Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1780
2006-07-24 12:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR COMMENTS ON LRA MEDIATION,

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL ABLD EFIN IBRD UG SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9319
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1780/01 2051245
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241245Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3871
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0008
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0048
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0018
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001780 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ABLD EFIN IBRD UG SU
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR COMMENTS ON LRA MEDIATION,
WORLD BANK RELATIONS, NEW U.S. CONSULATE

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1774


B. KHARTOUM 1775

KHARTOUM 00001780 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: P/E Eric Whitaker for reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001780

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ABLD EFIN IBRD UG SU
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR COMMENTS ON LRA MEDIATION,
WORLD BANK RELATIONS, NEW U.S. CONSULATE

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1774


B. KHARTOUM 1775

KHARTOUM 00001780 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: P/E Eric Whitaker for reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary: CG Juba met with GoSS Vice President
Machar on July 21 to review Machar's mediation between the
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda
(GOU),the strained GoSS relationship with the World Bank,
and the need for GoSS cooperation in completing due diligence
requirements on the new consulate compound site. Machar
admitted that the mediation was slow going and called for
greater U.S. support for the effort. He expressed great
exasperation with the Bank. Machar said that he would do his
utmost to break loose required documentation for the New
Consulate Compound (NCC). End summary.

--------------
Mediation Moves Ahead
--------------


2. (SBU) Machar told CG that while no breakthrough between
the LRA and GOU was in sight, neither party had walked out of
the talks. He said that discussion of the first agenda item,
a cessation of hostilities (Ref a),had concluded with
general consensus, although the GOU had refused to formalize
any agreement until the second point, the political and
economic background to the conflict, had been discussed. On
July 20, the mediation effort had jumped directly to the
third agenda point, reconciliation and accountability.
Machar said that the Ugandans had backed away from their
refusal to allow civil society and religious observers from
Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan to participate directly in
the talks. He said that he would propose, and expected that
both parties would accept, that these observers address the
mediation session directly on July 21.


3. (SBU) In response to the CG's query, Machar said that he
thought that the LRA delegation could undertake commitments

on the behalf of LRA military leaders in the bush if
sufficient consultation took place beforehand. He said that
Joseph Kony had asked to meet directly with religious
leaders, civil society, and tribal elders from Northern
Uganda, and that Machar himself would take this group as well
as Southern Sudanese civil society leaders to meet with Kony
in his camp on July 25. CG asked if any firm position on
accountability emerged from the July 20 discussions. Machar
said that it had not but cautioned that reconciliation should
not be taken to mean impunity.


4. (C) Machar pitched for greater U.S. support for the
mediation effort. He said that Sant'Egidio (Ref a)
represented the Vatican and that Pax Christi was the de facto
representative of the Dutch. In addition, a Swiss diplomat
attended the sessions and the day before the UN sent a UNICEF
official to observe the talks. Machar said that he would
request actual UN participation in the form of an expert on
IDPs and said that a U.S. observer - not participant - would
be warmly welcomed.


5. (SBU) Note: A Swiss representative has been in touch with
the CG directly and explained that the Swiss are looking to
give whatever support was needed, logistical, financial, or
consultative, to make the talks work. She also seemed eager
to get additional U.S. support for the project. CG replied
that we are keeping a distance from the talks for the time
being. End Note.

--------------
Jousting with the Bank
--------------


6. (SBU) Machar said that festering problems between the
World Bank and the GoSS persisted. He gave his version of a
July 19 meeting with Bank officials where "I (Machar) was
upset and let them know it." He accused the Bank of unfairly
refusing to release Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) support for
the Juba Roads Project and the Housing Project for GoSS
Officials (Ref b). Machar said that the Bank had released
funds for hospital, GoSS ministry rehabilitation, and
water/sanitation projects, but would not cooperate in other
areas. The CG said that while the USG had not directly
committed funds to the MDTF, we nonetheless hoped that some
equitable solution could be found to speed up reconstruction
of the South without sacrificing World Bank requirements for
transparent and open contracting and procurement processes.
Machar replied that he had insisted to the Bank team that the
Director for Southern Sudan should be based in Juba, and not
out of reach and sight in Washington.

KHARTOUM 00001780 002.2 OF 002



---
NCC
---


7. (SBU) The CG noted that over six months had been wasted
since the GoSS granted the USG a 99-year lease for a new
consular compound site on the outskirts of Juba, as necessary
GOSS actions to permit groundbreaking had not been taken.
The proximate cause of the delay was the continued failure of
officials of Central Equatoria State to complete the
formality of delivering a due diligence document that would
permit the USG to move ahead with the project. The longer
the delay, the longer it would take for the U.S. to establish
a fully operational presence in Juba. Machar said that he
was aware of the hold up and pledged to approach the proper
state authorities within the following week to resolve the
due diligence issue.
STEINFELD