AMIS INACTIVITY AND THE SECURITY CRISIS IN DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001632 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV MOPS AU UN US SU SUBJECT: AMIS INACTIVITY AND THE SECURITY CRISIS IN DARFUR Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: A security crisis is approaching in Darfur, and the AU peacekeepers are not taking charge of the situation. A wide variety of reporters -- civilian contractors, BBC journalists, INGO workers, and others -- have been filing unconfirmed reports of clashes between SLA/Minawi forces (supported by Sudanese Armed Forces) and JEM and SLA dissident forces for control of Birmaza in North Darfur over the past week. AMIS, which is either not patrolling in the area or not reporting on events, has been silent. This message proposes a number of steps needed to activate AMIS and to bring some equilibrium to the security situation in Darfur. See para 5. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Background: A variety of reporting, although conflicting on details, confirms that fighting is taking place in two areas of Darfur. In Birmaza, the G-19 (members of the SLA, including Suleiman Jamous, Khamis Abdullah, and Sharif Harir, who broke away from both Minni Minawi and Abdel Wahid over six months ago) and JEM elements have clashed with Minawi,s forces for control of the town over the past two months. Most reports suggested that the initial attack was launched by the G-19 and that Minawi now has some support from the Sudanese Armed Forces in the area. In Tawila, Minawi and Abdel Wahid forces have been clashing along the north/south road that runs from El Fasher to Nyala and separates Abdel Wahid,s area of control to the west of the road from the Minawi-controlled area to the east. Although fighting in both areas has been sporadic, no end to it is in sight. ¶3. (C) AMIS Inactivity: AMIS has been inactive. It is not activity patrolling in either area or submitting reports to the ceasefire commission. In fact, due to a procedural wrangle, the ceasefire commission has not met once this month; in late June a meeting of the Joint Commission adjourned without solving the procedural question of how to deal with "parties" who did not sign the DPA. On the ground AMIS is becoming increasingly passive, withdrawing from some areas (e.g., Kalma IDP Camp),staying in its fixed positions except during daylight hours, or postponing patrolling to areas of conflict. Given the interest that spoilers (including the JEM, the G-19, and Abdel Wahid) have in derailing the Darfur Peace Agreement, they are testing the new ceasefire mechanisms, and those mechanisms are failing. ¶4. (C) UN Sniping: Although the UN &supports8 the DPA, the UN has adopted a neutral stance toward the fighting. SRSG Pronk muddied the waters further in the criticism he posted on his &personal8 webblog. Some UN personnel have taken the position that, because JEM, the G-19, and Abdel Wahid did not sign the DPA, they are not bound by its ceasefire provisions and therefore not in violation even when initiating fighting. ¶5. (C) The next ten weeks: If the AMIS operation ends by the end of September, as planned, AMIS peacekeepers have only ten weeks from the July 18 pledging conference in Brussels to make a difference. Here are eight steps that AMIS can take in this period that will each make a material difference in the situation. Embassy Khartoum urges the Department to consider using the period between now and the July 18 pledging conference to develop consensus among donors to support these steps: -- Get AMIS to begin 24/7 patrolling in key strategic areas, to include the perimeter of the largest IDP camps (e.g., Kalma and Abu Shouk) and the key roads (e.g., the north/south road between El Fasher and Nyala); -- Have the AU resolve the procedural issue that has prevented the functioning of the Ceasefire Commission and the Joint Commission. (Note: One possible solution would be to have all parties participate in the &information phase8 of the work, with only adherents participating in the &decision phase,8 but almost any solution is better to no solution. End note); -- Secure a clear statement from the AU, supported by the international partners, that new adherents to the DPA should be included as partners in implementation, including for nomination to government positions, involvement in development work, and participation in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process); -- Complete the task of map preparation and verification. The AU has responsibility for this work, but partners, including the USG, have not yet provided the staff promised to work on this project. This work is crucial for stopping turf battles, such as those taking place in Birmaza and near Tawila; KHARTOUM 00001632 002 OF 002 -- Organize community policing in the IDP camps. AMIS and eventually the UN would have the lead; success here would not only improve security, but strengthen the links between the peacekeepers and the population; -- Launch a coordinated information campaign to explain and support the DPA. AMIS has so far been silent; the UN has been confused; the U.S. and UK are mobilizing their resources; but, JEM and Abdel Wahid have flooded the IDP camps with their critical messages. Minawi has held public meetings, but similar efforts by the Government of Sudan are probably counter-productive; -- Begin the work of the Joint Humanitarian Monitoring Unit called for in the DPA. Although the work of this unit would duplicate the work of the UN, the AU and UN should be able to work in tandem so that the peacekeepers' work in the security area gives better support to work of humanitarian agencies; and -- Name the Chairman of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. The DPA charged the AU with naming an eminent African to lead the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. The failure to do prevents consultation with parties on the ground. Cooperation with the UN would be needed to make sure adequate institutional resources are available. HUME