SUDAN/DARFUR: SUDAN REJECTS UN PKO; UN DEVISES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001475 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR D, AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO MARR AU UN SU SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: SUDAN REJECTS UN PKO; UN DEVISES DARFUR PKO PLAN REF: A. A. KHARTOUM 01459 ¶B. B. KHARTOUM 01458 ¶C. C. KHARTOUM 01402 ¶D. D. KHARTOUM 00953 Classified By: DCM Andrew Steinfeld, Reasons 1.4(b) and (c) ¶1. (C) Summary: In separate readouts, joint AU-UN Technical Assessment Mission officials stated that Sudan had decided not to permit a transition from the African Union Mission to Sudan to a UN peacekeeping operation, and a UN military planner provided details about its plans for a transition to a peacekeeping operation. On June 22, UN USYG Guehenno and AU PS&C Commissioner Djinnit told the diplomatic corps that their June 21 meeting with President Bashir had resulted in Sudan's rejection of their recommendation that AMIS transition to a UN peacekeeping operation. The AU PS&C will meet on June 27 to discuss the matter further, with the AU intending to work to strengthen AMIS. A donor meeting will follow in Brussels on July 17. This represents a major setback for broad-based efforts to address the Darfur conflict more aggressively. ¶2. (C) Summary (cont'd): Separately, UN DPKO military planner Colonel Ian Sinclair (protect) met with Embassy DLO to discuss the UN,s tentative plan for the transition from an African Union Mission (AMIS) to a UN peacekeeping mission after the joint AU-UN Technical Assessment Mission visit to Sudan. He knew Darfur was a large area that was difficult to travel, but had to reassess his initial assumptions after visiting the area. It will be more difficult to operate in than previously anticipated, he concluded. He provided his take on the UNSC resolution, force structure, logistics, transition, and USG support that the UN will need to be successful. End Summary. Joint AU-UN TAM Briefs Diplomatic Corps; Sudan Just Says No -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) UN PKO USYG Jean-Marie Guehenno reported that the two-week joint AU-UN Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) had conducted hundreds of meetings through its political consultation teams, which had fanned out from El Fasher, Nyala, El Geneina, and Zalingei, as well as Chad. Speaking to what he referred to as a wide range of stakeholders, the mission had resulted in a united transition plan. At the end of the road, however, President Bashir had responded negatively: Sudan would not countenance a UN peacekeeping mission. Guehenno warned that the risk of renewed violence in Darfur after the rainy season was not negligible. AU PS&C to Discuss Next Steps for Darfur; Donors to Meet -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PS&C) Commissioner Said Djinnit said that the PS&C would meet on June 27 to review the mission's findings and to address the conclusion of the Sudanese Government. After taking stock of the position of AMIS, a donor's conference will take place in Brussels on July 18. This conference involves both Western and African partners, with assistance anticipated in terms of pledges of financial support and troop contributions. No AMIS Green Light, Border Area Gray, Darfur Future Black -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) In response to questions posed by the diplomatic community, Guehenno stated that the inability of the Sudanese Government to provide consent for a UN peacekeeping mission is an obstacle to progress. The Sudanese government has not given a green light to a toughened mandate for AMIS; this thus remains a major political issue to be addressed. Djinnit said the AU is committed to strengthening AMIS; six additional battalions (five active plus one in reserve), including 300-400 civilian police and more military observers, will be necessary to ramp up the capacity of AMIS. The AU will discuss this revised concept of operations at a PS&C meeting on June 23 and at the July 1-2 AU Summit. This involves moving from primarily observation and investigation to a more robust peace-keeping operation. The situation leaves several gray areas, he said, including the 1000 kilometer Chad-Sudan border, which remains a liability for future conflict. Pronk noted that his prognosis was for a "black future" for Darfur. GNU Private and Public Views Consistent: The Answer is No -------------- -------------- KHARTOUM 00001475 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Guehenno said that it seemed that between the report of UN Special Representative Brahimi of May 25 and the present that the Government of National Unity (GNU) had held intensive discussions on the issue, with the NCP and SPLM elements drawing different conclusions. Both Djinnit and Guehenno, however, noted that the Sudanese Government's private and public views were consistent. Although the meetings held by the joint AU-UN TAM with officials were cordial, and the language used non-confrontational, the message nonetheless was clear: no UN peacekeeping mission would be allowed to enter Sudan. DPA Changes Situation; Security/Compensation Remain Key -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The Darfur Peace Agreement has created a new situation on the ground, Djinnit noted, with internally displaced persons (IDPs) increasingly expressing frustrations about both security and compensation (Note: although the TAM did not note interest about the question of a vice president or the status of Darfur as a region). End note.) Use of Joint Integrated Units Raised; Notion Left Hanging -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Finally, the issue of Sudan's suggestion that Joint Integrated Units (JIUs),as provided in the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement, be used in Darfur as a force augmentation was raised, but without a conclusion being drawn. Pronk recalled that SPLM Chairman John Garang had initially suggested the use of JIUs last year, even though the Sudanese Government was cool to then notion then. At the end of the Abuja peace talks on Darfur, however, Pronk noted that GNU delegation chief and Presidential Advisor Magzoub al-Khalifa has raised the issue, without further discussion occurring. UN Wants a Clean Break from AMIS -------------- ¶9. (C) In a separate readout, UN Deputy Peacekeeping Operations military planner Colonel Ian Sinclair (protect) described AMIS as a tired and spent force that needed to be replaced. He told Embassy Defense Liaison Officer that AMIS Force Commander Major General Ihekire is not up to the job and would not be asked to be the UN commander in Darfur. AMIS has completely lost credibility with all of the parties and would be unable to gain it back even if AMIS were to be expanded. During meetings with IDPs and warring parties' leaders, the UN was warned that a simple re-hatting of AMIS to the UN was not acceptable. Although AMIS has become ineffective, the UN takeover from the AU will be in a manner that is face saving for the AU. Since this is the AU,s first peacekeeping operation, it is extremely important that the mission be a handover and not a takeover. The UN wants to build up its infrastructure and troops and then rapidly descend on Darfur. It wants the security situation to dramatically improve when the UN takes over; it wants to send a subtle, but clear message that this is UNMIS and not AMIS. UNMIS Darfur Division Force Structure -------------- ¶10. (C) Sinclair said that although most of the AMIS contingents inspected did not meet UN standards, he realized the need to keep an &African face8 on the UNMIS Darfur Division. The UNMIS Darfur Division Commander must be an African for the first year. A hard nosed, tough Rwandan Major General with a lot of operation experience would be ideal. He would be able to push to contingents to be more aggressive and be tough with anyone that violates the Darfur Peace Agreement. ¶11. (C) The UNMIS Darfur Division will have three sectors: West, North, and South. The sectors would be covered by an Indian brigade, a Nigerian brigade, and a Rwandan brigade. The Nigerian and Rwandan brigades would not consist of troops from solely those nations. They would be the major contributors, however, and could legitimately claim command over those brigades. The UN expects Rwanda to contribute two to four battalions, and Nigeria to contribute two to three battalions. Senegal will likely be asked to contribute a battalion. ¶12. (C) The TAM will present three basic options for a UN mission in Darfur. Option One: more troops and fewer helicopters; Option Two: more helicopters and fewer troops; and Option Three: more troops and more helicopters. After KHARTOUM 00001475 003 OF 003 the visit, the TAM added Option Three, it hopes will be the one selected. For Option Three, the force structure is estimated to be 17,000 troops. 16,500 troops will be ground forces, and 500 troops will operate the helicopters. They will be divided into fourteen battalions. Each battalion will need 800 soldiers and 14 armored personnel carriers. Each sector will need nine helicopters. The TAM will conduct a troops/equipment to task analysis to ensure its task organization is correct. It also hopes troop-contributing nations will deploy two special forces companies to act as an UNMIS Darfur Division quick reaction force. Because of the large area and the difficulty identifying trouble makers, the UN envisions the helicopters conducting an aerial patrol with troops. Once a village or rough terrain is encountered, the helicopters will deploy the troops, who will then patrol the area on foot. They will be picked up after the foot patrol is completed. He asked &Who is a bad guy and who is not? Only foot patrolling and talking to villagers will help answer this question.8 Logistics -------------- ¶13. (C) He stated logistics will be critical to UNMIS, success. Right now, the Port of Sudan can handle only three UN ships a month, one troop ship and two supply vessels. Based on that equation, it will take too long to build up combat power. The UN is considering use of the Port of Mombasa to supply UNMIS in Southern Sudan. This would allow the UN to bring in two troop-carrying ships per month. It wants to use roll-on, roll-off ships to bring in some of the forces. A battalion of troops will roll off the ship with its equipment and drive to Darfur. The UN realizes the difficulty in doing this, but it will be cheaper than airlifting everything into Darfur. Also, the UN plans to help rehabilitate the railroad line to Nyala. It wants to move the bulk of the supplies by rail once the line is operational. Transition Plan and Enablers -------------- ¶14. (C) UNDPKO wants AMIS to transition to UNMIS on January 1, 2007. During the intervening time period, the UN wants to build capacity and infrastructure before the handover. The UN is planning to hold a conference with NATO and the EU in July 2006 to discuss support. Since Sudan has been so vocal against letting NATO into the country to help, the UN plans to have NATO and the EU coordinate support requirements to build up infrastructure and logistics capabilities. However, the actual work on the ground will not be done by NATO or the EU as an organization, but by individual countries. For instance, NATO may ask Germany and Belgium to provide support. NATO will coordinate the countries, support, but the two countries will not be working under the NATO hat, but as individual countries. The UN will likely ask NATO to provide four strategic aircraft and a movement control team to help plan the flow of personnel and troops. They will also ask that a transportation battalion or company be provided. To help facilitate an AMIS handover on January 1, 2007, the UN will ask AMIS to delay its scheduled troop rotation until the September-October time frame. The UN is also doubtful that AMIS would be able to expand to 10,000 before December 2006. It suspects AMIS could add two more battalions, but not the five called for in the CONOPS plan. USG Support to the Transition -------------- ¶15. (C) Sinclair said ACOTA training was a vital part of preparing the rotating African units coming to Darfur. Based on the TAM assessment, a unit,s performance was dependant on how good the unit,s commanding officer was. He suggested that to help the unit,s be more effective that all of the deploying units receive ACOTA training and deploy with two mentors at the company, battalion, and brigade level for the first two months of the deployment. The first twelve to eighteen months of the mission are critical; ACOTA training and the mentors would help the mission be successful. The UN would also like the USG to provide an information operations team. It would like the team to be deployed with AMIS to help prepare for the takeover and then be part of UNMIS. HUME