UN WARNING THAT SECURITY IN NORTH DARFUR IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001958 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/SPG, AND RPM/AF E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2016 TAGS: PHUM PREF EAID MOPS PREL PGOV PINS UN SU SUBJECT: UN WARNING THAT SECURITY IN NORTH DARFUR IS COLLAPSING Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action message - see para 5. ¶2. (C) After a briefing on Sudanese government-forced resettlement of IDPs from a camp south of Khartoum, UN Deputy Special Representative Manuel Da Silva described the dire situation that was developing in North Darfur. Da Silva said that increased violence in the field was starting to scare away humanitarian workers, with violent vehicle theft being the fastest growing risk. He said that SLA/Abdul Wahid and JEM commanders were the worst offenders; SLA/Minawi had been behaving more correctly. He added that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) had undertaken a &significant8 buildup of troops and armored vehicles, staging some of the units near to the El Fasher airport. He had no doubt that the government had already made its decision to use unilateral force to &implement8 the Darfur Peace Agreement. The issue was decided, and the troops were now &on the move.8 ¶3. (C) Da Silva said the situation was more dangerous for international humanitarian operations than it had been since early 2004 (the height of the genocide). At that time the ongoing military operations were similar, with SAF units and janjaweed auxiliaries &clearing out terrorists8 from rural communities by the destruction of entire villages. He expected the same tactics to be used again. In 2004, however, the humanitarian organizations often came in after attacks to provide assistance. This time around these organizations, because of attacks on their staff, were already thinking about departing Sudan, and he warned that, if they left, the Sudanese authorities would prevent their return. The AU peacekeepers were no longer patrolling in North Darfur. He foresaw the possible collapse of humanitarian action, with dire consequences for civilians. Finally, he said the situation in the camps was worse than before -- no police, no AMIS, no sense of authority, weapons in the hands of young men, and rising ethic tensions. ¶4. (C) CDA Hume stated that the information available to the USG confirmed the dire picture painted by Da Silva. In line with its own security plan, the Government had given orders &to stop and destroy8 forces opposed to the Darfur Peace Agreement, and if the SAF used the same methods it had previously, it would destroy entire communities. The Government was willing to see NGOs depart to reduce the number of witnesses to the use of force. The USG had issued a strong press statement on the risks just several days ago, and it was convinced that the Sudanese government,s insistence to implement the DPA on its own would bring disaster to the people of Darfur. There should be no illusions: in the short term there was no way to provide humanitarian services throughout Darfur if the Government unleashed the army. It was time for the international community to step up its insistence on early entry of UN forces into Darfur. ¶5. (C) Action Requested: Da Silva mentioned that UN SYG Annan is scheduled to brief the Security Council on Thursday regarding Sudan, a good opportunity to follow up on this information. With the scaring away of humanitarian workers and the restriction to base of AMIS peacekeepers and UN staff, USG overhead assets may be the only reliable way to track this situation. To the extent feasible, Embassy Khartoum requests support from the intelligence community for this mission. HUME