SUDAN/DARFUR: FM LAM AKOL ON IMPLEMENTATION, THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001367 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR D AND AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2016 TAGS: PREL SU PGOV SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: FM LAM AKOL ON IMPLEMENTATION, THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND, AND LATE ADHERENTS TO THE ACCORD REF: KHARTOUM 1362 Classified By: Charge Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: FM Lam Akol told Charge and USAID director on June 7 that, within the context of trilateral consultations among the GNU, UN, and AU, discussions would now proceed on a transition to UN peacekeeping. Sudan had always said there could be role for the UN after a peace agreement was signed, and it would be contradictory for Sudan to accept one in the South and not in Darfur. Akol recalled with some bitterness international activities in the past months, taken without consulting Sudan's leaders, that led to the AU's request for transition under pressure from the U.S. (an illegitimate act by the AU in his view),and to a series of UN Security Council resolutions, some of which included language insulting to Sudan. He also raised, as he and President Bashir had the day before with the visiting UN Security Council, the fact that a security role for the UN is not mentioned in the Darfur Peace Agreement. Akol indicated some willingness to consider a role for NATO in order to strengthen AMIS, but the proposals needed to come from the AU. Akol suggested the possibility of joint military operations between Sudanese forces and those belonging to Sudanese Liberation Movement-Minni Minawi faction against rebel forces opposed to peace. He also said the government wants to broaden the base of the agreement by permitting members of the SLM-Abdelwahid faction and JEM to join the peace agreement, arguing that they needed some political rights to entice them to do so. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On June 7, Charge, USAID country director Almquist, and poloff met with FM Lam Akol and MFA Director of the Americas el-Diridieri. Charge began by formally introducing Almquist in her new role as USAID mission director. Almquist detailed USAID's substantial aid program for Sudan. The FM promised the government's cooperation in our efforts. Strengthening AMIS and moving towards transition -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Charge began by asking for the FM's evaluation of the UNSC's meetings the day before with Sudan's leadership. Charge stressed the USG's keen interest in moving forward rapidly on implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA),which meant strengthening AMIS in the short-term and moving towards a UN PKO by the end of the year. ¶4. (C) FM Akol launched into a lengthy recapitulation of the past months in which he bemoaned the lack of dialogue with the GNU. He argued that the AU had been pressured into requesting transition to UN peacekeeping, particularly in the run-up to the U.S.'s presidency of the UNSC in February, when in late January, the "non-papers were flying all over. We saw them all," he asserted. Continuing with the past, he said that one reference in a UNSC resolution (1663) that talked about parties in Abuja "including the GNU" was particularly insulting. He also asserted, as he has before, that the AU had no political or legal authority to ask for transition to UN peacekeeping. With regard to the funding argument, Akol said that no one was deluded into thinking the AU could fund itself, but the EU, USG, withheld funds to prompt the AU to request a transition to the UN. ¶5. (C) Striking a more positive note, the FM said that now that a peace agreement had been reached, the dynamic had changed. The GNU has continually affirmed its willingness to discuss the role the UN can play in ensuring security in Darfur after a peace agreement. He emphasized the GNU has been clear about this issue in all of its public statements. It would be a contradiction, according to Akol, to accept such a mission in the south but reject the same role in Darfur. No reference to UN transition in the DPA -------------- ¶6. (C) In what has now become a prominent rhetorical point for the government, Akol emphasized that the text of the DPA only mentions a role for the AU and there is no explicit discussion of the UN,s role in the security provisions of the agreement. Akol asked AU negotiator Salim why the AU did not include a role for the UN in the draft if that was the intention. According to Akol, Salim responded that the AU felt the GNU would not have signed had a role for the UN been included. Akol asked why Salim assumed this, given the position of the GNU that there indeed could be a role for the UN after a peace agreement, intimating that it was wrong simply to assume that reference to a UN security role would KHARTOUM 00001367 002 OF 003 have been a deal breaker. The Chairman of the PSC told Akol that his vision of the UN mandate equated to striking out all of the references in the DPA to the AU and replacing them with the UN. Moving forward trilaterally -------------- ¶7. (C) Sudan has now agreed, he continued, on a mechanism for trilateal discussions among the UN, AU, and GNU. Akol balked at the term "assessment team" in reference to the group of UN and AU advisors about to arrive in Khartoum, calling the meetings instead a &joint political meeting of the UN, AU, and GNU.8 Following these initial discussions, the group can &go and make an assessment.8 The UNSC has now agreed that the GNU must play a role in any discussions regarding a potential transition, and the GNU is willing to talk to AU-UN representatives in Khartoum about the possible role of the UN in Darfur. He feels the time is now right to &let quiet diplomacy do the work.8 There is a need to move forward to ensure the agreement is implemented and the GNU is duty bound by the DPA to work with the AU to allow them a role. All parties are in agreement the AU must be strengthened in order to do its job effectively. A role for NATO? -------------- ¶8. (C) In the context of the immediate need to strengthen AMIS, Charge asked about a possible role for NATO. He outlined the various ways in which NATO might help with logistics, command and control, and training. Akol stated that NATO should work through the AU with regard to a possible role. Since all parties agree that AMIS needs to be strengthened, the only point of contention was how. According to Akol, the AU needs to present a plan of action for how they will adjust to become more effective. The GNU, in response, will look at the proposal, discuss the points, and negotiate. It will not be a problem for the GNU if the AU suggests NATO technical support. When pressed on whether the GNU would look favorably on a NATO role, Akol indicated it could. Enhancing security -------------- ¶9. (C) In response to Almquist,s question regarding Akol,s perspective on what the GNU can do to help the security environment, the FM offered that the cause of insecurity must be analyzed. The GNU is asking the international community to ensure Chad does not become &the spoiler.8 Akol referred to a recent speech by Sudanese President Bashir, in which Bashir mentioned using incentives to induce militias to disarm. The GNU has plans in place regarding disarmament and has already begun the process of collecting arms through the use of incentives, such as money. According to Akol, the militias are strong because of the N,djamena cease-fire agreement, halting the government's ability to pursue the perpetrators of violence. Sudan must ensure the border with Chad is sealed so no incursions can be made into Sudanese territory to further destabilize Darfur. ¶10. (C) Akol stated that soon the forces opposing the DPA will be forced by the GNU and Minni Minawi,s faction to cooperate. Akol envisioned the potential for joint Sudanese/SLA military operations against the remaining opposition forces. He said that if rebels opposed to the agreement do not put down their arms, that might be the only solution. With regard to calming the militia, they need to see that they will not be attacked by armed groups, and that the government can provide for their security. What about Abdul Wahid and those who adhere late? -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Akol expressed a desire to see members of the opposing factions join the agreement to encourage better prospects for peace and security. Discussion ensued regarding the legitimacy of the claimed representatives of the opposition factions, some presently in Addis Ababa preparing to sign "Declarations of Accession." Akol took the position that the AU already knows some of these individuals because they participated in the peace talks in Abuja. He indicated that they had legitimacy as leaders, and that if they adhered to the DPA, they should be given political rights. Charge and USAID director stressed the importance of not undercutting Minni, who was the only rebel leader actually to sign the DPA in Abuja. The FM countered that new adherents needed political incentives to join; otherwise, why would they. KHARTOUM 00001367 003 OF 003 STEINFELD