Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1558
2006-07-03 07:33:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
UNSRSG Pronk Elaborates on Blog
how-toVZCZCXRO7369 PP RUEHMA RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #1558 1840733 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 030733Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3515 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001558
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KPKO SOCI AU UN SU
SUBJECT: UNSRSG Pronk Elaborates on Blog
Ref: Khartoum 1549
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001558
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KPKO SOCI AU UN SU
SUBJECT: UNSRSG Pronk Elaborates on Blog
Ref: Khartoum 1549
1. SRSG Pronk's blog of June 28 continues to draw
attention, and he is now trying to clarify what he wrote.
An editorial in the Sudan Vision Daily, a pro-government
daily newspaper, states in its July 3 edition that
Pronk's blog represents a "complete U-turn," and that
this would infuriate both the Sudanese Government and the
African Union. There are also signs that those rebel
elements that seek to reopen, amend, or "add a lot"
(Pronk's words) to the DPA will use Pronk's comments to
support and reinforce their views.
2. On July 2, Pronk released the following explanation:
(Begin text)
Khartoum on 2 July 2006
In an article on the Darfur Peace Agreement, published
last week, I had raised the question: "How to put new
life into the DPA?" An answer is necessary because on
the ground, especially amongst the displaced persons, the
DPA continues to meet more and more resistance.
I have argued in this article that "In my view it is a
good text, an honest compromise. That is why the UN has
endorsed the agreement". However, wrong perceptions
about the agreement are paralysing it. In order to
address this situation, the article outlines three
necessary steps. "First, timely implementation of what
has been agreed, because non-implementation would
reinforce the position of those who have so far rejected
the agreement." The second priority is broadening the
circle of support for the peace agreement.... Efforts to
broaden the support for the DPA should not result in
losing partners who have already signed. For this reason
we should stick to the text of the agreement, but be
willing to add a lot. ... Credible international security
guarantees, visible disarmament of the Janjaweed, more
money for compensation and a tangible reconstruction of
the areas where refugees and displaced people lived
before they were chased away, will have to be added soon
in order to turn the present agreement into a sustainable
pact".
From these quotes it should be clear that I have neither
argued for a re-writing of the text, nor for a reopening
of the talks as portrayed by some in the international
media. On the contrary, I have said that "broadening and
implementation should go hand in hand. The necessary
additions and refinements should take place in the
framework of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue, ... the Cease
Fire Commission (and) the International Joint Committee",
that means within the DPA institutions themselves.
Finally, I argued, "a transition towards a UN
peacekeeping force is the third priority in a strategy to
save the DPA. Without an effective UN peace force, the
security of the displaced people and other victims of the
war cannot be guaranteed". Implicit in this, of course,
remains the need for the consent of the Government.
However, I have made it clear that "a transition towards
a UN peace force will only be successful if it can
reverse the present conditions of non-implementation and
exclusion". For that reason more should be done to
persuade Abdul Wahid and his followers to join the peace
agreement.
(End text)
HUME
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KPKO SOCI AU UN SU
SUBJECT: UNSRSG Pronk Elaborates on Blog
Ref: Khartoum 1549
1. SRSG Pronk's blog of June 28 continues to draw
attention, and he is now trying to clarify what he wrote.
An editorial in the Sudan Vision Daily, a pro-government
daily newspaper, states in its July 3 edition that
Pronk's blog represents a "complete U-turn," and that
this would infuriate both the Sudanese Government and the
African Union. There are also signs that those rebel
elements that seek to reopen, amend, or "add a lot"
(Pronk's words) to the DPA will use Pronk's comments to
support and reinforce their views.
2. On July 2, Pronk released the following explanation:
(Begin text)
Khartoum on 2 July 2006
In an article on the Darfur Peace Agreement, published
last week, I had raised the question: "How to put new
life into the DPA?" An answer is necessary because on
the ground, especially amongst the displaced persons, the
DPA continues to meet more and more resistance.
I have argued in this article that "In my view it is a
good text, an honest compromise. That is why the UN has
endorsed the agreement". However, wrong perceptions
about the agreement are paralysing it. In order to
address this situation, the article outlines three
necessary steps. "First, timely implementation of what
has been agreed, because non-implementation would
reinforce the position of those who have so far rejected
the agreement." The second priority is broadening the
circle of support for the peace agreement.... Efforts to
broaden the support for the DPA should not result in
losing partners who have already signed. For this reason
we should stick to the text of the agreement, but be
willing to add a lot. ... Credible international security
guarantees, visible disarmament of the Janjaweed, more
money for compensation and a tangible reconstruction of
the areas where refugees and displaced people lived
before they were chased away, will have to be added soon
in order to turn the present agreement into a sustainable
pact".
From these quotes it should be clear that I have neither
argued for a re-writing of the text, nor for a reopening
of the talks as portrayed by some in the international
media. On the contrary, I have said that "broadening and
implementation should go hand in hand. The necessary
additions and refinements should take place in the
framework of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue, ... the Cease
Fire Commission (and) the International Joint Committee",
that means within the DPA institutions themselves.
Finally, I argued, "a transition towards a UN
peacekeeping force is the third priority in a strategy to
save the DPA. Without an effective UN peace force, the
security of the displaced people and other victims of the
war cannot be guaranteed". Implicit in this, of course,
remains the need for the consent of the Government.
However, I have made it clear that "a transition towards
a UN peace force will only be successful if it can
reverse the present conditions of non-implementation and
exclusion". For that reason more should be done to
persuade Abdul Wahid and his followers to join the peace
agreement.
(End text)
HUME