SITUATION IN SUDAN DURING REAR ADMIRAL HUNT VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001633 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO MOPS SU AU UN SUBJECT: SITUATION IN SUDAN DURING REAR ADMIRAL HUNT VISIT Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b ) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: CJTF-HOA Commander, Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, visited Khartoum and El Fasher, Sudan, from 9-10 July ¶2006. During the visit, Charge d'Affaires Cameron Hume and Admiral Hunt met with UNMIS Force Commander Lieutenant General Jasbir Lidder and discussed the deteriorating situation in Darfur and the support Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) need in Southern Sudan. CDA Hume and Admiral Hunt also traveled to El Fasher, where they met with Acting Force Commander Brigadier General F.M. Kamanzi and received a briefing on AMIS operations. End Summary. Meeting with UNMIS FC LTG Lidder -------------- ¶2. (C) Darfur: LTG Lidder said the situation in Darfur was taking a turn for the worse and could spiral out of control in the next two months. Lidder was concerned about the recent fighting in the Birmaza area (Vicinity of GEOCOORD: 144000N/0243000E.) The town is Minni Minawi,s home village. He said the UN has received reports of fighting in the village between SLA (Minawi) and SLA (Wahid),and that Sudanese Armed Forces, (SAF) helicopters and Antonov airplanes have been seen flying in the area of Birmaza. ¶3. (C) Lidder also expressed concern about what he sees as AMIS favoritism towards SLA (M) and SAF because they are signatories to the DPA. The UN believes this has led SLA (W) and JEM to see AMIS as supporting SLA (M) and SAF. Lidder said AMIS must remain neutral. He also complained that AMIS had started resisting UNMIS help; although e gave no details. He also called the GoS disarmament of the janjaweed a farce, but again gave no details. To strengthen AMIS capabilities and efficiencies, Lidder recommended giving night vision goggles, thermal sights, and ground surveillance radars to AMIS. He also recommended that AMIS receive staff training of an unspecified nature. Furthermore, Lidder expressed concern about the politicization of the IDPs along tribal lines in support or non-support of the DPA. ¶4. (C) Southern Sudan: Lidder said there had been no major violations of the CPA except in Abyei. He gave no further details. (Note: The incident, in February 2006, involved a night ambush on SPLM-associated Southern militia by SAF-affiliated Southern militias, and is not regarded universally by the international community to have constituted a CPA violation, as neither party is a CPA signatory. End note.) He also stated the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) exist in name only. The former warring parties are suspicious of each other in the integrated units. The units need accommodations, equipment, and training. The UN wants a formal request for the support needed. He also said the indiscipline of the SPLA was a problem. The redeployment of SPLA forces from Kassala southward had been completed, and UNMIS forces in the area had started redeploying southward following the SPLA withdrawal, as they no longer had a mandate to stay in the area. UNMIS was also repositioning some of its forces into areas where they anticipated LRA attacks might occur in the future. He praised the GoSS, and Government of Uganda,s efforts to end the fighting with the LRA. AMIS Meetings in El Fasher -------------- ¶5. (C) Operations Brief: During an operations briefing, AMIS told CDA Hume and Admiral Hunt that AMIS only had about 30 percent of the forces it needs to conduct operations in support of the DPA and its still unapproved new CONOPs. The DPA gave AMIS more tasks than under its previous mandate; to be able to support the DPA, AMIS needs more troops. Under their new CONOPs, AMIS wants to establish buffer zones around IDP camps and along the main north-south road from El Fasher toward Nyala, and along the main east-west road from El Fasher towards El Geneina. AMIS said it had a lack of tactical and long-range communications equipment. It should be noted AMIS did not mention any reports of recent fighting in Darfur. When CDA Hume asked about recent reports of fighting in the Birmaza area, Acting Force Commander Brigadier Kamanzi did not answer the question. ¶6. (C) Meeting with Acting AMIS Force Commander: Acting Force Commander Brigadier General Kamanzi told CDA Hume and Admiral Hunt that AMIS needed medical supplies. Kamanzi never mentioned the recent fighting. Hunt asked Kamanzi if AMIS had seen any radicalization of the Muslim population, and Kamanzi responded no. ¶7. (C) Comment: Embassy officials talked to other UNMIS and AMIS officials about the situation in Birmaza and pieced together the following account. Reportedly the SLA (Minni) KHARTOUM 00001633 002 OF 002 Commander in the village started bad-mouthing the DPA. Minni came back to the village and tortured the commander. We have no way to verify the torture claim. The village elders then forced Minni to leave. The villagers decided to join the G-19 faction. Minni,s force started an offensive operation to regain the town on 05 July. As of 10 July, SLA (M) has been unable to retake the town.) The UN does not believe the SAF and SLA (M) are conducting joint operations, but they are concerned that since Minni,s forces have been unable to re-take the village, the SAF may support a future attack with aviation assets. The UN fears this could then lead to further military cooperation between SLA (M) and SAF. UNMIS believes since AMIS has issued SLA (M) and SAF members of the Ceasefire Commission vehicles, identification cards, and AU armbands, the DPA non-signatories view AMIS as favoring SLA (M) and the SAF. HUME