GNU ADVISOR DETAILS HISTORY OF TROUBLED BILATERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001852 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR AU UN SU SUBJECT: GNU ADVISOR DETAILS HISTORY OF TROUBLED BILATERAL RELATIONS, SEEKS SIGNS OF U.S. GOODWILL REF: SECSTATE 124400 Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) On August 3, Charge Hume briefed Yahya Hussein Babiker on the Washington visits of First Vice President Kiir and Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minawi. He also noted USG efforts to convince Chad to end support to rebels operating along the Chad-Sudan border (reftel),as well as his efforts to reach out to Abdul Wahid and the Fur community and encourage them to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). CDA also discussed ongoing negotiations at the United Nations regarding a transition to a UN PKO in Darfur. ¶2. (C) Babiker provided a detailed history of the evolution of bilateral relations across the past five-plus years, a process in which he was intimately involved. The U.S., he said, first raised concerns about Sudanese sponsorship of terrorism. Coming with a &cookbook,8 the U.S. clearly stated that if certain steps were taken, within six months a process of normalization could begin. Specifically, the U.S. offered to remove Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The two countries quickly resolved outstanding issues and outright cooperation ensued. However, six months came and went, but the U.S. did not reciprocate. ¶3. (C) Once the U.S. and Sudan resolved their differences over terrorism, the negotiations then underway between Khartoum and the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) became the next stumbling block to an improvement in bilateral relations. Sudan was grateful for the U.S. role in achieving the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),for otherwise the SPLA/M would not have negotiated seriously. However, the Sudanese government was disappointed that the relationship resisted improvement. Now it is Darfur that divides the U.S. and Sudan. ¶4. (C) Babiker went on to describe the sense of frustration among not only President Bashir, Vice President Taha, and the government, but also on the part of the Sudanese public. In return for its actions, the government expected some recognition on the part of the U.S., actions that would further propel the bilateral relationship forward. Babiker also lamented the simplistic media interpretation of the situation in Darfur, unhelpful rumors regarding the introduction of NATO troops, as well as the mixed signals that often came from Washington, such as the slavery bill currently before the U.S. Congress. Even the Kiir and Minawi visits were viewed unfavorably in Khartoum, rumored to be a U.S. ploy to unite the SPLM and SLM against the government. Babiker himself saw no problems with sending a UN peacekeeping force into Darfur, but wanted to emphasize the poisoned atmosphere that existed and the difficulties that lie ahead. However, these difficulties could be surmounted through intensive consultations with the GNU and positive signs from the U.S. ¶5. (C) Charge Hume detailed considerable U.S. efforts to address Sudan,s concerns, citing our demarche to N,djamena and adjacent capitals over Chadian support to rebels in Darfur and U.S. condemnation of the rebel attack in North Kordofan (met with silence by Sudan,s neighbors). Both agreed that tension between the U.S. and Sudan would undercut mutual interests, both in Southern Sudan and in Darfur. Charge Hume concluded by affirming that President Bush is both willing and able to take positive steps toward Sudan and move the bilateral relationship forward under the right circumstances. The most important step the GNU could take is accepting a UN PKO in Darfur. HUME