SITREP 12: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT UPDATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001282 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR D AND AF/SPG E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL SU MOPS KPKO AU SUBJECT: SITREP 12: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT UPDATE REF: A. KHARTOUM 1262 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1254 ¶1. (U) Summary: The following cable outlines current activities and events relating to the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA): -- Kiir,s Mini-Summit: June 2 -- Minawi Tours North Darfur -- AU Describes Needs for Peace Secretariat -- UNMIS Outlines Thinking on Transition -- DLO Discusses CONOPS/Advisors with AMIS Force Commander -------------- Kiir,s Mini-Summit: June 2 -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Roger Winter and Kate Almquist report from Darfur that VP Salva Kiir,s meeting with Minni Minawi and Abdul Wahid al-Nur (ref A) has been moved to June 2 in Yei due to scheduling conflicts. Sam Ibok, head of the AU DPA Implementation Team, will also attend. Minawi has placed a high priority on this meeting, recognizing the significance of a political alliance for the SLM with the SPLM and with Kiir. ¶3. (SBU) AMIS Senior Political Officer Ahmed Rufai Abubakar reports that the May 31 deadline will be extended to accommodate this change, and the Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa will be rescheduled. Poloff cautioned Abubakar that moving the deadline too often only emboldens Abdul Wahid and could jeopardize the credibility of the DPA if Abdul Wahid does not sign. Abubakar responded that the AU is trying to achieve a balance between giving Abdul Wahid the opportunity to join the agreement and not giving him the impression that he can veto the DPA. -------------- Minawi Tours North Darfur -------------- ¶4. (SBU) On May 30, Minni Minawi returned to areas north of Kutum to explain his decision to sign the DPA to his commanders. Winter and Almquist accompanied him and also spoke of the support and interest of the United States in Darfur and the transformation of Sudan. Minawi explained that the DPA was not perfect, but it was a chance for security and peace, especially with the support of friends like the United States, and he asked the commanders to give it a chance. Minawi was very warmly received and clearly in command and at ease in his element. ¶5. (SBU) During the trip, Winter and Almquist asked about the reports that Minawi had arrested Suleiman Jamoos. SLA Political Aide Ali Trayo explained that they had not arrested Jamoos, but did take away his satellite phone because he was using it to rally supporters against Minawi and the DPA. USDEL urged that Jamoos be allowed to signal to the outside world that he is alright, because rumors were circulating that Jamoos had been arrested and tortured. -------------- AU Describes Needs for Peace Secretariat -------------- ¶6. (SBU) As a follow-up to Charge Hume,s meeting with AMIS Head of Mission Kingibe (ref B),Acting POL Chief and USAID/OTI Officer met with AMIS Deputy Head of Mission Monique Mukaruliza and Senior Political Affairs Officer Ahmed Rufai Abubakar to discuss the details of a Peace Secretariat to support the DPA. OTI officer showed photos of a building identified for use by the signatories in El Fasher and laid out its program, including 3-4 offices and meeting space for ¶50. The AMIS representatives thought it seemed appropriate but will study the proposal more carefully. Mukaruliza explained that the DPA Implementation Team would be given offices at the current AMIS headquarters in el-Fasher, so office space for the signatories is all that is needed. However, there is some concern over where these Implementation Team members will stay. ¶7. (SBU) For Khartoum, the AU requested an office building that could support a range of implementation activities: -- The DPA Implementation Team, a minimum 10 person group now working out of the office of a person on leave; -- The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation Preparatory Committee, which will have at least 25 people; -- The media outreach office, with a minimum of three people KHARTOUM 00001282 002 OF 002 provided by the UK and arriving next week; -- Office space for the signatory rebel groups to use while in Khartoum; and -- A large conference room/small auditorium where the AU could give presentations and have larger meetings with partners and stakeholders. ¶8. (SBU) Mukaruliza asked how quickly the contractor could be sent to secure and furnish a building. She said that AMIS had already run out of office space, so the need for another facility was immediate and acute. -------------- UNMIS Outlines Thinking on Transition -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Acting POL Chief met with UNMIS Darfur Team Leader Ava Rogers to discuss current UNMIS planning on the transition from an AU force. Charge Hume had previously suggested that UNMIS take over non-security aspects of DPA implementation before the security forces were set to deploy. This would relieve pressure from AMIS and take advantage of the UN,s larger capacity for organizing commissions, delivering humanitarian aid, and providing development assistance. Rogers recognized that there was eagerness for a quick transition, but explained that UNMIS planners were currently divided over the feasibility of this plan. It could only be done with a clear division of responsibility and a strong mandate, and must be done in a way that does not embarrass the AU. While some in UNMIS agree that an early turnover of non-security responsibilities would help secure faster DPA implementation, others feel it is better to wait until the peace keeping forces are ready and take over the entire mission at one time. All planners feel that any sort of phased transition of individual responsibilities would be extremely difficult, so Rogers reiterated that the mandate would have to be strong and well-defined. STEINFELD