NO. DARFUR UNMIS OFFICE ON DDDC, SECURITY, & HUMANITARIAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001674 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR AF/SPG AND S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KPKO PREL PREF PHUM UN AU US SU SUBJECT: NO. DARFUR UNMIS OFFICE ON DDDC, SECURITY, & HUMANITARIAN ISSUES ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The North Darfur UNMIS office is moving cautiously in promoting the DDDC, acknowledging a lack of coordination between the UN and the AU. Local UNOCHA staff express concern that the international community's "preferential" treatment accorded to Minni Minawi is further undermining the DPA and exacerbating tensions on the ground. END SUMMARY. -------------- UNMIS THINKING AND ACTION ON DDDC -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Active Response Corps (ARC) officers met July 9 with UNMIS Civil Affairs officers Amin Bakhsh and Insaf Idris to discuss the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process and UN efforts to promote it in North Darfur. Bakhsh offered that the best prospects for encouraging the DDDC were through the local "elites," to include sheiks, omdas, and select IDP leaders. He noted that UNMIS is attempting to meet with this group on a regular basis to hear its views on the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and political, humanitarian, and security environments. Bakhsh and Idris echoed the common view that with renewed fighting in North Darfur and a perceived lack of clarity regarding key provisions of the DPA - namely on compensation - implementation of the document will be difficult. Darfurians' skepticism of the DPA compensation mechanism is compounded by the utter inefficacy and lack of follow-through demonstrated by the GNU National Compensation Committee that visited Darfur in 2005. ¶3. (SBU) Responding to ARC officer's query on UNMIS thinking about promoting the DDDC, Bakhsh noted that progress in South Darfur was further along than in the North. He reiterated Darfurians' concerns that the process, which itself might be viewed as an affirmation of the widely criticized DPA, would be manipulated by the GNU. Bakhsh opined that the success of the DDDC would be largely dependent on the Preparatory Committee and the extent of its consultations with Darfurian stakeholders. Some key open questions that have yet to be answered, Bakhsh remarked, was weight would any recommendations and findings made by the DDDC have, and how would they be implemented. He underscored the preference of many of his interlocutors that the DDDC's recommendations be incorporated as additional provisions to the DPA (or included as a separate addendum to the agreement). ¶4. (SBU) Bakhsh further noted that there was effectively no coordination between the African Union (AU) and the UN on DPA-related activities, adding that the AU was not seen by most Darfurians as a credible partner in DPA implementation. (Note: This contradicts reports from South Darfur that the AU and UNMIS have agreed to a joint plan on preparatory meetings for the DDDC and have already held joint workshops on DPA implementation. End note.) Nonetheless, UNMIS is proceeding, although at a slower pace in North Darfur, with plans to promote the DDDC through a variety of workshops. The first venue will be a UNDP-sponsored Sufi conference on July 21-22, during which UNMIS will deliver a presentation on the DDDC. Bakhsh further explained that his office has received funding to support a series of future symposiums (dates TBD) on "reconciliation and dialogue" organized by the Darfur Forum. Bakhsh invited ARC officers to attend these events. -------------- -------------- OCHA STAFF: MINAWI FAVORTISM UNDERMINES DPA, SECURITY -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) ARC officers later attended the UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)-run interagency coordination meeting. On security, the briefings, like others attended by ARC officers and as widely reported in the press, focused on recent fighting around Korma, Tawila, and nearby villages, and the accompanying humanitarian effects. On the margins of the meeting, senior OCHA Protection Officer Cate Steains animatedly conveyed to ARC field officer her opinion that the DPA is having a detrimental effect on the security of civilians on the ground. Nonplussed by arguments that killings and attacks on a wider and more violent scale have decreased since the DPA, Steains contended that the international community's "blind support for Minni Minawi" is misplaced, given that he has only spotty support throughout Darfur (based on her information from local NGOs and contacts) and is "as big a criminal" as the other faction leaders. ¶6. (SBU) Steains added that recent reports of joint GNU-SLA-Minawi attacks in Birmaza only hardened most Darfurians' views against Minawi and the DPA, which she alleged is now being used as justification to carry out military operations. Steins acknowledged that she viewed the security issue primarily through a "protection" lens, and not necessarily a political one. Pressed to provide her views on a viable solution to the current situation, she ceded that the international community must work with the signatories to the DPA, but that more effort must be paid to hearing out the other KHARTOUM 00001674 002 OF 002 factions and seeking their inclusion. Finally, Steains remarked that many Darfurians' distrust of the DPA has been augmented by G-19 claims that AMIS was involved in the Birmaza attacks, presumably because of unconfirmed reports (NFI) that a white helicopter was viewed circling the area. (NOTE: The SAF has been observed and photographed using white, or even AMIS-marked, air assets on several occasions in violation of agreed livery differentiation. The rumor of AMIS involvement in Birmaza was repeated in a separate conversation ARC field officer had with Sudan Social Development Organization (SUDO) head Khalil Dukran on July 10. END NOTE.) -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Steains' views - colored by the imperative she places on neutrality in providing protection to the civilian population - have not been as stridently expressed by other UNMIS staff. Her opinions, however, are transmitted to UNMIS head Jan Pronk and will likely influence the outlook in Khartoum. She made a direct appeal for the United States and other international actors take a more "balanced" view on Minawi, emphasizing that without the buy-in from SLA-Abdel Wahid and the broader Darfurian population, the DPA was not viable. STEINFELD