CHARGE'S VISIT TO DARFUR: SIX WEEKS AFTER DPA, A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001460 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D AND AF/SPG NSC FOR COURVILLE ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS A/S FRAZIER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO MOPS SU AU UN SUBJECT: CHARGE'S VISIT TO DARFUR: SIX WEEKS AFTER DPA, A TENTATIVE PEACE REF: A. KHARTOUM 1459 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1439 ¶C. KHARTOUM 1429 ¶D. KHARTOUM 1428 ¶E. KHARTOUM 1344 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4(B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: A tentative peace has emerged in Darfur six weeks after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement. However, more must be done to create security around IDP camps and build confidence in the peace process. Some attacks between rebel groups continue, and banditry remains rife. Government officials appear outwardly cooperative, and some have even started planning for the return of IDPs to their villages. Local leaders -- especially those from the Fur tribe -- have serious doubts about the DPA; many are fixated on its apparent failure to disarm janjaweed militias as a first step, and to provide adequate compensation. Military observers also report some improvement in security, due to the leadership of certain AU sector commanders, while some aid workers have noticed increased space for humanitarian operations. The situation remains fragile. End Summary. Governors Optimistic about Peace -- Maybe Too Optimistic -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The DPA has created the "conditions for peace," North Darfur Governor Osman Yousif al-Kibir told CDA Hume on June 18 in El Fasher. Though banditry remains common, there have been no violations of the peace in North Darfur by either signatories or others. "The SLA/M (Wahid) has even paid some IDPs to not support the DPA," al-Kibir charged, quickly adding that he strongly favors the agreement -- despite reports to the contrary (Ref C). The United States is ready to help with reconstruction, Hume replied, but improving security is critical to giving IDPs the confidence to return home. The state government has started talks with the Ministry of the Interior about community policing, and plans to train IDPs to act as police in the camps, the Governor said. Over the next three months, it wants to gradually increase security outside El Fasher by clearing roads for returning IDPs. Finally, the Government must work with other "stakeholders" -- including the AU, the UN, and the SLA -- to reconstruct origin 
al villages, and restore social services. (The Governor offered no timetable for this process.) ¶3. (C) The Government of South Darfur, however, had no such ambitions. The DPA had changed the whole situation in Darfur, Governor Haj Hatta al-Manan told the Charge on June 19 in Nyala, so there was no need to strengthen peacekeeping forces. In fact, there were now "too many" troops, rather than too few. Most of the people supported the agreement, and IDPs were now willing to return home. There had been no violations of the DPA, except for fighting between different SLA factions; most of South Darfur was now stable -- except for Kalma camp, which remained a "base for criminals." Pushing DPA implementation too fast, however, could reverse this progress, he argued. UN peacekeepers could come to Darfur, but it would be better to allow the AU to implement the agreement first, and then evaluate whether the UN troops were needed. Sensational reports by the "New York media" about conditions at Kalma did not help, either. Hume reiterated that Americans care deeply about conditions in IDP camps; the key issue was not the number or source of troops, but the level of violence around the camps. "The AU is like a runner staggering to the finish line," he said. "We need to pass the baton to the UN." Local Leaders: Doubtful, but Reasonable -------------- ¶4. (C) Many local leaders have serious doubts about the DPA, particularly regarding disarmament and compensation issues. A group of Fur tribal chiefs in El Fasher -- including Rabei Baharedin Ali Dinar, grandson of the last sultan of Darfur -- thanked the Charge for the United States' help during the humanitarian crisis, but pleaded for America to "take the lead to solve Darfur's problems." The AU had been useless, and the security situation was getting worse every day, they charged; conflict between the tribes was also increasing. Peace could come only when the UN came to disarm the janjaweed and the International Criminal Court came to bring KHARTOUM 00001460 002 OF 002 justice. But Hume challenged their assessment that violence was getting worse, and urged them to take the lead in solving Darfur's problems. "The problem is in Darfur, not Nairobi or Asmara," referring to SLA Commander Abdulwahid al-Nur. "If your leader will not lead you, you must lead yourselves." Improving security on the ground was the first step to peace -- an issue that Nur had avoided during the Abuja Talks -- but the local community had to engage the AU and the UN if peacekeeping efforts were to succeed. ¶5. (C) Civil society leaders in Nyala also complained about the lack of security guarantees and wealth/power sharing mechanisms, but suggested six points for an additional annex to the agreement. "The DPA would be fine in a civilized country, but not here," argued Dr. Mohamed Ahmed, who joined other Fur leaders last month in a meeting with Nur (Ref B). Ahmed called for a mechanism to hold the Government accountable for disarming the militias, and for compensation so IDPs can rebuild their lives. The National Assembly should be more representative of the people of Darfur, not just the parties to the DPA, and Darfur needs someone in the Government who can look after its rights and interests. The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue (DDD) will also be critical, he said, and should have an American, European, or Asian as its chair. Hume said that the international community should help provide livestock, seed, and social services to help IDPs return to the villages, and promised the United States' support. But he also counseled the leaders to use the democratic process enshrined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to change Sudan's political realities, and to work with the AU to find a suitable chairman. "You have to take this opportunity to use your influence." International Observers See Less Violence, More Space -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) International observers agreed that the general level violence had decreased in recent weeks, with some exceptions. The Government seems to have become more cooperative, AU Force Commander General Cru Ihekire said on June 18, and now allows AU forces to fly at night upon request. However, it has yet to disarm the janjaweed. The rebels have been more problematic. Though the SLA/M (Minawi) has cooperated, Nur's faction has attacked AU forces doing outreach on the DPA, and the JEM threatened to leave the last Ceasefire Commission meeting (Ref D). U.S. MILOBS echoed Ihekire's assessment, but noted that some areas were more stable than others. The Senegalese commander north West Darfur (Sector 5),was more aggressive about patrolling than his Nigerian counterpart to his south (Sector 3). (Note: MILOBS also noted "lots of movement" across the Chad-Sudan border in both directions in recent weeks, and reports that Khartoum had ordered Chadian rebels to launch an attack by July 1). Aggressively patrolling the area around IDP camps would immediately increase security, they suggested, and pushing through checkpoints would show the parties the AU takes its role seriously. ¶7. (C) Humanitarian aid workers in Nyala reported increased civic space for their operations. There had been no attempts to block fuel and water supplies to the camps in recent weeks, and it seemed easier to obtain exit visas and import equipment. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) had returned to Kalma (Ref E),though the camp's assistant manager still feels the group's position is precarious. Another aid worker observed that SLA/M leader Minawi seems to be losing popularity in the camps, though in his judgement, everyone agrees that the DPA could be a "starting point" for the peace process. "The problem is the government keeps saying the DPA is the end of the process" -- and people believe it. Comment: Strong Action Needed -- and Coming Soon -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) The situation on the ground has improved, but the DPA remains at risk. USG action on the ground, including support for AU outreach efforts, is urgently needed and should begin shortly. Post will report separately on the Charge's recent meetings with SLA/M leader Minawi and UN Peacekeeping USYG Guehenno (Ref A),and plans additional visits to Darfur in coming weeks. HUME