DISCOURAGING AU MEETING WITH G-19 RAISES MANY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001772 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO PGOV US AU UN SU SUBJECT: DISCOURAGING AU MEETING WITH G-19 RAISES MANY QUESTIONS Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: AU DPA implementation lead Ambassador Sam Ibok held a harrowing, but fruitless meeting with members of the G-19 SLM/A-Minawi breakaway group. The G-19 sees little utility in engaging with the African Union (AU),which they believe will soon be replaced by a UN peacekeeping operation willing to reopen the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Ibok is pessimistic about his own organization,s capabilities, unless dramatic changes are made soon. Ibok is traveling to New York July 23-26 and hopes to raise these issues with the UN. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- AU DPA HEAD SAM IBOK HOLDS ROADSIDE MEETING WITH G-19 -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) AU Lead for DPA Implementation Ambassador Sam Ibok met with members of the G-19 splinter group in North Darfur on April 21. Ibok flew into Korma from El Fasher and attempted to travel by land to Birmaza, the site of recent fighting between the G-19 and SLM/A-Minawi,s forces. However, the G-19 rebels intercepted Ibok and his AMIS escort half way into their journey, warning them they could not guarantee the safety of the AU/AMIS convoy if they traveled further. Thus, Ibok was forced to hold his meeting with the rebels where they had stopped on the road. However, shortly after discussion started, they were interrupted by a &random8 SAF patrol. The rebels accused AMIS of planning an ambush and fled into the mountains. Meanwhile, Ibok placed a call to military contacts in Khartoum demanding that they call off the patrol that threatened not only to scuttle the meeting, but place his delegation in the middle of a firefight. After some tense negotiation, the SAF patrol withdrew and Ibok coaxed the rebels back for a short and ultimately fruitless discussion. -------------- IS PRONK PROMISING TO REOPEN DPA? -------------- ¶3. (C) Ibok had hoped to create some political space to separate fighting G-19 and SLM/A-Minawi forces, but his attempts to open some initial lines of communication were firmly rebuffed by the G-19 representatives. The rebels instead accused AMIS of collaborating with the GNU and supporting SLM/A-Minawi forces, and therefore of being incapable of negotiating in good faith. More importantly, the G-19 saw little reason to establish a relationship with the AU, which it believed would soon be replaced by UN forces. The rebels reportedly claimed that SRSG Jan Pronk had told them that once UNMIS replaced AMIS, the UN would reopen the DPA to resolve their compensation, disarmament, and power sharing grievances, and therefore the AU had nothing to offer. ¶4. (C) Ibok asked the rebels if they were at least willing to engage in discussions with SLM/A leader Minni Minawi to end the recent skirmishes in the region and return to the cease-fire status quo. The rebels responded that they had already defeated Minawi,s forces in the Birmaza area and therefore had no need to meet with Minawi. Finally, Ibok demanded that the G-19 return vehicles and arms it had stolen from AMIS earlier that week, but the rebels refused, explaining that AMIS, support of SLM/A-Minawi made them legitimate targets. In closing, the rebels informed Ibok that they would soon finalize an agreement among SLM/A leader Abdel Wahid, General Najib, Souleman Marjan, Suleiman Jamous, and others to join together under the banner of the National Redemption Front. -------------- -------------- AMIS NEEDS CLARITY AND GUIDANCE BEFORE DPA UNRAVELS -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Ibok,s visit to Darfur, which included a stay at the AMIS Forward Command Headquarters in El Fasher, left him highly discouraged. His South African security escorts had privately complained to him that they &were sitting ducks,8 a situation illustrated when an AMIS patrol was held-up and disarmed outside an IDP camp that same weekend. After meetings with AMIS Force Commander Ikihiri and his staff, Ibok felt that the AU mission was in &serious trouble,8 lacking both &situational clarity and assertive ability.8 Much of Darfur was becoming a &combat no-go zone8 which prevented the underpowered AU from fulfilling its DPA verification mandate. He concluded that unless AWOL AU KHARTOUM 00001772 002 OF 002 Special Representative and AMIS Head of Mission Ambassador Kingibe quickly returned to Sudan to gave AMIS immediate policy direction and authorize &dramatic8 measures, &this was all going to unravel.8 (NOTE: Kingibe,s deputy and senior AMIS civilian in Darfur, Ambassador Hassan Gibril, due back in Darfur July 15, was also still absent as of Ibok,s return from Darfur on July 22. END NOTE.) -------------- - INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO CONFRONT CHAD -------------- - ¶6. (C) According to Ambassador Ibok, the number one problem facing the DPA was confronting the issue of Chadian forces in Darfur. He said there was no question that Chadian interference was undermining the DPA. He accused Chadian forces of hostage taking, participating in the attacks on SLM/A-Minawi, and supplying the G-19 with the brand new weapons he saw during his meeting. However, Ibok complained that no one, including the AU, was willing to raise this issue publicly. Ibok hoped to meet with the French Ambassador in Khartoum to request French assistance on the Chadian side of the border to confirm his allegations. -------------- -------------- IBOK TRAVELING TO NY: HOPES TO MEET UN, CALL A/S FRAZER -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ibok departed for New York on July 23 to attend a July 24-25 Institute for Social Science Research conference on DPA implementation. While in New York, Ibok hopes to meet with Deputy UNSYG Hedi Annabi and UNDPKO U/S Jean-Marie Guehenno to discuss SRSG Pronk,s reported assurances to the G-19 and others that the DPA will be reopened. Ibok is concerned that the continuing failure of the UN and the AU to collectively stay on message on the DPA will only ensure their collective failure. Ibok also offered to brief A/S Frazer by phone on these issues. (NOTE: Ibok,s contact information forwarded separately to AF/SPG. END NOTE.) ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Ambassador Sam Ibok,s commentary reflects his frustration with his own organization,s shortcomings. Ibok,s office is essentially two people with one desk and no computer. His boss and AU mission head Ambassador Kingibe has been absent from Sudan for over a month, and Ibok,s other assigned staff are rarely in country. Ibok depends heavily on outside help, including ours, for meetings, travel, and resources. Nevertheless, Ibok has better understanding of the situation in Darfur than most. His views are in line with our own impressions and other reporting we receive. STEINFELD