Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1257
2006-05-26 12:48:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SUDAN: PRESS REFLECTS ON DARFUR DEVELOPMENTS,

Tags:  PREL KPAO OIIP PGOV PINR SU 
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VZCZCXRO9223
OO RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1257/01 1461248
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261248Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2955
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001257 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SPG/, AF/PD (A. JOHNSON, S. WESTGATE),
IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KPAO OIIP PGOV PINR SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: PRESS REFLECTS ON DARFUR DEVELOPMENTS,
EMERGING U.S.-SUDAN RELATIONS

REF: Khartoum 1210

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001257 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/SPG/, AF/PD (A. JOHNSON, S. WESTGATE), IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL KPAO OIIP PGOV PINR SU SUBJECT: SUDAN: PRESS REFLECTS ON DARFUR DEVELOPMENTS, EMERGING U.S.-SUDAN RELATIONS REF: Khartoum 1210 ¶1. SUMMARY. Sudanese press commentaries suggest growing consensus in favor of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Opposition continues, however, to the proposed transition from African Union (AU) to UN peacekeepers in Darfur (something explored with the Sudan Government this week by UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Al-Brahimi, septel),and growing perception of government confusion in this regard. Speculations also continue concerning the U.S. role and motives in Darfur, with some thinking an improvement in relations is in the air. -------------- Growing Acceptance of the DPA -------------- ¶2. Compared to the diffuse rejection of the DPA that was common in opposition circles a few weeks ago, most comments now focus more on how to can be fixed and made to work. A piece by Khartoum Monitor editor Alfred Taban, for instance ("Darfur in Crisis" May 18),begins by condemning the DPA: "What should have brought the people of Darfur their rights is now a naked power struggle between Khartoum and Darfur, and between the Darfuris themselves. What is clear is that the DPA has not answered even a quarter of the aspirations of the people of Darfur. It is grossly in favour of the government in Khartoum." His prescription, however, point to an unromantic compromise among rival leaders jockeying for power: "Unless there is a formula found whereby the three political leaders... are given prominent roles, there will be no peace in Darfur. Many of these leaders, while they talk of the rights of their people, are actually referring to their rights to leadership positions. That is a reality that has to be taken into consideration." ¶3. Pro-government writers continue to defend the DPA. Idriss Hassan (a columnist known to be close to Vice- President Taha) suggests the agreement should be followed up with discussions with civilian as well as armed groups (Al-Wihda, May 18). Abdel Hamid Musa Kasha - a Rezeiguat Arab from Darfur and former Minister of Foreign Trade, notorious for his role in channeling funds to the Janjaweed in 2003-04 - takes aims at the rebels who have not yet signed: "Those opposing the Darfur Peace Agreement seem to be oblivious to the fact that
there are people in Darfur who are still suffering.... These same people are waiting for the rains, the schools and their lives to begin again following the signing of the agreement. I call on all warring factions in Darfur to sign the agreement so as to first establish a cease-fire, and squabble later about the details." -------------- UN Rehatting Still Controversial -------------- ¶4. There is still considerable opposition to the proposed "international intervention" of UN peacekeepers in Darfur, representing for some a real blow to the Sudanese state: "The GOS is risking loss of credibility with the Sudanese public. The deployment of international forces to Darfur gives the impression that their own government is not capable of assuring their safety, and that it must resort to UN forces in order to maintain security. National sovereignty is the government's responsibility and no other party can be responsible for that" ("Restoring National Sovereignty." Al-Sudani, May 18). ¶5. Some -- especially in the pro-government Sudan Vision -- still nurture hopes that an expanded UN presence can be avoided. One editorial calls for Darfur's traditional chiefs to use their lore to bring about peace, obviating the need for foreign troops ("Revive Traditional Wisdom," Sudan Vision, May 18). Another argues that, in light of popular opposition to deployment of UN forces in Darfur, the special UN Envoy should consider alternative roles for the UN to play in that region (Sudan Vision, May 21). ¶6. There is a general perception that the government is in a quandary on the issue: KHARTOUM 00001257 002 OF 003 "The contradictory statements issued by the GOS regarding international forces' deployment to Darfur are striking. We have one official affirming that the government will not accept the deployment... and another official asserting that the GOS is still reviewing this proposal. The President is currently engaged in intensive discussions with NCP leaders on this matter. I hope that he chooses to extend his consultations to include the opposition as well. The issue at hand is huge and the two parties in power should not be the only ones responsible for making this decision." "An Issue as Big as Our Nation," Al-Sudani, May 22). ¶7. Another editorial, noting the advent of the UN special envoy, suggests that this should be a lesson to the government, "not to make vows in the name of Allah" before better weighing the odds. "We have been hearing conflicting statements by senior Sudanese government officials about the presence of UN- led forces in Darfur. But much of that is simply meant for local political consumption. The government is looking for justifications to convince the Sudanese public as to why it has to step down in the face of all the strong avowals it made earlier in its rejection of foreign intervention in Darfur. ("Driving the Nail Home," Khartoum Monitor, May 22) -------------- Perceptions of the U.S. Role -------------- ¶8. Others reflect on why the U.S. is promoting a U.N. presence in Darfur. One columnist commends a recent press interview with the U.S. Charg (reftel),but wonders about what was left unsaid: "The U.S. Ambassador to Khartoum sees Sudan's future in an optimistic way. His upbeat view of the Sudan should be compared with the bleak assessments of certain Sudanese politicians.... but there seems to be a question missing... why does the U.S. insist on deployment of international forces to Darfur? Does the deployment of forces help to feed the thousands who were displaced in Darfur? The problem of Darfur is that its social fabric has been ripped apart: can foreign troops fix that? " (Al- Rai Al-Aam, May 23) ¶9. "What is the Price of Submission to the U.S.?" another editorial asks: "The deployment of international forces to Darfur was met with massive rejection by the Sudanese public. This proposal... was submitted by the U.S. Administration to the UNSC. It is only logical for us to ask the GOS what it will gain from cooperating with the U.S. administration in the deployment of international forces. An even more pertinent question is: is the expected gain worth the humiliation we are doomed to face?" (Al-Sudani, May 21) -------------- U.S.-Sudan Relations may Improve? -------------- ¶10. The U.S. role in facilitating the DPA, the U.S. Charg's recent interview, the dropping of Libya from the Sponsors of Terrorism list -- all have stimulated new reflections on U.S.-Sudan relations. Some reject any reassessment. One columnist criticized a Sudanese official spokesman for characterizing U.S.-Sudanese relations as being "good." "This adjective... cannot be used to describe relations between Sudan and the U.S. The Presidential Press Secretary might have considered his statement a routine SIPDIS courtesy, but I think he should be more exact - when he refers to a relationship viewed by many as the worst ever found between two countries ." ¶11. Another columnist, reviewing a recent meeting between the MFA Minister of State Al-Sammani Al-Waseela and the U.S. Charg d'Affaires ("Putting the Cards on the Table," Al-Wihda, May 24),detects mixed signals: "The meeting also covered the issue of deploying international forces to Darfur, given the U.S. conviction n KHARTOUM 00001257 003 OF 003 of the importance of [such] deployment.... The U.S. was the party responsible for the escalation of war in Darfur, for internal electoral reasons. It is trying now (and for the same reasons) to calm down the crisis in the troubled region. The U.S. administration has also expressed, through its Charge d'Affaires, its support for the Abuja agreement. Nonetheless, and surprisingly, it is still pressuring the GOS." ¶12. "It is Time for America to Change its Foreign Policy," concludes the pro-government Sudan Vision (May 23). Praising the normalization of U.S.-Libyan relations, the paper calls for a similar deal for the Sudan: "We at Sudan Vision believe that it is high time for America to review its policy towards Sudan and normalize bilateral relations by lifting Sudan's name from the list of terrorist countries, in addition to lifting unilateral sanctions. We see no reason why these two measures remain imposed when USA is saying it is genuinely brokering peace in Sudan. South Sudan and Darfur peace agreements need the support of the International Community, including the United States." Whitehead

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