UNSRSG Pronk Elaborates on Blog

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001558 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KPKO SOCI AU UN SU SUBJECT: UNSRSG Pronk Elaborates on Blog Ref: Khartoum 1549 ¶1. SRSG Pronk's blog of June 28 continues to draw attention, and he is now trying to clarify what he wrote. An editorial in the Sudan Vision Daily, a pro-government daily newspaper, states in its July 3 edition that Pronk's blog represents a "complete U-turn," and that this would infuriate both the Sudanese Government and the African Union. There are also signs that those rebel elements that seek to reopen, amend, or "add a lot" (Pronk's words) to the DPA will use Pronk's comments to support and reinforce their views. ¶2. On July 2, Pronk released the following explanation: (Begin text) Khartoum on 2 July 2006 In an article on the Darfur Peace Agreement, published last week, I had raised the question: "How to put new life into the DPA?" An answer is necessary because on the ground, especially amongst the displaced persons, the DPA continues to meet more and more resistance. I have argued in this article that "In my view it is a good text, an honest compromise. That is why the UN has endorsed the agreement". However, wrong perceptions about the agreement are paralysing it. In order to address this situation, the article outlines three necessary steps. "First, timely implementation of what has been agreed, because non-implementation would reinforce the position of those who have so far rejected the agreement." The second priority is broadening the circle of support for the peace agreement.... Efforts to broaden the support for the DPA should not result in losing partners who have already signed. For this reason we should stick to the text of the agreement, but be willing to add a lot. ... Credible international security guarantees, visible disarmament of the Janjaweed, more money for compensation and a tangible reconstruction of the areas where refugees and displaced people lived before they were chased away, will have to be added soon in order to turn the present agreement into a sustainable pact". From these quotes it should be clear that I have neither argued for a re-writing of the text, nor for a reopening of the talks as portrayed by some in the international media. On the contrary, I have said that "broadening and implementation should go hand in hand. The necessary additions and refinements should take place in the framework of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue, ... the Cease Fire Commission (and) the International Joint Committee", that means within the DPA institutions themselves. Finally, I argued, "a transition towards a UN peacekeeping force is the third priority in a strategy to save the DPA. Without an effective UN peace force, the security of the displaced people and other victims of the war cannot be guaranteed". Implicit in this, of course, remains the need for the consent of the Government. However, I have made it clear that "a transition towards a UN peace force will only be successful if it can reverse the present conditions of non-implementation and exclusion". For that reason more should be done to persuade Abdul Wahid and his followers to join the peace agreement. (End text) HUME