SUDAN/UN SECURITY COUNCIL VISIT: STROKING THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 KHARTOUM 001362 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR D AND AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC SU SUBJECT: SUDAN/UN SECURITY COUNCIL VISIT: STROKING THE LEADERSHIP TO REACH A YES ON UN PEACEKEEPING REF: KHARTOUM 1354 Classified By: Charge Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment. The UN Security Council held a series of meetings in Khartoum on June 6, including with President Bashir and FM Lam Akol. SRSG Jan Pronk counseled the group to be aware of Sudan's sensitivities with regard to international intervention and Sudan's sovereignty as it pressed on the need for a transition from AU to UN peacekeeping. In his opening remarks at the key meetings and at a press conference, UK perm rep, Emyr Jones Parry, leader of the group, stressed the respect that the UNSC had for Sudan's sovereignty, and promised that any transition to UN peacekeeping would be done in full coordination, or even in "negotiation" with Sudan's government. That said, he and others pointed to the need for rapid progress on transition to UN peacekeeping, as the AU/UN assessment team was about to arrive in the region. The voice of the UNSC came across as largely united, since the Chinese and Russians had little space to sound more solicitous of Sudan's sensitivities than the group's chief spokesman. With regard to pressing the government to permit greater unimpeded access to humanitarian work, only U.S. Ambassador Sanders raised this repeatedly. ¶2. (C) The response from Sudan's leaders with regard to UN transition showed some signs of an increasingly open attitude, but was not devoid of the usual posturing. Both the President and FM pointed to the lack of any reference to UN transition in the Darfur Peace Agreement as raising the issue of why AMIS could not simply continue its work (or why this matter was not tackled at Abuja). Chapter VII provisions were also rejected. But the FM also said that a page had been turned in the heretofore contentious relations between the UNSC and Sudan, stressed that the assessment mission would be welcome, and commented that "the stage is set for very serious and substantive discussions." While President Bashir took a harder line and ceded less, several of our key interlocutors tell us that UN peacekeeping is now seen as largely inevitable by Sudan's leaders. ¶3. (C) The generally careful and polite approach the UNSC and its principal spokesman took to the UN transition issue should serve to preempt further disinformation and hyperbole here with regard to perceived malevolent intentions of the international community. The other message (or promise) left behind -- both privately and publicly -- is that whatever transition does take place will be developed only with the full cooperation and consent of Sudan's government. End Summary and Comment. Itinerary/Participants -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The UN Security Council began its mission to Sudan with a full day of meetings in Khartoum on June 6. All 15 countries were represented from NYC, with a mix of perm reps or deputies. P-5 participants were the UK, French, and Chinese perm reps, a Russian deputy, and Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders for the U.S. (Sanders was accompanied by LtCol Pat Murray from USUN.) UK perm rep Emyr Jones Parry was the group's leader and principal spokesman. The group traveled on to Addis on June 7, and will continue to Juba, back to Khartoum, and then to Darfur and Chad. Some members will then go on to Kinshasa. ¶5. (SBU) Meetings here were held with SRSG Pronk, Minister for Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor, FM Lam Akol, and President Bashir. The UNSC also met in separate meetings with groups of parliamentarians, NGOs, and opposition leaders. They also gave a well-attended press conference (reftel). Although a meeting was requested with VP Taha, the government did not arrange one. COMs in Khartoum accompanied the group, but were asked by the Presidency not to attend the Bashir meeting. SRSG Jan Pronk: Stroke Sudan; Invite Abdul Wahid to NYC -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The day began with an extensive briefing from SRSG Jan Pronk, who recalled the recent Brahimi mission, in which the government granted permission for the joint UN/AU assessment team only the very last half hour. He emphasized to the 15 that the green light was for the KHARTOUM 00001362 002 OF 006 assessment mission only, not for the transition to a blue-hatted force. Pronk spent considerable time describing Sudanese sensitivities: foreign activities in Sudan caused special sensitivities in the fiftieth anniversary year of Sudan's independence, the government was upset that it had received no congratulations for signing the Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja, the there was a sense among Sudanese of a lack of respect for Sudanese sovereignty. Pronk suggested that these be taken into account during UNSC representations to the government. With regard to rehatting, he said the international community was now in a period of "negotiations" with the GNU. The transition could not be forced; rather, Sudan wants to be able to invite the UN in. He described extraordinary GNU sensitivity to Chapter VII provisions, but, he argued that a much more robust PKO than AMIS was needed that would have to include Chapter VII. This should be explained the GNU as not being against them, but rather helping to curb the activities of spoilers. The message to the government should be: "you may need UN peacekeepers to help you to implement your agreement." ¶7. (C) With regard to the security situation on the ground in Darfur, Pronk reported that, while May was very violent, the first week of June had been quiet. Turning to Abdul Wahid and other non-signatories, Pronk told the group that AW had been complying scrupulously with all the previous agreements he was signatory to, and it was imperative to "get him on board" with the DPA. "Do not be cross with him," he pronounced, but invite him and Mini Minawi to NYC and give them the red carpet treatment. -- The south and the east ¶8. (C) Pronk said Sudan was far from being a failed state. The problem was the division of wealth between center and periphery. Implementation of the CPA was not going badly, he said, but there were some commissions that were rarely meeting or not established, and others that were underutilized. Pronk also referred to security problems in the south that were tribal, economic, and military in nature (non-integration of the other armed groups). Abyei still need to be resolved. On the LRA, Pronk reported that, in light of the GOSS decision to speak to Kony, fighting has stopped. Pronk intimated that he agreed with the need to keep the political track open, and, as he has done often before, criticized the timing of the ICC indictments of LRA leaders. He also mentioned talks about the East to start next week in Asmara, indicating some optimism with regard to Eritrean mediation. "Talks in Libya have always been a non-starter," he said. ¶9. (C) During qs and as, UK ambassador questioned the advisability of courting Abdul Wahid, which would be seen as appeasing him and might weaken Mini. Pronk said that, although AW is a very difficult person, he must not be counted out, as you need the Fur on board, of whom most still consider AW their leader. He has a lot of support in the camps, as well, noted Pronk. Pronk said the signatures could easily have gone the other way -- with AW signing and Mini not, adding that he was not surprised, given the animosity between them, that one SLA leader signed and the other did not. (Charge privately told Pronk later in the day that Washington believed firmly that AW had missed his last chance, but Pronk persisted, clearly convinced of the necessity of bring AW on board.) In response to other queries, Pronk said that Bashir's relationship with Salva Kiir was improving, and that JEM's interest in Darfur was waning as its involvement in the East grew. He told the group that Sudanese leaders were quite fearful the UN peacekeepers might be tasked to carry out ICC tasks. With regard to the inability to get a meeting with VP Taha, Pronk intimated that it could be because he has now agreed to the clear need for a transition to UN PKO. He said that AMIS had gotten less effective in the field over time. On the question of janjeweed, Pronk speculated that 60 percent could be brought under the control of the government, while 40 percent were "completely out of control." In fact, the government was afraid of them, and one way to weaken the intransigents would be to deal with those more flexible. The government needed to come up with a good plan on how to disarm the militias. Deng Alor: CPA progress mixed; GNU moving on UN in Darfur -------------- -------------- -- UK intervention KHARTOUM 00001362 003 OF 006 ¶10. (C) Taking his cue at least to a degree from Pronk's counsel, UK perm rep opened the meeting (and subsequent ones) with the following message: the UN respects Sudan's sovereignty, Sudan deserves respect, Sudan took a courageous step in signing the DPA, the UNSC is here to help Sudan with implementation, and the security of the people of Sudan is first and foremost Sudan's issue. But he also stressed firmly that transition from AMIS to a UN force was necessary: the task had become too large and too long-term for AMIS's resources, and AMIS itself had asked to be relieved. But, Jones Parry stressed, the transition would be managed in partnership with the GNU. Other Ambassadors added the following. Ghana noted that, because of Sudan's size and geographical position, Sudan's future was Africa's future. Russia urged non-signatories to the DPA to sign, said the council would listen "most attentively" to the GNU views, and any transition would require the "consent and willful cooperation" of the government. China hailed the new stage in relations between the UN and Sudan, noting that we respect your government and want to be helpful; "we are partners." Amb. Sanders noted the U.S.'s long interest in Sudan, its huge aid program of more than one billion dollars, and the critical need to move forward with UN transition. -- North/South ¶11. (C) Minister for Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor (SPLM) focused largely on north-south issues in his extended comments. He said that the establishment of the GNU signified a big change in the right direction with regard to Sudan's governance. But there were successes and failures in CPA implementation. A big success was the formation of the government itself. Problems included serious security problems in the south, with some other armed groups still maintaining ties with the Sudan Armed Forces. LRA remains a large concern, Deng said, adding that that is why talks with Kony are necessary. But, in general, the pace of implementation is too slow: it took the SPLM a while to recoup after Garang's death, and there are many commissions and institutions that are either not formed, or not functioning. There is still a pervasive lack of trust and confidence between two parties who had fought each other for so long. ¶12. (C) Deng gave relatively positive spin to the recent high-level NCP-SPLM meeting, saying that the two sides had agreed to deal with their differences head-on. He reported the development of additional structures for partnership, and concluded that, although the two sides had political visions that diverged, they are now partners. He noted that the unresolved issue of Abyei could threaten the entire CPA. He critiqued the current Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) because, having to report its findings to the Presidency, the AEC could find itself deadlocked. This should not be repeated for whatever is set up for DPA implementation. He concluded N/S by saying that there can be no return to war, but that the peace dividend is too slow. ¶13. (C) Deng thanked the donor community for its support, but complained in rather strong terms about his disappointment over lack of international support for refugee returns, terming it "not a priority" for the donors. -- Darfur ¶14. (C) Deng said he (personally) would be happy with UN support in Darfur. While there had indeed been differences and suspicions in the past, a new page has been turned, and there can now be cooperation with the UN. Consensus is being built within the GNU, he reported, to cooperate with the UN. He said that the SPLM was talking with non-signatories of the DPA, including Abdul Wahid. He said that internal discussions were taking place within the GNU on how to deal with the janjeweed; disarming them is easier said than done. Who will disarm them, he asked rhetorically: the SAF? the SPLM? the joint integrated units? the UN? On support for Chadian rebels, he said that the SPLM and NCP had decided at their meeting to suspend support for any dissidents in any neighboring countries. FM Lam Akol: UN transition is not specified in the Darfur Peace Agreement -------------- -------------- KHARTOUM 00001362 004.2 OF 006 -------------- ¶15. (C) Jones Parry opened with a similar presentation to the one he had made to Deng Alor, stressing UN-Sudan partnership, respect for sovereignty etc. Noteworthy was his comment that the UN/AU peacekeeping assessment mission would "negotiate" a turnover of the mission to the UN with the GNU (in the press conference he used the word again). With regard to humanitarian access, he said he understood that it was "a little bit intermittent;" improvements were needed. The French delegate stressed the need for protection of civilians. Ambassador Sanders pushed hard on the humanitarian access issue, as well as on AMIS strengthening and UN transition. ¶16. (C) Lam Akol opened by saying the meeting was important, as it marked the turning of a new page in the UNSC's relations with Sudan. Too much earlier had been in the media, and it was important to have this tte--tte. The visit of the UNSC would serve a useful purpose in helping to allay mutual suspicions; it would create a new atmosphere. He commented the Darfur dialogue was critical to consolidating the agreement. Disarming the janjeweed was also key; arms could only be carried in the future by recognized groups. On the issue of humanitarian access, the FM said that the GNU had extended the moratorium on restrictions on aid delivery, and was now contributing food to the WFP. -- On UN transition; and signatories ¶17. (C) Lam Akol stressed that any future role for the UN in Darfur would have to be in the context of the DPA. Therefore, the trilateral meetings among the AU, UN, and GNU to take place with the arrival of the assessment mission would be crucial in hammering this out. As no transition is mentioned in the text of the DPA itself, he said, there was a question about what role the UN would or could have: the same as the one outlined for the AU? Or a different one? He stressed that the GNU was open to discussions with the assessment mission, recalling that the government had always said they were open to a UN role after the signing of a peace accord. "The stage is set for very serious and substantive discussions" on this issue. ¶18. (C) Regarding Abdul Wahid's refusal to sign the agreement, he indicated that the clock had run out. The agreement cannot be held hostage to latecomers; quick implementation was key. That said, it was important to broaden the base of support for the agreement in some manner. (Comment: There is debate here about the question of whether or not to continue to court Abdul Wahid, and on what rights and privileges late adherents might have vis--vis the agreement. The FM did not go into detail on these matters at this meeting.) -- LRA: Give peace, and Kony, a chance ¶19. (C) The FM said that the attempt by the Government of South Sudan to negotiate with Kony had the support of the GNU. Kony has said that he is now committed to peace, and we need to give this a chance, he said. President Bashir: tough line on transition -------------- ¶20. (C) The following are key points from the UNSC's meeting with President Bashir, from which, as noted earlier, resident COM's were excluded. -- Sudan will not accept UN forces under Chapter VII. -- The DPA does not take a UN force into account. The mandate of the DPA is to be accomplished by the AU; if the AU was not capable of accomplishing the objectives in the DPA then it should have said as much before signing on. Moreover, the AU does not have the authority to transfer its responsibilities to another entity. -- Sudan (along with the AU) is capable of accomplishing the tasks in the DPA, outside help is not needed. -- There are 150k troops in Iraq and there is no peace there, Sudan does not want the same thing on its soil. -- The Sudanese people are not ready for outside forces. Locals accept AMIS because AMIS troops have the same KHARTOUM 00001362 005 OF 006 features and same culture. -- Ultimately, it is the Darfurians who will have to resolve their differences, as they have a history of working out their own problems. --A significant portion of the problem in Darfur is with Chadian rebels who are well armed and supplied by President Deby. Sudan has adhered to the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement, Chad has not. Meeting with Parliamentarians -------------- ¶21. (SBU) The meeting with the parliamentarians was reported to have been lively, including attacks on the U.S. with regard to Iraq policy. Chapter VII was rejected by the parliamentarians. There were double standards in the manner in which the international community dealt with global issues; Sudan was being unfairly treated. Meeting with NGO's -------------- ¶22. (SBU) National and international NGOs were given an opportunity to brief the UNSC for approximately one hour. Both national and international NGOs emphasized the need to implement all UNSC resolutions on Darfur. Common themes were protection of civilians, quick start to disarmament of janjaweed, strengthening AMIS while preparing for a UN transition, and removing obstacles to humanitarian access. The situation on the ground so far has not improved as a result of the DPA, according to the NGOs, and IDPs will be extremely reluctant to move out of the camps until there is security. The DPA itself is quite controversial, and most NGOs are reluctant to raise the topic with beneficiaries or be directly associated with outreach efforts. The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue must be well-run, and cannot be seen as a Government initiative. "Nobody" trusts the Government in Darfur, which will have to work hard to restore any credibility. ¶23. (C) The NGOs also emphasized the problems of CPA implementation in the south, citing the issues of Abyei and the status of DDR and integration of forces through the JIUs, among others, as well as noting ongoing zones of insecurity in Equatoria and Upper Nile due to the Lord's Resistance Army and Other Armed Groups that still require attention. These issues all need more attention from the international community. Problems in the east and three areas were also cited. Several NGOs, both international and national, urged the UNSC to take a more holistic approach to Sudan, rather than dealing with the fundamental problems of peace and security in the country piecemeal, by region, as it is now being done. Opposition parties meeting -------------- ¶24. (SBU) Participants included: Sadiq al Mahdi, Chairman, Umma Party Ali Mahmoud Hassanien, Deputy Chairman, Democratic Union Party Hassan al-Turabi, Chairman, Popular National Congress Party Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud, Secretary General, Sudan Communist Party Leaders of the major northern opposition political parties welcomed the visit of the UNSC, expressed measured support for the DPA and the CPA, but contended that both agreements would have been better had the opposition parties participated more fully in both the Naivasha and Abuja talks. They universally criticized the CPA for being a bilateral agreement between the NCP and SPLM, resulting in only a 14 percent share in power for the opposition parties in the north. This imbalance is now further complicated by the DPA, which allocates part of the 14 percent to Darfur, but does nothing to the NCP's 52 percent stake. Nonetheless, all expressed support for elections that are mandated in the CPA as the legitimate way of redressing these imbalances and allowing the people of Sudan to decide who their leaders are. In the meantime, they warned, Sudan was in danger of "Somalization" if a more comprehensive approach to the country's problems is not taken. Already the east and the north are vying for the same kind of attention that the south and the west is now receiving. In KHARTOUM 00001362 006 OF 006 response to a question on the likelihood of the Government to accept transition to a UN force, the consensus was that ultimately the Government would agree but to expect that it would continue to object loudly for a while longer. In the words of the deputy chairman of the DUP, "This is the way it always works." Press conference -------------- ¶25. (SBU) The day concluded with a press conference, in which the UK, Ghana, and China spoke. The preeminent theme was that the UNSC wanted to cooperate with the GNU in order to implement the DPA and achieve security in Darfur. There was no intention to invade or take over territory in Sudan; the GNU would be fully consulted with regard to any UN transition. In fact, as noted above, Jones Parry said a UN transition would result from "negotiations" with the GNU. (See Khartoum 1354.) STEINFELD