PRESIDENT BASHIR TELLS UN AND AU THAT NO TO UN PKO

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001474 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR D, AND AF/SPG ADDIS AND DJIBOUTI FOR A/S FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO MOPS AU SU SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BASHIR TELLS UN AND AU THAT NO TO UN PKO IS "FINAL" REF: A. KHARTOUM 1459 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1458 Classified By: DCM Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Immediately after UN Guehenno's and AU Djinnit's carefully worded, but not entirely forthcoming, briefing to 30 or so diplomats afternoon of June 22 on the AU/UN assessment mission, DCM pulled SRSG Pronk aside and asked him what had actually transpired at the meeting among the AU, UN, and President Bashir the previous evening (June 21). ¶2. (C) Pronk reported that Bashir's, and the government's, position had hardened considerably (as reflected in Bashir's public comments). Pronk said that Bashir could have said, let's see how AMIS strengthening goes, and then we'll see. He did not, said Pronk. He could have dwelled on Chapter 6 vs. 7; he did not, said Pronk. Rather, in polite, but firm tones, Bashir, according to Pronk, repeated three times: We have looked at possible UN peacekeeping, and we do not want it in Darfur. The decision is final. Pronk emphasized the Bashir used the word final three times. ¶3. (C) Bashir told his AU and UN interlocutors that the decision had nothing to do with Sudan's view of the UN. Rather, he pointed to the U.S. and other Western countries as having other agendas in Sudan, that they would attempt to carry out through a UN PKO in Darfur. ¶4. (C) All the meetings this time around were tough, according to Pronk. In a separate meeting with FM Akol and Interior minister Taha, Pronk reported that the latter was simply insulting. He accused Guehenno of having written his report in NYC, before ever arriving in Khartoum. ¶5. (C) In discussing next steps, Pronk indicated that the AU as an institution was weak on this issue. Konare, he said, continued to repeat that the U.S. was behind a move earlier in the year to undermine AMIS, by having argued that funding AMIS was difficult. Even Djinnit, he said, while a strong voice on AMIS strengthening, never spoke directly about UN transition to Sudanese interlocutors. Thus, further AU peace and security council meetings, and the Banjul summit (at which Kofi Annan's participation was confirmed),would be unlikely to move Bashir. ¶6. (C) Pronk reported that there will be a UNSC meeting on Sudan on Tuesday. He will urge Kofi Annan to consult further not with the entire Council, but rather, with the P-5, who have a real interest in peace and security in Africa. Picking up a theme discussed between Charge Hume and Guehenno the day before, Pronk agreed that working with the Chinese would be critical. China matters to Sudan. And the Russians will follow China on issues related to Sudan. HUME