VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001158 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM MOPS PTER PEL SU SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT MACHAR ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LORD,S RESISTANCE ARMY, CONFLICT IN JONGLEI STATE REF: KHARTOUM 1116 Classified By: P/E Chief Eric Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) The following is an action request - see para 3. ¶2. (C) Summary: CG met with Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) Vice President Riek Machar and Minster for Parliamentary Affairs Gabriel Changson on May 12 to discuss the security climate in Southern Sudan. Machar spoke at length on his contacts with Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leaders and justified his actions as being in the self-interest of the GoSS (reftel). Because of these talks, Machar confirmed that Sudan will not renew the mandate of the Ugandan Popular Defense Force (UPDF) to operate on Sudanese territory. The discussion also covered ongoing clashes between the Lou Nuer and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Jonglei State. Machar explaine why the SPLA had resorted to force, but said that he hoped to return to negotiations with the White Army militia (septel). Other sources indicate that the SPLA units involved have been ordered to remain in their current positions. End Summary. ¶3. (C) ACTION REQUEST: AF/SPG is requested to advise on the background and legal ramifications of contacts with the LRA that we can share with senior GoSS officials. -------------- Cutting Deals with the Devil -------------- ¶4. (C) Machar was very forthcoming in providing details regarding his talks with the LRA. Following GoSS President Kiir's January 9 speech in which he offered the LRA three options -- GoSS mediation between the LRA and Government of Uganda (GOU),voluntary LRA withdrawal from Sudan, or an offensive against the LRA by the SPLA - a Dutch NGO named Pax Christi contacted the GoSS Presidency and offered to set up a meeting between GoSS representatives and the LRA. Dr. Simon, Dr. Leonard Anab, and Professor Safa, an American of Ethiopian descent, spearheaded this initiative. Machar said that the trio had been involved in earlier attempts to negotiate with the LRA. ¶5. (C) Machar said that he used the hubbub surrounding the February visit of Sudanese President Bashir to spirit LRA representatives through Juba airport. They offered to arrange a meeting between Machar and LRA Deputy Commander Vincent Otti, and on March 11 Machar traveled to Western 
Equatoria State for the meeting. This led to a second meeting on May 3 that included GoSS Security Minister Daniel Awet, an SPLA general, Otti, LRA leader Joseph Kony, and LRA General Odiambo. ¶6. (C) Machar said that Kony, who was dressed in the uniform of a general, was articulate and to the point. To Machar's surprise, several LRA advisors who also attended the meeting were "well learned" Ugandans who had studied in Europe. Machar repeated Kiir's offer to mediate or allow the LRA to withdraw peacefully from Sudan, but he warned that continued attacks on the Sudanese population would provoke a strong military reaction from the SPLA, and they would employ whatever force necessary to evict the LRA. He also told Kony that the LRA should desist from further attacks on UNMIS forces. ¶7. (C) Kony responded that he was interested in peaceful negotiation with Uganda, but said that he believed Museveni's goal was to kill him, rather than talk. He agreed to cease all offensive operations on Sudanese soil and told Machar that there was not a single LRA soldier remaining in Sudan east of the Nile. ¶8. (C) Machar pointed out that there had been no LRA attacks since May 1, although he deflected questions from the CG on what the GoSS offered in return for these assurances -- there are rumors the GoSS provided food aid to the LRA. Machar said that he had briefed Kiir on the meeting before Kiir's May 4 departure for Khartoum, with scheduled onward travel to Kampala for Museveni's May 12 inauguration. Machar said that Kiir would return with Museveni's response, which would be delivered to Kony. ¶9. (C) Machar said that he had heard, through various channels, including the Ugandan CG in Juba, that Kampala might not be adverse to a peaceful settlement of the LRA problem. Machar continued that under the present circumstances, Sudan had decided not to renew the protocol with Uganda that permitted Kampala to station UPDF forces on Sudanese territory. UPDF forces currently in Sudan would withdraw and deploy along the Ugandan border with Sudan. KHARTOUM 00001158 002 OF 003 ¶10. (C) Machar said that the GoSS had taken these steps not out of any fondness for the LRA, but rather out of self-interest. The LRA was a Ugandan problem that had migrated to Sudan as a facet of the North/South conflict in Sudan, and now that the war was over, the GoSS wanted the Ugandan problem to return home. Machar observed that Kony's willingness to deal may have been influenced by the withdrawal of SAF forces to the north. When the SAF abandoned its blocking positions on the roads between Juba and Torit, and between Juba and Nimule, LRA activities in those areas ceased. ¶11. (C) CG replied that he understood why the GoSS wanted the LRA to go away, but cautioned that dealing with a group on the U.S. list of designated terrorist organizations, or with individuals under International Criminal Court indictment in The Hague, could bear a political and possible legal price. Machar asked exactly what the latter might entail; CG responded that he would seek more precise information and report back. -------------- The White Army vs. SPLA -------------- ¶12. (U) Machar said that he had spent 22 days traveling in Western Equatoria, Jonglei, and Upper Nile States since fighting broke out between the Lou Nuer militia, the White Army, and the SPLA in January (septel). He said that in late February he had invited representatives of all of the pastoralist (and cattle raiding) tribes, to Pibor to discuss disarmament and reconciliation. Nuer (including Lou Nuer), Dinka, Murle, Taposa, Jie, Anuak, and Mundari representatives all participated. In separate discussions, he had gotten commitments from the White Army to disarm before beginning its annual end-of-dry-season migration toward the Toich to the west, through territories peopled by the Gawar Nuer and Dinka groups. ¶13. (U) The agreement was never honored, and a group of Lou Nuer began almost immediately an armed march toward the Toich, raising the specter of clashes with the neighboring groups. The White Army shot two senior Lou chiefs who protested the forced migration and subsequently clashed with SPLA units that had been dispatched to protect the March and prevent inter-tribal conflict. Machar said that the GoSS could not simply stand by while large armed units marched about the countryside at will - the SPLA was obliged to intervene. He confirmed that there had been fighting since early May, but said that this had died down and that he hoped to be able to return to negotiations soon. ¶14. (U) He stressed, however, that ultimately disarmament must take place. Machar did not think buying back arms or other soft methods would be effective, since the White Army was so well-armed that many of its members owned several guns. Machar said that negotiations would not be easy because the White Army consisted mostly of young men who had created a military structure and selected their own leaders. They no longer respected the authority of traditional leaders. Machar said that for now the SPLA had ceased operations against the White Army, which had retreated back toward its traditional Lou Nuer homeland. CG applauded this course of action, noting that attempts to pursue and disarm the retreating militia would only aggravate the situation. ¶15. (C) Following the Machar meeting, CG tracked down Waat Constituency MP Gatkouth Kuich. Kuich said that SPLA Chief of Staff Oyai Deng had indicated that he was the one who ordered the SPLA to desist from further pursuit of the retreating White Army. Kuich estimated that there had been 50,000 Lou Nuer in the migrating cattle camps, with as many as 20,000 of these armed. He said that the most recent number of Nuer "civilians" killed had reached 210, but admitted that many of these were armed youths. He did not know SPLA casualty figures. In addition, the Nuer had lost some 7,000 head of cattle. Kuich said that Paulino Matiep stood ready to join him in a visit to northern Jonglei State to attempt to calm passions as soon as a halt to the hostilities was confirmed. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶16. (C) Machar's comments on the LRA confirmed much of what we have heard from other sources, including the Governor of Eastern Equatoria's recent claim to CG that LRA forces had abandoned positions east of the Nile concurrently with the pull-out of SAF forces there. The GoSS desire for the LRA problem to go back where it came from is understandable and sympathetic, but the GoSS may not be able to continue to buy KHARTOUM 00001158 003 OF 003 off Kony's depredations, especially if Museveni indicates that he is unwilling to negotiate. HUME