DARFUR DPA SUPPORT TEAM FIRST IMPRESSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001538 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO SOCI US UN AU SU SUBJECT: DARFUR DPA SUPPORT TEAM FIRST IMPRESSIONS REF: KHARTOUM 1490 Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ANDREW STEINFELD; REASON: 1.4 (B ) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Initial impressions from an orientation tour for the DPA Support Team to El Fasher confirmed the DPA implementation faces many challenges. There is no visible sign of DPA implementation taking place on the ground. The most significant contributing factors are a lack of AMIS capacity and political will and a non-proactive GNU. The local population's view towards the DPA is that it is either an incomplete solution, or simply un-implementable unless all the parties sign. Meanwhile, security has improved over the past few weeks, though continued divisions of both the SLA factions bode poorly for continued improvement. Actions to turn this situation around are needed, started as early as the July 1-2 AU Summit in Banjul. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Embassy and S/CRS TDY officers completed an orientation tour in El Fasher June 25-27 in order to lay the groundwork for the DPA Implementation Support Team presence over the next three months. The group met with AMIS Acting Force Commander BG FM Kamanzi and his political officer Elizabeth Mgaya, UN Field Security Coordination Officer William Harrison and UNMIS civil affairs officer Amin Balchsh, GNU and SPLM representatives, HOA Officer MAJ Robert Williams, the SLM Secretary General, and representatives of NGOs active in IDP camps. NO VISIBLE SIGN OF DPA IMPLEMENTATION -------------- ¶3. (C) Briefings with AMIS and the UN, and personal observations, revealed no signs of either local attempts at DPA implementation, or GNU activities or guidance coming from Khartoum. None of the DPA commissions have been started, nor has there been any attempt to organize support for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process. Beyond printing Arabic copies of the DPA and distributing them to those that inquire, neither AMIS nor the government has started or planned a DPA information dissemination campaign (though all sides recognize the need). On the security side, a GNU disarmament plan for the Janjaweed has yet to be presented to the AU (although we have been told that one is prepared),nor is there any AMIS planning or open discussion of a verification process. ¶4. (C) Per discussions with BG Kamanzi, Harrison, and MAJ Williams, AMIS' inaction is based on a lack of political direction, lack of resources, and poor military leadership at the top. The delay on a decision on the status of the parties that have not signed the DPA has hamstrung AMIS implementation, especially since the current AMIS ConOps is based on full participation of all parties and cannot be implemented without revision. Furthermore, any AMIS implementation will require a significant increase in resources that are not forthcoming. Even if they were, there is a general impression that a lack of competence and risk acceptance would still prevent AMIS from carrying out its mission. DPA implementation requires flexible command with initiative and decision making pushed as low as possible. However, AMIS' command climate discourages initiative and constrains decision making to the top. Even Acting Force Commander Kamanzi was seemingly in the dark about issues that had reportedly been discussed with Commander MG Ihekire, currently on leave. IDP VIEWS ON DPA TWO-SIDED, NEITHER FULLY APPROVE -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) A meeting with fifteen omdas and sheikhs representing the el-Salaam IDP camp offered a snapshot view of IDP opinions towards the DPA (detailed septel). Among those community leaders that had (albeit limited) knowledge of the DPA's provisions, they either viewed the DPA as far short of a complete solution, or that as basically a good document, but nevertheless un-implementable until all parties sign and therefore moot. ¶6. (SBU) The SLA-Wahid faction is reportedly threatening AMIS and the IC not to discuss the DPA with IDPs in the areas under its control. Meanwhile, the G-19 group (a group of nineteen SLA-Minawi breakaway commanders) appears bent on increasing its power base at the expense of the DPA. Minawi continues to exercise tenuous control over his other commanders, but may be weakened without signs of DPA implementation. The JEM, while exerting influence, is not a major obstruction -- yet. KHARTOUM 00001538 002 OF 002 THREE WEEKS OF IMPROVED SECURITY -------------- ¶7. (C) The UN and AMIS agreed that the security situation over the past three weeks was significantly calmer. However, as the factions continue to splinter, it becomes increasingly difficult for the UN to coordinate operations (receive security assurances) with the parties around the region. There have been no known clashes between SLA-Minawi and the GNU. There have been some GNU action against SLA-Wahid and limited Janjaweed raids. Inter-factional fighting is localized and may not be authorized by senior leaders. However, tensions along the Chad border in the NW and SW continues. Also, UN Security Coordinator Harrison and local contacts relayed multiple reports of foreign fighters from Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, entering Sudan over the past three to four months from the south to travel to Darfur to prepare for attacks on foreign peacekeepers. He mentioned Kenya, Chad, and Libya as possible entry points, noting that Sudan's borders were porous. FOUR STRIKES AGAINST DPA PROGRESS -------------- ¶8. (C) COMMENT: There are four problems currently impeding progress on DPA implementation: -- Lack of AMIS capacity and political will; -- Non-proactive GNU; -- The unresolved issue of a UNPKO transition; and, -- Lack of capacity to organize DPA participation by SLA-M and splinter groups. ¶9. (C) COMMENT CONT: Capacity building efforts to address the above problems are not likely to save the DPA by themselves. The issues of non-signatories and transition to UNPKO need resolution. We need to continue to press on implementation of key DPA issues such as a plan for disarmament, nomination for the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA),and movement on the DDDC. Finally, we should jumpstart the DPA strategic communications campaign. While ground actions are the best way to convey the right story, the international community nevertheless has a significant capacity to broadcast information using both civilian and military means. END COMMENT. HUME