MEETING WITH UN SPECIAL ENVOY LAKHDAR BRAHIMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001230 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR D AND AF A/S FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: MEETING WITH UN SPECIAL ENVOY LAKHDAR BRAHIMI Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume for reason: Section 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On May 25 CDA Hume at his request met with UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to discuss prospects of transition to a UN peace-keeping force in Darfur. Brahimi was accompanied by A/SYG for peacekeeping, Hedi Annabi. During the 90 minute meeting Brahimi sought USG views on the viability of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),on activity to secure additional public support for the DPA, on capacity of the African Union to lead the process of implementation, and especially on government of Sudan positions. Brahimi has a series of meetings with top officials over the next two days, ending with President Bashir on the evening of May 26. He will then write his report, most likely recommending a specific mandate for a UN peace-keeping force. U/SYG Guehenno will lead the UN's technical assessment mission to Sudan. End Summary. ¶2. (C) CDA Hume said he had requested the meeting to go over a number of points regarding implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Whatever the flaws of the agreement or the difficulty of the situation in Darfur, the agreement provided a better basis for international activity than did the prevailing conflict and chaos. However, early action was needed to improve the situation. First, the Sudanese government and the African Union mediation should work to secure support for the DPA. On the one hand, if Abdul Wahid and Khalil Ibrahim could not be persuaded to sign the agreement on behalf of their groups, then attention should be given to securing adherence from their supporters. On the other hand, the African Union should coordinate a public information campaign throughout Darfur to publicize the agreement and to counter the negative and inaccurate information being spread by the Abdul Wahid and Khalil Ibrahim factions, as well as by Hassan al Turabi and Sadiq al Mahdi. ¶3. (C) Second, the African Union lacked many of the organizational resources and instincts needed to keep implementation on track and moving forward. Whatever the good intentions of donors and troop contributors, the AU would not be able to deploy additional, more capable troops into Darfur in the near future. The AU Force Commander lacked resources for strategic planning and for logistics, and implementation of the cease-fire provisions would have to begin before any outside support would arrive. Third, the African Union needed to put arrangements in place for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue, and it had made practically no preparations for this task. Given that most of the people of Darfur were in no way represented at the peace talks, this dialogue was urgently needed. ¶4. (C) Hume asked if Brahimi could consider steps the UN might take to meet these needs. Could the UN lend assistance to the AU for a public relations effort to secure popular support for the DPA? For example, Hume had recently urged the government to grant the UN permission to begin UN radio broadcasts, and such broadcasts could greatly help in getting out correct information. The UN could help the AU to organize and launch the Darfur-Darfur dialogue. Likewise, the UN could give early assistance for strategic planning and logistics, well before transition to a UN command. Finally, it was important for the UN to continue its lead on humanitarian issues. Relations between the government and the NGOs were poor, but in the context of a peace agreement UN leadership could improve this situation. ¶5. (C) In response Brahimi said he was well aware of the weakness of the AU and problems with the AU mediation. He appreciated the strong USG role during the peace talks, without which an agreement would not have been made two weeks ago. He thought the UN could provide early help to the AU both in terms of organization and public outreach and in terms of military planning and logistics. He would push for authorization for the UN radio to go on air. With regard to AbdulWahid and Khalil Ibrahim, he asked for the USG view on the way forward, including with regard to the threat that they would be listed under UNSCR 1591. Hume said the USG position was that the DPA was a valid agreement that both should be encouraged to sign, perhaps stating their reservations but not changing the text. Whether or not they signed before any AU deadline, it would be best for them to support DPA implementation. Surely they were bound by the cease-fire provisions, and cease-fire violations by their forces could be a basis for their being listed under 1591, as could extensive political efforts aimed at blocking implementation. A mere failure to sign, however, might be seen differently. ¶6. (C) Brahimi asked a series of questions about the position of the government of Sudan. Earlier in the day he had met with leaders of parliament, who had handed him a resolution adopted in February that opposed a UN peace-keeping operation. Did the conclusion of the DPA change that position? What were the key points of possible opposition to a UN operation? Annabi recalled that during his visit to Khartoum in mid-April the pictures of former Liberian President Charles Taylor being escorted by UN peace-keepers to The Hague seemed to have created some hostility. ¶7. (C) Hume said that the conclusion of the DPA had created a new opening, but it had not eliminated all opposition. President Bashir was the key decision-maker. Vice Presidents Kiir and Taha, as well as Minister of Intelligence Gosh, seemed to have accepted that a UN operation was a key part of the package needed to secure peace in Darfur. Bashir's Darfur negotiator, Mazjoub Khalifa, was of the same view. The stiffest opposition was likely from the Minister of the Interior and Minister of Defense. During negotiation of the security provisions of the DPA a key sticking point had been whether only the Sudanese police or also the movements police liaison officers and the AU police monitors had executive policing authority to arrest suspects, either for violations of local law or pursuant to International Criminal Court decisions. There had been rumors that the UN would seek such authority. Annabi clarified that few potential contributors of civilian police monitors would permit their police to exercise such authority; Brahimi recalled that Canadian police had refused to do so in Haiti, even in the absence of any Haitian police. ¶8. (C) Brahimi said would explain that the purpose of a UN peace-keeping operation would be to secure the implementation of the DPA. In itself, that was a hugely complicated task. If asked, he would state that it would be unusual for a UN operation to have executive policing authority, and he did not intend to recommend that it seek such authority. On the other hand, he was in no position to commit the Security Council to any course of action. On May 24 and 25 he planned to meet with numerous Sudanese officials, including Vice President Kiir and Vice President Taha, as well as the ministers of interior and defense. ¶9. (C) Brahimi said he had talked with UK Permrep Jones-Parry about the upcoming visit by a delegation of security council members to Sudan. Brahimi thought the result of such a brief visit was somewhat unpredictable; the best one could hope for was a message that the international community supported full implementation of both the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the south and the DPA. ¶10. (C) In conclusion Brahimi said that surely by the end of his last meeting on May 26 with President Bashir he would know the official position on a UN peace-keeping operation for Darfur. He expected Bashir to accept an expansion of the UNMIS operation, with a similar mandate to the one it has in the south and following the same practices. He already thought that, given the AU's limitations, a transition to the UN should be sooner rather than later. The UN was ready to follow up on his mission by sending out the technical assessment team called for in the recent UNSC resolution, and, given the importance of the matter, Under Secretary General Guehenno would head the team. HUME