DPA IMPLEMENTATION: AU ADMITS DRAMATIC LACK OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001659 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV US AU UN SU SUBJECT: DPA IMPLEMENTATION: AU ADMITS DRAMATIC LACK OF CAPACITY REF: KHARTOUM 01560 Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary and recommendations: In a frank three- hour discussion among the donors, UNMIS deputy, and AU DPA implementer Sam Ibok, it became clear that the AU was dramatically understaffed and underfunded to lead DPA implementation. Ibok admitted that he will be totally reliant on the UN and the international community to support the AU's work. The group spent considerable time discussing the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the Joint Commission (JC), both currently moribund. The problems include the outstanding issue of how to deal with non-participants, and the leadership of both. Recommendations: -- In Brussels, the importance of a successfully functioning CFC and JC needs to be underlined. There is consensus that a way needs to be found to make these as inclusive as possible, permitting participation of groups other than the SLM/Minawi, at least as observers. AU Special Rep Kingibe and AMIS Force Commander Ihikire, both of whom have fallen on the job, need to be told what is expected of their leadership of these two fora. -- Senior levels of the AU (Konare) should be told that Ibok needs more institutional support. He admitted having received no extra funds for his work. The international community cannot be expected to bear the entire financial burden of the AU's effort, to include telephones and computers. -- The donor community and the UN will have to usher this process forward. In Khartoum, building on the work of our S/CRS surge team, we will press for the completion of the long-awaited AU/UN implementation matrix, and push for the formation of working groups on key issues like the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process. End Summary and Recommendations. -------------- Preparations for Brussels -------------- ¶2. (C) U.S. called a meeting July 13 to review DPA implementation issues and the upcoming meeting in Brussels. Participants included diplomats from the AU, Canada, EU, EC, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, UK, and UN. DCM (in the absence of Charge, who was traveling to Juba) outlined the basic elements covered in the July 11-12 Washington and New York Brussels conference preparatory meetings. He stressed that the U.S. position was that the transition must begin on October 1. The UK ambassador noted that Minister of Foreign Affairs Lam Akol would head Sudan's delegation to the conference. (Note: AU Special Representative Kingibe is also expected to participate. End note.) UK Amb added that, in Banjul, UN SYG Annan had reportedly agreed to receive by the end of the month a six-month security plan from President Bashir for Darfur, and then to keep discussing the issue. UN Senior Deputy Special Representative Taye Brook Zerihoun added that in his meeting with Annan, Bashir had articulately argued that UN rehatting should be off the table: the UNSC and Guehenno and Djinnit had repeated that there would be no UN PKO without Sudan's approval. Sudan did not approve. Why then, was this continually being raised? Taye also said that the July 12 New York meeting had caused some "discomfort" at the UN, as it assumed that the UN would be well prepared when it hit the ground in an anticipated peacekeeping operation in Darfur. If AMIS is not strengthened before a transition, he stated, it would undermine the credibility of the UN. ¶3. (C) DCM noted that only one option remains; it will be difficult to get donors to commit to pledging the $300 ) 400 million necessary to extend AMIS through the end of 2006 unless it is linked to a UN peacekeeping transition. Pressing for an October 1 transition increases the pressure for the Sudanese to change their position sooner rather than later. -------------- CFC, JC Dysfunctional -------------- ¶4. (C) During a lengthy discussion, it became clear that the CFC and JC were not functioning properly, if at all. While all agreed on the urgent importance of quick professional KHARTOUM 00001659 002 OF 003 investigation of ceasefire violations, the mechanism was not working. Special Advisor Sam Ibok said that the CFC and JC should be inclusive, and that much effort had been wasted on arguments over participation. The German ambassador said that the CFC would only work with lines of communication open to all parties. Both the Ndjamena Accord and the DPA called for ceasefires, and the CFC needs to be able to cover both aspects. The UK ambassador said that the JEM and SLM/Abdel Wahid delegations are prepared to go to CFC meetings; also, the JC is essential to the success of the DPA. Ibok said he was aware of these issues, but that the answer lay in part with Kingibe and AMIS Force Commander Ihikire. He said that there was a need for more consultation, and that meetings should be requested with the heads of both bodies. (Note: Ibok was openly critical of Kingibe and Ihikire. The former had not been in Khartoum in weeks, and had not planned a second Joint Commission meeting, which Zerihoun openly called a fiasco. It was also noted that neither Ihikire nor his deputy showed up at the July 12 CFC in El Fasher, busy, apparently, with other matters. UK Ambassador --strictly protect -- told DCM that Kingibe was brazenly campaigning in London for UK support for his presidential aspirations in Nigeria. End Note.) -------------- -------------- DPA Assistance: An Updated Tally of Who is Doing What -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) ARC Team Leader Wechsler provided an update on the two DPA Implementation Offices in Khartoum and El Fasher, noting that the facilities, including Embassy housing in El Fasher, could also be made available to support efforts by other donors in support of the DPA, such as the incoming UK media advisors. He said that the facilities would provide office space to DPA signatories and those signing the Declaration of Commitment, training, workshops, and meetings. The UK ambassador said that the media advisors would produce handouts and radio announcements about the DPA, with the preliminary team soon to be replaced by a more permanent team. He added that the UK is supporting English language training for the SLM, as well as training in office, computer, and media skills in each of the three Darfur state capitals as well as Khartoum. ¶6. (C) Other assistance in support of the DPA included the following: -- Germany - intends to publish a DPA summary guide for mass distribution. -- Canada ) has a joint military team coming to assist in strengthening AMIS. -- EU ) plans to support the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process, including providing support to the newly formed DPA implementation commissions. -- The Netherlands ) is supporting the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (D-JAM) process, through coordination of working groups to design Tracks I and II. Involves $100 million for Darfur capacity building, including media assistance and leadership skills. Funds also target AMIS capacity development in Khartoum. -- Norway ) also providing $25 million for capacity building assistance to the SLM, including support for a delegation to the Brussels conference. -------------- -------------- Ibok Admits AU Weaknesses, Appeals for Partnership -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ibok said that the AU plans to continue coordinating with the UN, with which it is establishing priorities for DPA implementation. He thanked those present for their support, and admitted to a number of institutional weaknesses he faced in attempting to assist DPA implementation: a complete lack of office space and civilian staff, computers, and finances. The AU DPA implementation team currently consists of Ibok and one assistant. There is no dedicated AU staff to support the DPA implementation process in El Fasher. The AU, he said, had minimal capacity and logistics to carry out its DPA support role, a situation unlikely to change soon. Thus the AU will need to rely upon its partners extensively. He implored partners to furnish medium and long-term technical assistance, rather than that of shorter duration. As the AU's staff is very limited, donor focus groups are needed to support implementation of the DPA. Queried by the DCM, Ibok admitted he had not received one penny for implementation from AU headquarters in Addis. KHARTOUM 00001659 003 OF 003 ¶8. (C) The Italian ambassador inquired about the selection of a Chair for the DDDC Commission, which he believed was to be an African personality, and the extent to which the DDC would be an inclusive dialogue ) with janjaweed, local tribes, etc. participating. Ibok thanked Italy for its support and noted that there might be news regarding a DDDC Chair by the time of the Brussels conference. He invited the international community partners to submit candidates to him for referral to Addis Ababa, including Sudanese. An ideal Chair would have familiarity with the situation in Darfur, and would have sensitivity as to the region's cultural and religious make-up. Regarding DDDC participation, Ibok said the premise was to be inclusive, as it was well understood that the Abuja peace talks did not allow for a broad base of representatives to be present. All but those taking up arms are welcome, he added, and the composition of the 85-member Preparatory Committee should include those suggested by the international community. ¶10. (C) Taye noted that the DDC was the single most important aspect on DPA implementation. While other areas of the DPA have representation, the DDDC needs participation by all Darfurians, not those hijacked by parties. Fortunately, the DPA did not include many of the factors that make the CPA so challenging, such as oil, Abyei, North-South boundaries, etc. Dialogue, he concluded, is the priority for sustained peace. The French ambassador agreed, and noted that time was of the essence, as the Government is working behind the scenes discussing power sharing arrangements with tribal leaders. ¶11. (C) Taye stated that the UN has had a civil affairs program in Darfur for a long time, and had continued programming to take into account the realities of the DPA. He underscored the UN's continuing support for the AU, and mentioned its seconding of staff to the AU and its own shifting of staff to Darfur. He added that the UN sees support for the AU and transition to a UN peacekeeping operation as elements of a continuum. -------------- Next steps -------------- ¶12. (C) DCM urged that Ibok call a meeting immediately after the Brussels meeting to continue work. He asked that the UN and AU complete their joint matrix, and that, during the next plenary of the donors/UN/AU group, task forces be established to move forward on various fronts, most importantly, the DDDC and the CFC/JC issue. HUME