SUDANESE VP TAHA SAYS NO DECISION YET ON UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001122

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D, AF/FO, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, PM, AND IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PREF EAID PGOV US AU UN SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE VP TAHA SAYS NO DECISION YET ON UN
TRANSITION

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sction 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On May 13, Sudanese VP Taha told CDA Hume
that Sudan had not yet decided on whether to accept
transition to a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. The
Government of Sudan is committed to the Darfur Peace
Agreement, and it is ready to take concrete steps, such as
expanding delivery of humanitarian assistance, to widen
support for the agreement. Sudan is willing, however, to
accept NATO support for the AU peacekeeping force in Darfur.
President Bashir appreciated the recent letter from President
Bush, and has just sent a reply. End Summary.

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DPA: Turning the Page in Darfur & in U.S.-Sudan Relations
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2. (2) CDA Hume at his request met with Sudanese VP Taha May
13 to discuss implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.
Hume said that the agreement was a positive opportunity to
turn the page in the Darfur tragedy, and potentially an
opportunity also to turn the page in U.S./Sudanese relations.
U.S. officials were continuing to work with AU mediator
Salim in hopes of producing a breakthrough that would enable
Fur leader Abdel Wahid to sign the agreement. For the
outcome of the peace to be positive, all those concerned will
have to step up to their responsibilities, at times making
difficult decisions. The agreement itself was not
self-implementing, and the situation in Darfur had many
tragic aspects.


3. (C) Hume recalled that President Bush had recently
announced the rerouting of ships carrying USG food donations,
a decision that will enable WFP soon to announce increases in
the daily food rations for IDPs in Darfur. The Government of
Sudan should consider deciding on its own contribution
through WFP so that the rations could be further increased.
The announcement of WFP of a cut in rations at the same time
as the peace was signed had a bad impact; IDPs in Kalma and
Abu Shouk camps outside Nyala and El Fasher were now rioting.

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CDA Hume: NGO Work Hampered; NATO Can Strengthen AMIS
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4. (C) Hume raised the problems confronted in Sudan by
international humanitarian agencies. The visa and residency
permit requirements were onerous and expensive; often the
government seemed intent on hampering their operations. If
the Government of Sudan hoped that the Darfur peace could
lead to improved bilateral relations, it would have to
improve treatment of international NGOs. Peace plus
difficulties for humanitarian assistance was a negative
message.


5. (C) Regarding the military aspects of the peace, Hume
recalled that U.S. policy was based on securing a peace
agreement in Abuja, achieving a transition to UN
peacekeeping, and strengthening AU peacekeeping in the
interim. As he had mentioned to Taha three weeks ago, the
USG thought that up to 500 NATO personnel could help AMIS in
the areas of training, logistics, and intelligence; some of
the troops would be American, but most would come from other
countries. At the same time, the U.S. thought it essential
to get an early decision to authorize preparation of the
transition to a UN mission. The USG was already planning to
send three officers to help AMIS with verification issues,
and an early visit by RADM Hunt was being considered.

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VP Taha: Sudan Grateful to USG for Food, Will Also Give
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6. (C) Taha said that on May 14 the Sudanese ministers of
humanitarian assistance and of finance were scheduled to
decide on a Sudanese contribution to help with the food
situation in Darfur. Sudan was grateful for President
Bush,s decision on food aid. The goal should be a return to
full rations. He acknowledged that relations with INGOs had
at times been difficult, caused on the one side by
nationalist resentments, and on the other by caustic
criticism of the Sudanese government. It was important to
fix relations, and the Sudanese government thought that the
peace agreement presented the right basis for doing so. Taha
had discussed this issue with UN U/SYG Egelund earlier in the
week.

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VP Taha: Gov't Committed to Broad Support for DPA...
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KHARTOUM 00001122 002 OF 002




7. (C) Taha said that the Sudanese government was reaching
out to all groups in Darfur, both those who felt excluded
from the Abuja talks and to Abdel Wahid. The government was
committed to the agreement and wanted to secure the fullest
possible support for it. Hume said that the USG shared the
view that the basis of support had to be widened, and it was
considering steps that might help secure that support.

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Although No Decision Made Yet re Transition to UN Mission
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8. (C) On military questions, Taha said that Sudan would
welcome the arrival of U.S. military experts to advise AMIS
on verification issues, as it would a visit by RADM Hunt.
Sudan wanted to see how AMIS could be strengthened in the
near future, including with the addition of troops from
countries such as Algeria and Egypt, and it accepted that
NATO could play a role in strengthening AMIS. As for
transition to a UN force, no/no decision had been made. At
times the UN approach in Khartoum was overly confrontational,
and there was the threat of International Criminal Court
activity. Taha commented that it would not help to rush this
issue.

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CDA Hume: Sudan Should Invite UN Assessment Mission
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9. (C) CDA Hume noted that the UN Security Council was now
considering a draft resolution on this subject. However that
was dealt with, Security Council members have planned a visit
to Sudan at the start of June -- it would be simply
impossible to keep this issue quiet for long. The best
course of action for Sudan would be to state now that it
wanted the international community, including the United
Nations, to support implementation of the Darfur Peace
Agreement, and to invite the Secretary General to send an
assessment mission. He suggested that the Government of
Sudan discuss the issue with UN U/SYG Guehenno, who was in
charge of peace-keeping and who had just done a good press
interview on the subject of the Darfur peace agreement.


10. (C) Taha said that he would talk with President Bashir
about establishing direct contact with Guehenno. He said
that Sudan appreciated the personal involvement of President
Bush in managing U.S./Sudanese relations. President Bashir
was glad to receive the recent letter from President Bush,
and a reply from President Bashir was on the way to
Washington.

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Comment
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11. (C) Taha,s comments on NATO assistance for AMIS and on
transition to UN peacekeeping are not necessarily the last
word. It behooves the USG to secure a specific request from
the AU to NATO for assistance. As for the UN, the best
course is to maintain pressure on Khartoum, but to keep it
focused, for now, on the practical necessity of shifting the
burden of implementing the Darfur peace from the African
Union to the United Nations. End Comment.
HUME