SUDAN ADMITS AU PEACKEEPING COLLAPSING, BUT NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001667 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG USEU PLEASE PASS A/S FRAZER NSC FOR COURVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO PHUM SU AU UN SUBJECT: SUDAN ADMITS AU PEACKEEPING COLLAPSING, BUT NOT YET READY FOR UN REF: A. KHARTOUM 1659 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1588 ¶C. KHARTOUM 1565 ¶D. KHARTOUM 1562 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Sudan fully recognizes that the African Union is not meeting its responsibilities in Darfur, Presidential Advisor Magzoub Al-Khalifa told CDA Hume on July ¶15. The AU is not acting to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement, and the Government has pushed the AU to make basic decisions about the membership of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC),the leadership of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue, and arrangements for wealth and power sharing. The situation on the ground was now "very serious," Magzoub said. But Sudan was still not prepared to allow a UN peacekeeping force, instead urging that both Sudan and the United States "move to the middle and find a common position" to bring peace to the region. A meeting between President Bashir and his top advisors -- scheduled later on the afternoon of July 15 -- could open a way forward, Magzoub suggested. The Government looks forward to preparing its own plan, and discussing it with A/S Frazer in Brussels. End Summary. U.S., Sudan Agree: AU Not Implementing DPA -------------- ¶2. (C) CDA Hume recounted for Magzoub a July 13 meeting between AU Special Advisor Sam Ibok and key donor representatives (Ref A). The AU was doing nothing to implement the DPA, and had not given Ibok a single dinar to support the agreement. The CFC had done nothing to investigate fighting between the SLA's Minawi and Abdulwahid factions near Korma, and neither the AMIS Force Commander nor his deputy had even attended the July 12 CFC meeting. Most recently, Chadian-backed militias had attacked Minawi's forces several times near Muzbat within the past 24 hours, and AMIS had done nothing to respond. (Post will report on the most recent attacks septel). The AU peacekeeping force was collapsing, Hume argued, and Sudan's opposition to UN force was no longer tenable. ¶3. (C) Magzoub "fully agreed" that the AU was not meeting its responsibilities, and told Hume that he had had his own "very tough meeting" with Ibok. Magzoub had pressed Ibok to clarify the membership of the CFC, and had urged the AU to hold a second Joint Commission meeting. He had pushed the AU to launch the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue, and make arrangements for the wealth and power sharing provisions of the DPA. Sudan had even offered money to support the AU's efforts, Magzoub revealed, but this seemed to have no effect. AMIS intentionally was dragging its feet because Nigerian President Obasango wanted to wait for an AU/UN transition, he believed. But even if Sudan were to agree to a transition in six months, how could there be any transition if AMIS could not maintain peace in the interim, Magzoub wondered aloud. ¶4. (C) President Omer al-Bashir had called a meeting of his top advisors for the afternoon of July 15, Magzoub said, to make a full evaluation of the situation in the field. Mazgoub hoped it would point a way forward. Sudan and the United States must push the AU to start moving, especially on the Joint Commission. But the Joint Commission also includes the UN, Hume interjected, and Sudan must re-assess its position towards the UN. "Let us speak about the AU Plus, if only for the sake of the Government," Magzoub pleaded. "We have to strike a balance to avoid political problems." Preparing for Brussels, Searching for Middle Ground -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The Government was looking forward to talks in Brussels with A/S Frazer, Magzoub said. Sudan was preparing its plan on empowering AMIS to implement the DPA, but also wanted to leave the door open to dialogue, he said. As for the need for UN forces, there can always be another evaluation down the road. In the meantime, Sudan and the United States had to agree on a new formula to overcome weaknesses in AMIS, like expanding the ceasefire verification team. ¶6. (C) But Hume reminded Magzoub that AMIS needed more than just incremental changes. A few foreign verifiers or NATO staff officers would not help; neither would new commanders or new battalions. President Bush had already asked African KHARTOUM 00001667 002 OF 002 leaders to send more troops, but even if the AU was able to muster 8800 troops, it would still have only 100 civilians to help support its operations -- compared to the 4000 civilians the UN envisages for force just twice the size. AMIS was failing, and the international community would not support expanding it. Sudan, however, had rejected any UN deployment outright. The United States was not a party to the International Criminal Court; unlike some of its allies, it favors a UN mandate in Darfur that focuses solely on peacekeeping. UN troops could not come without Sudan's approval, Hume acknowledged, but if Sudan sticks to its current position, the Government will face a huge risk. "If the situation deteriorates, who will be seen as responsible?" Hume asked pointedly. ¶7. (C) Sudan's position would be better defined by Monday afternoon's meetings with A/S Frazer, Magzoub said. Sudan and the United States must find a way forward together and not go forth in confrontation, he emphasized. Both sides should move to the middle and find a common position, he urged. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Magzoub focused less on sovereignty, neo-colonialism, and popular opposition to UN forces -- and more on seeking middle ground -- than in previous meetings (Refs B, C, and D). The Government understands that AMIS is collapsing, but it is not yet intellectually or politically ready to agree to a UN deployment. Bashir's July 15 meeting with his advisors may help, but more must likely be done in Brussels to show the Sudanese a way out of their self-made dilemma. HUME