.) Chad had
supplied the NRF with SA-7 missiles. The NRF had attacked
positions held by SLA/Minawi troops, without any response by
AU peacekeepers or the UN; when Minawi allowed his troops to
counter-attack, the UN criticized him.

--------------
Minawi Lobbies President Bashir for a UN PKO
--------------


7. (C) Minawi recalled he had promised President Bush that he

KHARTOUM 00001987 002 OF 002


would work for transition to UN forces. The previous day he
had met President Bashir and urged him to reconsider his
rejection of UN forces. When Bashir said that many of his
advisers agreed on keeping the UN out, Minawi pointed out
that others, including FVP Salva Kiir, did not. Minawi said
he expected to meet Bashir on August 22, and he would again
push the issue.

-------------- --------------
Both AU, SLM Unaware of Gov't Plan for Darfur Security
-------------- --------------


8. (C) CDA Hume asked Minawi and Ibok if either had reviewed
the security plan for Darfur that President Bashir had
submitted to UN SYG Annan. Neither had seen a copy of the
plan. Hume said he would provide a copy of the plan, which
was circulating at the United Nations, to both. Minawi
should note well that the plan affirms that 2,000 of his own
forces will deploy as early as this month with the Sudanese
Armed Forces (SAF) in operations in Darfur. Minawi said no
one had talked to him yet about the plan, and it could not
possibly work. The most important element in countering the
NRF would be stopping support from Chad. Given the role
played by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in
organizing the NRF and the ties between Islamist leader
al-Turabi and JEM, Minawi wondered if all elements of the
Sudanese government wanted to destroy the NRF or whether
Islamist hardliners wanted the NRF to attack Minawi,s
forces.

-------------- --------------
Keys: Broader DPA Support, Urgent AU Call for UN PKO
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Hume asked how Minawi and Ibok saw the chances of
getting President Bashir to agree to UN peacekeepers. Minawi
said he wanted to be able to talk with Bashir one-on-one.
The two key elements needed now were to broaden support for
the DPA and to arrange for UN peace-keeping. He knew Bashir
had received contrary advice, but he thought it was still
possible to change his mind. Ibok said that without an early
transition to UN peace-keeping, the AU mission would simply
fail. African leaders had been ignoring the risks for too
long. He was trying to arrange for an AU Peace and Security
Council meeting in Addis before the end of August to discuss
the urgency of the need for transition to the UN. He urged
Minawi to attend any such meeting and to take a leading role
in the discussions.
HUME