Sudan/Darfur - Ibok and Kingibe Describe

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001304

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL EAID PGOV AU SU
SUBJECT: Sudan/Darfur - Ibok and Kingibe Describe
Declaration of Accession for late adherents to the DPA;
Troika partners still want to court Abdul Wahid


1. Summary: AU's Ibok and Kingibe discussed with Embassy
further steps related to DPA implementation, including
support for the "peace secretariats." There will be a
"signing ceremony" Wednesday in Addis for 40-60 individuals
for whom Declarations of Accession to the DPA have been
especially drafted. Those who sign will have a legal and
political status less than that of the original signatories,
but the AU has determined this is a way of encouraging
broader support. Plans for the Darfur-Darfur dialogue are
proceeding. There seems to be some sympathy for continued
courting of Abdul Wahid among some of our Troika partners:
see para. 7 for recommendation. End Summary.


2. On June 4, Charge Steinfeld, USAID Director Almquist and
USAID/OTI Officer Briggs met with AU Ambassadors Sam Ibok
and Baba Gana Kingibe to advance USG support for DPA
implementation. This was the first opportunity for us to
brief Ibok, newly arrived in Khartoum to head the AU's
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) Implementation Team, on USG
support. Ibok warmly welcomed USG assistance in
establishing offices in Khartoum and El Fasher to support
the AU's DPA implementation efforts and provide a base of
operations for DPA signatories. He also requested
suggestions of Darfur experts who already know the situation
and the players on the ground to support the AU and help
shore up SLM-Minawi in implementation. Several names were
discussed in this regard, and Ibok encouraged the USG to
pursue two of them who would be immediately acceptable to
the AU and to the SLM. USAID is following up.

The DPA is closed; but association is possible
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3. Ibok was very clear that Minawi is the only official
partner with the Government in the DPA, and therefore every
effort must be made to increase his capacity to follow
through on implementation. The AU has firmly considered the
document closed for signature since May 31. The only
remaining option is signature of a Declaration of Accession
(see para. 8),expressing association with and support for
the DPA. The AU Peace and Security Council may meet on
Tuesday, according to Ibok and Kingibe, although they were
not certain where the discussion would come out with respect
to consequences for non-signers, other than that the DPA is
closed to further signatories. Debate going into the
meeting appears to center on whether simply not signing the
agreement is sufficient reason to sanction individuals or
otherwise impose penalties on them. The position of the AU
seems to be that this alone is not enough, but that any
evidence of concrete action to undermine the DPA would
warrant a strong response, possibly through travel bans and
asset freezes or other actions. All noted this would be
consistent with UNSC Resolution 1591. (Ibok and Kingibe
thought it would not be legally tenable to sanction
individuals simply for not signing an agreement; they noted,
however, that some of African leaders were taking a harder
line.)

"Signing ceremony" planned
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4. Ibok and Kingibe described plans for "dissident"
representatives of SLM-Abdul Wahid and JEM-South Darfur to
sign Declarations of Accession to the DPA in a ceremony in
Addis on Wednesday, June 7. Kingibe extolled the idea of
the ceremony as a way to signify increased support for the
beleaguered agreement. The Government's chief negotiator on
Darfur, Maghzoub Khalifa, is expected to participate in the
ceremony and is reportedly extremely eager for it to take
place. Kingibe wondered whether it might not also be
appropriate for Minni Minawi to be there as well, and for
both to witness the Declarations. Charge and USAID Director
discouraged this idea as elevating the signing too much,
when others have already associated themselves with the
agreement without this formality, and noted that the
official signing ceremony had already taken place in Abuja.
Almquist reported that Minawi is increasingly concerned
about the delays in implementation of the DPA, particularly
the security arrangements, and another signing ceremony
would only reinforce to his commanders that the original
ceremony was not meaningful. Ibok speculated that Khalifa's
intense eagerness for the ceremony to take place belies a
desire by the Government both to replace Abdul Wahid, and to
weaken Minni. Wahid's chief negotiatior, Dr. Abdurrahman
Mussa, and senior political advisor, Ibrahim Maddibo, are
among the forty to sixty individuals reportedly already in
Addis prepared to sign. Mussa and Maddibo have requested
that the AU recognize them as the official leadership of SLM-
AW, but the AU is declining, arguing that it is not their

KHARTOUM 00001304 002 OF 003


place to "anoint" new leadership for the SLM, that this can
only be done through a process of popular consultation in
Darfur. Leaders of JEM-South Darfur are also due to sign a
Declaration of Accession on Wednesday.

UK (and Norway) a bit wobbly
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5. The meeting was then joined by UK Ambassador Ian Cliff
and DCM Hugh Evans, and further discussion ensued on the
issue of non- or late signatories. UK pushed for some real
benefits for latecomers, like assurances of positions in the
various governmental structures to be set up. Ibok and
Kingibe argued that signing these Declarations does not
equate to rights to directly participate in implementation
of the DPA. The UK ambassador felt that signers of
Declarations of Accession would expect to be formally
integrated into the process of implementation, and that this
could be helpful in isolating Wahid while bringing his
supporters into the deal. Charge and USAID Director offered
this would diminish Minawi and would not be in keeping with
the DPA, but agreed with the goal of increasing support for
the DPA among the Fur and other communities. Charge
commented that Minni should be encouraged to be inclusive of
all those agreeing to the DPA (even if they did so late, and
particularly non-Zaghawa),but it seemed appropriate that
the Declaration of Accession did not explicitly promise them
political positions (UK seemed to disagree). Kingibe noted
with concern that Magzoub Khalifa has already stated that
SLM-Minawi should only get one-third of the seats and
"votes" in implementation allocated for the Movements since
he does not represent the other two partners meant to sign -
- SLM-AW or JEM. The AU will not accept this
interpretation. (Note: In another meeting where the
Norwegian ambassador was present, he, too, took a more
conciliatory line towards Abdul Wahid than ours.)

Darfur- Darfur dialogue
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6. Ibok highlighted the importance of the Darfur-Darfur
Dialogue as an important mechanism to create "buy-in" to the
DPA from a broader base of Darfurians. While affirming the
details outlined in the DPA, he noted that it will be
important to see this as a process, and not just two
discrete meetings (prepcom and conference). Ibok hopes that
a series of smaller consultations across Darfur, possibly
both before and after the prepcom, will provide an outlet
for discussion and consensus among the people of Darfur and
lead to the selection of representatives who could then
attend the formal conference, perhaps obviating the need for
800-1000 individuals to gather for a month or more as
currently conceptualized (note: Ibok refers to this concept
of the conference as a "jamboree" and something to be
avoided). The AU is still considering names, including some
Sudanese, for the eminent person to chair the conference,
but will proceed with planning and organizing the initial
prepcom and other preparatory consultations in the meantime.
USG and UK emphasized strong support to move the process
forward quickly.

Comment
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7. It is clear from this meeting and earlier discussions
in the day with other donors that the AU's position on no
further formal signatures and the alternative of signing a
declaration of accession is not yet widely understood, as
there are still some sentiments to continue to attempt to
pull Wahid, or at least his supporters, formally into the
deal. Post recommends that Department reconcile positions
in capitals at least among the Troika-Plus. The degree of
isolation of Wahid and JEM is a recurrent question in all
manners of DPA implementation, ranging from presence in the
Darfur JAM Core Coordinating Group (CCG) to how
participation in the Joint Commission (JC) and Ceasefire
Commission (CFC) should be modified post-Abuja. A balance
between giving erstwhile supporters of SLM-AW and JEM
reasons to support the DPA and respect its terms (e.g.
security arrangements) while at the same time not rewarding
the leaders of these movements must be found. The AU has
determined that the Declarations of Accession are a way to
encourage additional adherents without granting them
automatic rights or undermining Minni.

Declaration of Accession
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8. The copy of the declaration we received from the AU is

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still in draft. Introductory paras recall previous
agreements relating to Darfur. Relevant para reads:

We, the undersigned, hereby declare that upon signature:

-- We shall be bound by the letter and spirit of the DPA and
shall assume and implement the relevant obligations arising
therefrom, especially those related to the Comprehensive
Ceasefire Agreement and the Arrangements agreed therein.

-- We commit ourselves to ensure that all the Organs,
Committees and Structures under our control including our
members, shall comply with the provisions of the DPA.

-- The present Declaration shall be submitted to the
Chairperson of the Commission of the AU for registration
with the Secretary General of the UN.

STEINFELD