ABDULWAHID NUR MAY BE READY TO SIGN DARFUR PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001539 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AND AF/SPG ASMARA FOR FRENCH NSC FOR COURVILLE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU AU UN SUBJECT: ABDULWAHID NUR MAY BE READY TO SIGN DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT REF: KHARTOUM 1439 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: SLA/M leader Abdulwahid Nur may be ready to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement, his father-in-law, Abdulgassem Seif al-Din, told CDA Hume on June 29. Abdulwahid ha7 Q:"Tr U.S. support in flying to Asmara to meet Abdulwahid as early as July 1; Post is working with USAID/OTI to make arrangements. Abdulgassem also encouraged A/S Frazer to call Abdulwahid as soon as possible. End Summary. Abdulwahid Agrees to "Modality of Implementation" Proposals -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Abdulgassem Seif al-Din, father-in-law of SLA/M leader Abdulwahid al-Nur, called PolOff late on June 28 and requested to meet as soon as possible. At a meeting on the morning of June 29, Abulgassem told PolOff that he and other Fur tribal leaders had been deeply impressed by President Bush's letter to Abdulwahid, as outlined by CDA Hume at their last meeting (reftel). He had later spoken to Abdulwahid, who said he had written his own letters to the President, the UN, and the AU; however, Abdulwahid had yet to receive a response. (Note: Post is not aware of any letters from Abdulwahid to the President, the UN, or the AU). ¶3. (C) Abdulgassem urged Abdulwahid to use the five proposals in the Fur leaders' "Vision for Implementation of Modality to Address Deficiencies in the Darfur Peace Agreement" (MI) as way to reconcile himself with the DPA. The proposals include the following (the full text of the MI will be faxed to AF/SPG): -- A Government-subsidized compensation fund of at least USD 150 million to provide for the "immediate basic needs" of IDPs, supplemented by funds from the international community. This fund "does not in any way represent 'diya,' or blood money." -- Disarmament and demobilization of the janjaweed, with the engagement of senior SLA/M liaison officers to verify and confirm the process. The Government should also be represented on the DPA Joint Commission. -- Equal power-sharing during the transitional period, with 50 percent of government positions in Darfur to the NCP and 50 percent to the armed movements. -- The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue should take place in an appropriate place with a neutral secretariat including African and non-African figures. Key decisions about the conference should be made by an impartial international body, not by the Government, and the AU must endorse the conference's recommendations. -- Deployment of a UN peacekeeping force with a full mandate to protect civilians. But Drops UN Peackeepers as Precondition for Agremeent -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Abdulgassem had also spoken to Government officials about the MI proposals, particularly the deployment of peacekeepers. He believed the Government would be more likely to accept the MI without the proposal on UN peackeepers. After discussing the matter with Abdulwahid on the phone, Abdulwahid had agreed to drop this proposal from the MI, recognizing that the deployment of peacekeepers was an issue for the international community to decide, not the SLA/M. Abdulwahid still supports a UN deployment, but this is no longer a precondition for his signature of the DPA. ¶5. (C) Abdulgassem believed that Abdulwahid was now "willing to come and sign the agreement" based on the proposals in the MI. He asked PolOff for U.S. support to fly to Asmara with other Darfuri leaders to meet with Abdulwahid, and finalize his agreement. PolOff immediately took Abdulgassem to see CDA Hume, and contacted USAID/OTI to arrange for funding. Encourages A/S Frazer to Call Abdulwahid -------------- KHARTOUM 00001539 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Abdulgassem repeated his account of his conversations with Abdulwahid, and the Charge thanked him for his efforts. Hume added that A/S Frazer would be interested in talking to Abdulwahid, and asked when might be a good time to call. Abdulgassem replied that he thought a call from Frazer would be very helpful, and encouraged her to call as soon as possible, even before Abdulgassem's visit to Asmara. (Note: Abulgassem provided two numbers for Abdulwahid: 291 1 711 20272 and 882 162 134 4296). ¶7. (C) Abdulgassem hopes to depart for Asmara as early as Saturday, July 1. He plans to take with him two other Fur representatives, including Abdulwahid's best friend, plus a third non-Fur representative, possibly from an Arab tribe. Post is working with USAID/OTI on flights and will report progress septel. HUME