UN PEACEKEEPING USYG GUEHENNO SEEES AU FALTERING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001459 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZIER AND AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO MOPS UN SU AU SUBJECT: UN PEACEKEEPING USYG GUEHENNO SEEES AU FALTERING IN DARFUR REF: KHARTOUM 1402 Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: UN USYG Guehenno told CDA Hume that, although the situation in Darfur had improved in the wake of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),the AU mission was weak and liable to falter. The U.S. should make sure that the upcoming African summit backed transition to the UN in no uncertain terms. His assessment mission with AU ASYG Djinnit had gone well, but the Government of Sudan consistently took the line that transition to UN forces was not needed or wanted. Guehenno said the UN needed an improved approach to policing and a strong role in the Darfur/Darfur dialogue. The key to overcoming any Sudanese opposition, Guehenno suggested, could be renewed U.S./Chinese cooperation. End summary. ¶2. (C) On June 21 CDA Hume at his request met with UN Under Secretary-General Guehenno to discuss Darfur. Hume reported SIPDIS on his own recent trip to the area. The security situation had improved significantly in North Darfur and South Darfur (but not in West Darfur),a result of more cooperation among SLA forces loyal to Minny Minawi, AMIS, and GoS forces. Local leaders stressed the importance of improving security and offers of economic support that would enable IDPs to return home. As for the AU, there was no evidence that it had the capacity to mount the kind of sustained political activity needed for the Darfur/Darfur dialogue. The AMIS Force Commander, while acknowledging the overall improvements in security, had closed out his meeting by asking that the UN be sent in as soon as possible, please. ¶3. (C) Summing up, Hume said he came away with two impressions. First, in the weeks since the DPA had been signed the situation had improved but was still fragile. In particular more had to be done to involve the people of Darfur in the peace process, especially on security and political issues. Second, AMIS was like an athlete carrying a too heavy weight, beginning to stagger toward an eventual collapse if help were not sent soon. ¶4. (C) Guehenno agreed that AMIS was losing its ability to handle the situation, let alone assume full responsibility for DPA implementation. He described his own assessment mission accompanied by the AU's Said Djinnit. He said that Djinnit was frank and helpful throughout, usually operating at the limit of the range of cooperation permitted by his political leaders. At the technical level AU staff was concerned that it could not succeed with the operation; the political leadership seemed unconcerned with such details. ¶5. (C) Guehenno urged that the USG coordinate with key AU leaders before the upcoming PSC meeting and AU summit to make sure that decisions taken at that level would back a transition to the UN. He said that during meetings earlier in the day Interior Minister Taha and Foreign Minister Lam Akol had taken the line that things were going well in Darfur with DPA implementation, AMIS forces were doing a fine job, the DPA did not specify a UN role, so maybe the UN was not needed. Guehenno was concerned that this line might be deployed at the AU meetings in an effort to weaken support for transition to the UN. He stressed that AMIS risked faltering, and any delay would be an error. ¶6. (C) As for the UN's own timetable, Guehenno said he hoped he could have UN units arriving in January. He thought it was important that the initiation of the UN role be seen as a real change for the better by people in Darfur. Gradually they had lost trust in AU peacekeepers. The UN forces would have to make a difference, especially in the role of protecting civilians. He described a probable UN force structure of one division, with three brigades. He thought there would be a need for 3-4,000 civilian police monitors and several thousand civilian employees, in addition. ¶7. (C) Hume asked how the UN would plan to approach improving security. Guehenno said that he would want immediate, regular, 24/7 patrolling of the perimeters of IDP camps; plus, the civilian police monitors would have to work to improve camp security. He acknowledged that was a difficult task that could only be done with the cooperation of camp leaders and the Sudanese police. In an aside he commented that the Sudanese concern over sovereignty was more pronounced regarding police work than regarding peacekeeping. He expected his report would recommend the inclusion of one or more formed police units. KHARTOUM 00001459 002 OF 002 ¶8. (C) Guehenno expressed concern over unity of action on the political and peacekeeping fronts. The AU did not have the capacity to staff and conduct a comprehensive Darfur-Darfur dialogue, but Djinnit had opposed shifting any responsibility for political affairs to the UN. The only way for the UN to succeed at peacekeeping was to operate in the context of a political process that was succeeding. Hume agreed that this was a major challenge. The AU did not have the capacity to manage the simpler tasks of coordination with local leaders that were needed under the original mandate, let alone take on responsibility for tasks under the DPA. It was essential that the AU accept a strong UN role in organizing and staffing the Darfur/Darfur dialogue. ¶9. (C) Guehenno said that he wanted to begin sending a "shadow staff" to work alongside AMIS units, helping to strengthen the operation before the UN would take over. He said the AMIS plan to reorganize into three brigades from the current eight sectors reflected UN views. ¶10. (C) Hume asked how Guehenno would suggest dealing with the Sudanese opposition to Chapter VII. Guehenno said that he would explain that the Security Council was master of its resolutions, but it would act on the SYG's definition of tasks. He thought that the pattern used with UNMIS could be applied; Chapter VII would be invoked only with the task of protecting civilians, not with the overall mission. Hume commented that repeating this formula would have the virtue of a good precedent in securing Chinese support. Guehenno said the best way to keep pressure on the Sudanese was for the U.S. and China to work together. ¶11. (C) At the end of the meeting SRSG Jan Pronk arrived to tell Guehenno that he and Djinnit would meet with President Bashir at 18:30. HUME