DARFUR: MINNI MINAWI SPEAKS HIS MIND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001937

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PINR AU CH ER US UN SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: MINNI MINAWI SPEAKS HIS MIND


Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and
(d)


1. (C) Summary: In a wide ranging, two-hour meeting between
Minni Minawi and the USG Senior Security Advisor, Tod Wilson,
Minni discussed ideas on how to move forward with the DPA and
his short-term concerns, particularly SLM capacity building.
He asked for advice on how to improve the Ceasefire
Commission (CFC),and counter National Redemption Front (NRF)
propaganda. Minni also reviewed his thinking on how to reach
out to other non-signatories. When asked about the probable
impact of President Bashir,s recent &reconciliation8 with
Deby, Minni launched into a long history of the regional
players and the machinations, manipulations, and uncertainty
that are common with regional relations. End Summary.

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Minni: SLM Needs Capacity Development, Party Building
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2. (C) Minni was pleased to hear that the Khartoum Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA) Implementation Office would be open by
the end of this week, and the El Fasher facility the week
following. He indicated he planned to attend the opening
ceremonies on August 12 (Note: the DPA Implementation Office
opening -) an event that included Minni's participation --
will be covered septel. End note.) He confirmed that the
SLM is finalizing its nomination process for the various DPA
commissions and committees, and noted that office space would
be timely and very welcome. However, he indicated he needed
capacity building training keenly for the SLM for political
party development. Minni stated that the UK is providing 100
of his members English language training in Khartoum and 20
in El Fasher, but said the SLM also needed organizational and
management training. He has approached GoSS President Salva
Kiir regarding obtaining financial support from the SPLM for
SLM party building and operations to meld a viable opposition
party to the NPC. Minni's future focus and first priority
for returning internally displaced persons to their Darfur
homelands is in Sheiria, where tribal relations aomng the
Arabs, Fur, and Zaghawa have been shattered.

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Minni Asks Kiir to Meet Shafi, Tell Welcome to Join DPA
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3. (C) He also indicated that he had tried to reach out to
Abdul Wahid and Ahmed Abdul Shafi, but had not been
successful with Shafi. He stated that he had discussed his
thoughts with Salva Kirr for spurring Wahid towards the DPA
through the Darfur-Darfur Dialog and Consultation Prep
Commission, but expected little success. Minni passed on an
anecdote that he had heard about Wahid and his recent
dethroning, which he implied indicated Wahid,s demise as a
key Fur leader. According to Minni, Shafi had requested
Wahid to return to Darfur to meet the 32 commanders before
they voted, but was told by Wahid that he had a long-planned
two-week vacation that could not be rescheduled, where upon
Shafi held the vote that ousted Wahid. Minni did ask Salva
to engage with Shafi in Asmara during his visit and pass on
that Minni would welcome them into the DPA and into various
positions outlined in the DPA. The Security Advisor noted
that he had heard there was a conference of respected Fur
leaders being held in Khartoum, and that it might be
beneficial to reach out to them also. Minni concurred, and
indicated he would look into the conference.

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Minni: G-19 Few, JEM Small but Troublesome, NRF Chadian
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4. (C) In regard to other parties, he indicated that there
was little left of the G-19, with only a group of leaders and
very few forces. The JEM remained small, but troublesome and
immersed in the NRF and leading a disinformation campaign.
In a side note, Minni confirmed that the UN was embarrassed
over its role in transporting Suleiman Jamous to Kadugli, and
Jamous' continued activity against the DPA. Minni indicated
he would guarantee Jamous,s safety in Khartoum if he stopped
coordinating anti-DPA activities with the NRF and rejoined
the SLM/A. He believed that most of the fighters with the
NRF are Chadian, and claimed to have captured a Chadian
regular ARMY captain on a logistic mission. (Note: Minni
subsequently turned the Chadian captain over to the SAF in Um
Baro. End note.)

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Minni Recognizes Need for PR, Participation in CFC
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5. (C) The Security Advisor said that regardless of who was
the aggressor in the fighting, the NRF was winning the

KHARTOUM 00001937 002 OF 003


information war. He noted that the NRF had already released
three press statements claiming that SLM/A-M was the
aggressor. Minni recognized the SLM,s shortcomings in
getting out its side of the story and asked for advice. In
addition to improving SLM information management and public
relations, Minni concurred that the best way to counter
propaganda in the long run was to have a functional and
timely CFC. He also agreed that his El Fasher and sector
sub-commission CFC representatives had to be constructive and
proactive. Providing immediate access and security
guarantees to AMIS was essential to getting accurate
information out early. The Security Advisor mentioned that
he had been told that the UNMIS security officer in Khartoum
had offered investigative training to AMIS with no success.
Minni concurred that a request to UNMIS from the SLM could
provide beneficial training to his representatives, counter
concerns that SLM was routinely denying allegations instead
of investigating, and possibly prove to be the impetus for
AMIS to shift from reporting claims to investigating
ceasefire violations.

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SLM Needs to Assist in Investigations, Exert Discipline
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6. (C) In addition, the Security Advisor noted that SLM/A Ali
Traio,s role in the Joint Commission as representative was
very helpful in countering the perception that the AMIS Force
Commander,s briefing was a coordinated CFC product
notwithstanding Ali,s persistent, argumentative style.
However, Minni was told that it was also apparent that the
SLM was losing credibility by refuting every allegation
without the basis of a full investigation. As CFC
investigations progress, the SLM/A has to be prepared to take
action against those commanders who have lost control of
their forces and perpetrated abuses. Serious commitment by
the SLM to full investigations and appropriate actions would
make the international community more cautious and patient to
hear a factual and valid investigation of all allegations and
lessen the impact of a NRF information campaign to discredit
SLM forces. Minni asked that the Security Advisor work with
Ali Traio over the next several days and get back to him on
the best way to implement these suggestions.

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Minni: Regionals to Interfere, SAF to Protect Towns
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7. (C) Throughout a rambling discourse of regional history
and rebel relations, Minni focused on two themes: 1)
regional players will continue to interfere in Darfur while
deferring visible support for the NRF as necessary; and, 2)
the SAF will protect the towns of Darfur from NRF attack and
strike at targets of opportunity. The SAF, however, will not
conduct sustained combat operations unless the NRF succeed in
gaining momentum and threatening South Darfur, as the
government far prefers continued fighting between forces in
North Darfur.


8. (C) Minni provided two examples. First, there is a
continuing build-up of NRF support in eastern Chad, including
two recent flights into Abeche from Eritrea with additional
weapons and munitions. Dousa Deby's forces continue to have
a presence across the border with additional fighters and
equipment, with significant Chadian forces still supporting
the NRF in North Darfur. Deby, he claimed, also has provided
supplies and provisions to some JEM elements and instructed
them to lie low in northern Chad near the Libyan border for
several months. Second, while the NRF has conducted sporadic
attacks over the past few days against SLM/A forces in Sayeh,
less than 30 kilometers away in Melit the Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF) has three battalions behind the NRF.
Rhetorically, he asked why the SAF had not come to the
defense of fellow DPA signatories by attacking the exposed
NRF forces.

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Comment
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9. (C) The latter example Minni cited is somewhat at odds
with continued and largely unconfirmed reports of SAF and
SLM/A coordinated combat operations, as well as President
Bashir,s stated intent. However, it also exemplifies the
government's historical patterns of weakening opponents by
letting opposing militias bleed each other while keeping a
watchful eye on the volatile security environment. In either
case, there is considerable potential for the increased
fighting to continue over the next several weeks.


10. (C) When the Security Advisor departed Minawi,s house,
he was shuttled through a maze of rooms to avoid the next

KHARTOUM 00001937 003 OF 003


visitors. This may portend Minni,s perceived need to reduce
the visibility of USG advisory assistance for the near-term.
End comment.
HUME