DARFUR: MINNI MINAWI SPEAKS HIS MIND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001937 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PINR AU CH ER US UN SU SUBJECT: DARFUR: MINNI MINAWI SPEAKS HIS MIND Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a wide ranging, two-hour meeting between Minni Minawi and the USG Senior Security Advisor, Tod Wilson, Minni discussed ideas on how to move forward with the DPA and his short-term concerns, particularly SLM capacity building. He asked for advice on how to improve the Ceasefire Commission (CFC),and counter National Redemption Front (NRF) propaganda. Minni also reviewed his thinking on how to reach out to other non-signatories. When asked about the probable impact of President Bashir,s recent &reconciliation8 with Deby, Minni launched into a long history of the regional players and the machinations, manipulations, and uncertainty that are common with regional relations. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Minni: SLM Needs Capacity Development, Party Building -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Minni was pleased to hear that the Khartoum Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) Implementation Office would be open by the end of this week, and the El Fasher facility the week following. He indicated he planned to attend the opening ceremonies on August 12 (Note: the DPA Implementation Office opening -) an event that included Minni's participation -- will be covered septel. End note.) He confirmed that the SLM is finalizing its nomination process for the various DPA commissions and committees, and noted that office space would be timely and very welcome. However, he indicated he needed capacity building training keenly for the SLM for political party development. Minni stated that the UK is providing 100 of his members English language training in Khartoum and 20 in El Fasher, but said the SLM also needed organizational and management training. He has approached GoSS President Salva Kiir regarding obtaining financial support from the SPLM for SLM party building and operations to meld a viable opposition party to the NPC. Minni's future focus and first priority for returning internally displaced persons to their Darfur homelands is in Sheiria, where tribal relations aomng the Arabs, Fur, and Zaghawa have been shattered. -------------- -------------- Minni Asks Kiir to Meet Shafi, Tell Welcome to Join DPA -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) He also indicated that he had tried to reach out to Abdul Wahid and Ahmed Abdul Shafi, but had not been successful with Shafi. He stated that he had discussed his thoughts with Salva Kirr for spurring Wahid towards the DPA through the Darfur-Darfur Dialog and Consultation Prep Commission, but expected little success. Minni passed on an anecdote that he had heard about Wahid and his recent dethroning, which he implied indicated Wahid,s demise as a key Fur leader. According to Minni, Shafi had requested Wahid to return to Darfur to meet the 32 commanders before they voted, but was told by Wahid that he had a long-planned two-week vacation that could not be rescheduled, where upon Shafi held the vote that ousted Wahid. Minni did ask Salva to engage with Shafi in Asmara during his visit and pass on that Minni would welcome them into the DPA and into various positions outlined in the DPA. The Security Advisor noted that he had heard there was a conference of respected Fur leaders being held in Khartoum, and that it might be beneficial to reach out to them also. Minni concurred, and indicated he would look into the conference. -------------- -------------- Minni: G-19 Few, JEM Small but Troublesome, NRF Chadian -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) In regard to other parties, he indicated that there was little left of the G-19, with only a group of leaders and very few forces. The JEM remained small, but troublesome and immersed in the NRF and leading a disinformation campaign. In a side note, Minni confirmed that the UN was embarrassed over its role in transporting Suleiman Jamous to Kadugli, and Jamous' continued activity against the DPA. Minni indicated he would guarantee Jamous,s safety in Khartoum if he stopped coordinating anti-DPA activities with the NRF and rejoined the SLM/A. He believed that most of the fighters with the NRF are Chadian, and claimed to have captured a Chadian regular army captain on a logistic mission. (Note: Minni subsequently turned the Chadian captain over to the SAF in Um Baro. End note.) -------------- -------------- Minni Recognizes Need for PR, Participation in CFC -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The Security Advisor said that regardless of who was the aggressor in the fighting, the NRF was winning the KHARTOUM 00001937 002 OF 003 information war. He noted that the NRF had already released three press statements claiming that SLM/A-M was the aggressor. Minni recognized the SLM,s shortcomings in getting out its side of the story and asked for advice. In addition to improving SLM information management and public relations, Minni concurred that the best way to counter propaganda in the long run was to have a functional and timely CFC. He also agreed that his El Fasher and sector sub-commission CFC representatives had to be constructive and proactive. Providing immediate access and security guarantees to AMIS was essential to getting accurate information out early. The Security Advisor mentioned that he had been told that the UNMIS security officer in Khartoum had offered investigative training to AMIS with no success. Minni concurred that a request to UNMIS from the SLM could provide beneficial training to his representatives, counter concerns that SLM was routinely denying allegations instead of investigating, and possibly prove to be the impetus for AMIS to shift from reporting claims to investigating ceasefire violations. -------------- -------------- SLM Needs to Assist in Investigations, Exert Discipline -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) In addition, the Security Advisor noted that SLM/A Ali Traio,s role in the Joint Commission as representative was very helpful in countering the perception that the AMIS Force Commander,s briefing was a coordinated CFC product notwithstanding Ali,s persistent, argumentative style. However, Minni was told that it was also apparent that the SLM was losing credibility by refuting every allegation without the basis of a full investigation. As CFC investigations progress, the SLM/A has to be prepared to take action against those commanders who have lost control of their forces and perpetrated abuses. Serious commitment by the SLM to full investigations and appropriate actions would make the international community more cautious and patient to hear a factual and valid investigation of all allegations and lessen the impact of a NRF information campaign to discredit SLM forces. Minni asked that the Security Advisor work with Ali Traio over the next several days and get back to him on the best way to implement these suggestions. -------------- -------------- Minni: Regionals to Interfere, SAF to Protect Towns -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Throughout a rambling discourse of regional history and rebel relations, Minni focused on two themes: 1) regional players will continue to interfere in Darfur while deferring visible support for the NRF as necessary; and, 2) the SAF will protect the towns of Darfur from NRF attack and strike at targets of opportunity. The SAF, however, will not conduct sustained combat operations unless the NRF succeed in gaining momentum and threatening South Darfur, as the government far prefers continued fighting between forces in North Darfur. ¶8. (C) Minni provided two examples. First, there is a continuing build-up of NRF support in eastern Chad, including two recent flights into Abeche from Eritrea with additional weapons and munitions. Dousa Deby's forces continue to have a presence across the border with additional fighters and equipment, with significant Chadian forces still supporting the NRF in North Darfur. Deby, he claimed, also has provided supplies and provisions to some JEM elements and instructed them to lie low in northern Chad near the Libyan border for several months. Second, while the NRF has conducted sporadic attacks over the past few days against SLM/A forces in Sayeh, less than 30 kilometers away in Melit the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has three battalions behind the NRF. Rhetorically, he asked why the SAF had not come to the defense of fellow DPA signatories by attacking the exposed NRF forces. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The latter example Minni cited is somewhat at odds with continued and largely unconfirmed reports of SAF and SLM/A coordinated combat operations, as well as President Bashir,s stated intent. However, it also exemplifies the government's historical patterns of weakening opponents by letting opposing militias bleed each other while keeping a watchful eye on the volatile security environment. In either case, there is considerable potential for the increased fighting to continue over the next several weeks. ¶10. (C) When the Security Advisor departed Minawi,s house, he was shuttled through a maze of rooms to avoid the next KHARTOUM 00001937 003 OF 003 visitors. This may portend Minni,s perceived need to reduce the visibility of USG advisory assistance for the near-term. End comment. HUME