SUDAN/DARFUR: SUDAN REJECTS UN PKO; UN DEVISES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001475

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D, AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO MARR AU UN SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: SUDAN REJECTS UN PKO; UN DEVISES
DARFUR PKO PLAN

REF: A. A. KHARTOUM 01459


B. B. KHARTOUM 01458

C. C. KHARTOUM 01402

D. D. KHARTOUM 00953

Classified By: DCM Andrew Steinfeld, Reasons 1.4(b) and (c)


1. (C) Summary: In separate readouts, joint AU-UN Technical
Assessment Mission officials stated that Sudan had decided
not to permit a transition from the African Union Mission to
Sudan to a UN peacekeeping operation, and a UN military
planner provided details about its plans for a transition to
a peacekeeping operation. On June 22, UN USYG Guehenno and
AU PS&C Commissioner Djinnit told the diplomatic corps that
their June 21 meeting with President Bashir had resulted in
Sudan's rejection of their recommendation that AMIS
transition to a UN peacekeeping operation. The AU PS&C will
meet on June 27 to discuss the matter further, with the AU
intending to work to strengthen AMIS. A donor meeting will
follow in Brussels on July 17. This represents a major
setback for broad-based efforts to address the Darfur
conflict more aggressively.


2. (C) Summary (cont'd): Separately, UN DPKO military
planner Colonel Ian Sinclair (protect) met with Embassy DLO
to discuss the UN,s tentative plan for the transition from
an African Union Mission (AMIS) to a UN peacekeeping mission
after the joint AU-UN Technical Assessment Mission visit to
Sudan. He knew Darfur was a large area that was difficult to
travel, but had to reassess his initial assumptions after
visiting the area. It will be more difficult to operate in
than previously anticipated, he concluded. He provided his
take on the UNSC resolution, force structure, logistics,
transition, and USG support that the UN will need to be
successful. End Summary.

Joint AU-UN TAM Briefs Diplomatic Corps; Sudan Just Says No
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3. (C) UN PKO USYG Jean-Marie Guehenno reported that the
two-week joint AU-UN Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) had
conducted hundreds of meetings through its political
consultation teams, which had fanned out from El Fasher,
Nyala, El Geneina, and Zalingei, as well as Chad. Speaking
to what he referred to as a wide range of stakeholders, the
mission had resulted in a united transition plan. At the end
of the road, however, President Bashir had responded
negatively: Sudan would not countenance a UN peacekeeping
mission. Guehenno warned that the risk of renewed violence
in Darfur after the rainy season was not negligible.

AU PS&C to Discuss Next Steps for Darfur; Donors to Meet
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4. (C) African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PS&C)
Commissioner Said Djinnit said that the PS&C would meet on
June 27 to review the mission's findings and to address the
conclusion of the Sudanese Government. After taking stock of
the position of AMIS, a donor's conference will take place in
Brussels on July 18. This conference involves both Western
and African partners, with assistance anticipated in terms of
pledges of financial support and troop contributions.

No AMIS Green Light, Border Area Gray, Darfur Future Black
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5. (C) In response to questions posed by the diplomatic
community, Guehenno stated that the inability of the Sudanese
Government to provide consent for a UN peacekeeping mission
is an obstacle to progress. The Sudanese government has not
given a green light to a toughened mandate for AMIS; this
thus remains a major political issue to be addressed.
Djinnit said the AU is committed to strengthening AMIS; six
additional battalions (five active plus one in reserve),
including 300-400 civilian police and more military
observers, will be necessary to ramp up the capacity of AMIS.
The AU will discuss this revised concept of operations at a
PS&C meeting on June 23 and at the July 1-2 AU Summit. This
involves moving from primarily observation and investigation
to a more robust peace-keeping operation. The situation
leaves several gray areas, he said, including the 1000
kilometer Chad-Sudan border, which remains a liability for
future conflict. Pronk noted that his prognosis was for a
"black future" for Darfur.

GNU Private and Public Views Consistent: The Answer is No
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6. (C) Guehenno said that it seemed that between the report
of UN Special Representative Brahimi of May 25 and the
present that the Government of National Unity (GNU) had held
intensive discussions on the issue, with the NCP and SPLM
elements drawing different conclusions. Both Djinnit and
Guehenno, however, noted that the Sudanese Government's
private and public views were consistent. Although the
meetings held by the joint AU-UN TAM with officials were
cordial, and the language used non-confrontational, the
message nonetheless was clear: no UN peacekeeping mission
would be allowed to enter Sudan.

DPA Changes Situation; Security/Compensation Remain Key
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7. (C) The Darfur Peace Agreement has created a new situation
on the ground, Djinnit noted, with internally displaced
persons (IDPs) increasingly expressing frustrations about
both security and compensation (Note: although the TAM did
not note interest about the question of a vice president or
the status of Darfur as a region). End note.)

Use of Joint Integrated Units Raised; Notion Left Hanging
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8. (C) Finally, the issue of Sudan's suggestion that Joint
Integrated Units (JIUs),as provided in the North-South
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, be used in Darfur as a force
augmentation was raised, but without a conclusion being
drawn. Pronk recalled that SPLM Chairman John Garang had
initially suggested the use of JIUs last year, even though
the Sudanese Government was cool to then notion then. At the
end of the Abuja peace talks on Darfur, however, Pronk noted
that GNU delegation chief and Presidential Advisor Magzoub
al-Khalifa has raised the issue, without further discussion
occurring.

UN Wants a Clean Break from AMIS
--------------


9. (C) In a separate readout, UN Deputy Peacekeeping
Operations military planner Colonel Ian Sinclair (protect)
described AMIS as a tired and spent force that needed to be
replaced. He told Embassy Defense Liaison Officer that AMIS
Force Commander Major General Ihekire is not up to the job
and would not be asked to be the UN commander in Darfur.
AMIS has completely lost credibility with all of the parties
and would be unable to gain it back even if AMIS were to be
expanded. During meetings with IDPs and warring parties'
leaders, the UN was warned that a simple re-hatting of AMIS
to the UN was not acceptable. Although AMIS has become
ineffective, the UN takeover from the AU will be in a manner
that is face saving for the AU. Since this is the AU,s
first peacekeeping operation, it is extremely important that
the mission be a handover and not a takeover. The UN wants
to build up its infrastructure and troops and then rapidly
descend on Darfur. It wants the security situation to
dramatically improve when the UN takes over; it wants to send
a subtle, but clear message that this is UNMIS and not AMIS.

UNMIS Darfur Division Force Structure
--------------


10. (C) Sinclair said that although most of the AMIS
contingents inspected did not meet UN standards, he realized
the need to keep an &African face8 on the UNMIS Darfur
Division. The UNMIS Darfur Division Commander must be an
African for the first year. A hard nosed, tough Rwandan
Major General with a lot of operation experience would be
ideal. He would be able to push to contingents to be more
aggressive and be tough with anyone that violates the Darfur
Peace Agreement.


11. (C) The UNMIS Darfur Division will have three sectors:
West, North, and South. The sectors would be covered by an
Indian brigade, a Nigerian brigade, and a Rwandan brigade.
The Nigerian and Rwandan brigades would not consist of troops
from solely those nations. They would be the major
contributors, however, and could legitimately claim command
over those brigades. The UN expects Rwanda to contribute two
to four battalions, and Nigeria to contribute two to three
battalions. Senegal will likely be asked to contribute a
battalion.


12. (C) The TAM will present three basic options for a UN
mission in Darfur. Option One: more troops and fewer
helicopters; Option Two: more helicopters and fewer troops;
and Option Three: more troops and more helicopters. After

KHARTOUM 00001475 003 OF 003


the visit, the TAM added Option Three, it hopes will be the
one selected. For Option Three, the force structure is
estimated to be 17,000 troops. 16,500 troops will be ground
forces, and 500 troops will operate the helicopters. They
will be divided into fourteen battalions. Each battalion
will need 800 soldiers and 14 armored personnel carriers.
Each sector will need nine helicopters. The TAM will conduct
a troops/equipment to task analysis to ensure its task
organization is correct. It also hopes troop-contributing
nations will deploy two special forces companies to act as an
UNMIS Darfur Division quick reaction force. Because of the
large area and the difficulty identifying trouble makers, the
UN envisions the helicopters conducting an aerial patrol with
troops. Once a village or rough terrain is encountered, the
helicopters will deploy the troops, who will then patrol the
area on foot. They will be picked up after the foot patrol
is completed. He asked &Who is a bad guy and who is not?
Only foot patrolling and talking to villagers will help
answer this question.8

Logistics
--------------


13. (C) He stated logistics will be critical to UNMIS,
success. Right now, the Port of Sudan can handle only three
UN ships a month, one troop ship and two supply vessels.
Based on that equation, it will take too long to build up
combat power. The UN is considering use of the Port of
Mombasa to supply UNMIS in Southern Sudan. This would allow
the UN to bring in two troop-carrying ships per month. It
wants to use roll-on, roll-off ships to bring in some of the
forces. A battalion of troops will roll off the ship with
its equipment and drive to Darfur. The UN realizes the
difficulty in doing this, but it will be cheaper than
airlifting everything into Darfur. Also, the UN plans to
help rehabilitate the railroad line to Nyala. It wants to
move the bulk of the supplies by rail once the line is
operational.

Transition Plan and Enablers
--------------


14. (C) UNDPKO wants AMIS to transition to UNMIS on January
1, 2007. During the intervening time period, the UN wants to
build capacity and infrastructure before the handover. The
UN is planning to hold a conference with NATO and the EU in
July 2006 to discuss support. Since Sudan has been so vocal
against letting NATO into the country to help, the UN plans
to have NATO and the EU coordinate support requirements to
build up infrastructure and logistics capabilities. However,
the actual work on the ground will not be done by NATO or the
EU as an organization, but by individual countries. For
instance, NATO may ask Germany and Belgium to provide
support. NATO will coordinate the countries, support, but
the two countries will not be working under the NATO hat, but
as individual countries. The UN will likely ask NATO to
provide four strategic aircraft and a movement control team
to help plan the flow of personnel and troops. They will
also ask that a transportation battalion or company be
provided. To help facilitate an AMIS handover on January 1,
2007, the UN will ask AMIS to delay its scheduled troop
rotation until the September-October time frame. The UN is
also doubtful that AMIS would be able to expand to 10,000
before December 2006. It suspects AMIS could add two more
battalions, but not the five called for in the CONOPS plan.

USG Support to the Transition
--------------


15. (C) Sinclair said ACOTA training was a vital part of
preparing the rotating African units coming to Darfur. Based
on the TAM assessment, a unit,s performance was dependant on
how good the unit,s commanding officer was. He suggested
that to help the unit,s be more effective that all of the
deploying units receive ACOTA training and deploy with two
mentors at the company, battalion, and brigade level for the
first two months of the deployment. The first twelve to
eighteen months of the mission are critical; ACOTA training
and the mentors would help the mission be successful. The UN
would also like the USG to provide an information operations
team. It would like the team to be deployed with AMIS to
help prepare for the takeover and then be part of UNMIS.
HUME