SOUTHERN SUDAN: APPROXIMATE TROOP STRENGTH AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001650 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2016 TAGS: MCAP PREL SU SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SUDAN: APPROXIMATE TROOP STRENGTH AND EQUIPMENT INVENTORY OF SUDAN PEOPLE,S LIBERATION ARMY Classified By: CGJ R. Whitehead, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: We have obtained from a contractor (strictly protect) involved in the Sudan People,s Liberation Army Transformation (SPLAT) Project the troop strength and heavy weapons inventory of the SPLA. As long suspected, SPLA numbers are far below those previously claimed by senior SPLM officials. The new numbers should provide a more rational approach to downsizing the SPLA and designing an appropriate DDR plan. The number of armed civilians that supported the SPLA during the conflict and still consider themselves to be members of the SPLA remains a more elusive figure. End summary. -------------- SPLA Troop Strength -------------- ¶2. (C) The document we have obtained breaks down the number of officers and other ranks by location. The following table indicates current numbers under arms that the SPLA considers a part of its forces. Officers Other Ranks General Headquarters 915 1,934 SPLA Air Force 196 420 SPLA Nile Patrol 66 600 Infantry Division (GHQ reserve)1,130 12,488 Mechanized Infantry Brigade 135 2,110 Airborne 294 3,354 SPLA JIU Forces 1,484 18,395 (Training Units) NCO Infantry School 60 200 Unified Training Center 64 400 Institute for Strategic Studies 155 175 Military College 65 360 Infantry Institute 35 360 Total 4,599 40,796 Grand Total 45,395 Troop numbers are broken down by the following directorates: inspectorate, research, political and moral orientation, procurement, logistics, intelligence, external relations, operations, military justice, war heroes, military production, finance, officers, affairs, training, organization, and administration. Embassy Khartoum will send these figures to SPG. -------------- SPLA Weapons Inventory -------------- ¶3. (C) We have also obtained a chart of heavy weapons in the SPLA inventory, as follows. Main Battle Tank -- 51 APC/IFV -- 6 Field Guns -- 6 Howitzers -- 36 Mortars -- 468 RR/RPG -- 184 Missiles -- 6 AA Guns (towed) -- 0 AA Guns (SP) -- 262 HM SAM -- 3 There was no inventory for pistols, machine pistols, rifles, light and heavy machineguns, or MANPAD SAMs. The weapons inventory is broken down between the five military fronts and the General Headquarters Unit. These figures will be transmitted to SPG. -------------- Analysis -------------- ¶4. (C) There are still questions about effective SPLA troop strength that require answers. GoSS Minister of Police and Security Awet recently told CG that the SPLA had transferred 18,000 troops to Awet,s ministry for training as policemen, prison guards, and game wardens. We assume that the global figure above does not include these forces. In addition, there are certainly large numbers of armed civilians who fought in militia support of the SPLA during various periods of the conflict and who still consider themselves to be &military8 whether or not the SPLA has officially counted them among SPLA ranks. ¶5. (C) In the past, both during and after the Naivasha negotiations, various SPLA/SPLM leaders have bandied about troop figures ranging from 200,000-320,000, numbers that were always in serious doubt. The current number ) if accurate sounds more reasonable and is a good starting place for transforming the SPLA into an effective professional force large and capable enough to assure Southern Sudan,s legitimate defense interests. The large number of armed civilians who may or may not consider themselves to be soldiers in the SPLA remains problematic; however, this phenomenon is more of a DDR than a SPLAT issue. ¶6. (C) The number of fighters claimed by other armed groups (OAGs) and tribal militias is probably inflated as well. Claims that now-SPLA Chief of Staff Paolino Matiep brought 40,000 SSDF troops with him into the SPLA are certainly not credible. We suspect that force numbers claimed by other armed groups are equally unreliable. HUME