AMIS TRANSITION AND DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001117 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR D, AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/SPG, AND IO E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PREF EAID AU US UN SU SUBJECT: AMIS TRANSITION AND DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION: A DIAGNOSTIC STRATEGY Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Initiating the transition from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a UN peacekeeping operation and implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement require well targeted and bold steps taken in a timely manner. Advancing this agenda will require strengthening AMIS during the interim, supporting DPA signatories to sustain popular support, and expanding USG capacity to oversee and report on the dynamic situation in Darfur. End summary. -------------- Laying the Foundation for Darfur's Future -------------- ¶2. (C) The next 60 days are the most critical phase of the transition from an African Union force to a UN force in Darfur and beginning to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Getting the first steps right will insure the process goes as smoothly as is possible in a place like Darfur, and taking the right steps means insuring that we do what only what is important and actually will help. ¶3. (C) We see three general areas the USG should focus on: security - strengthening AMIS in preparation for transition to a UN peace-keeping operation; political - continuing work with the DPA signatories; and economic ) fostering an environmental conducive to long-term economic development. As well, our focus must address concurrently the need for enhanced USG oversight and reporting capability. -------------- -------------- Security: Facilitating the AMIS to UN PKO Transition -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Strengthening AMIS should take place as part of a dialogue among the USG, the African Union and AMIS, the UN and UNMIS, NATO, and the EU. At the same time, we need to engage the Sudanese Government, stepping up our contacts to ease the transition process. AMIS has many weaknesses in leadership, training, and sheer numbers of forces to execute its mission effectively within the huge area of Darfur. These weaknesses have been identified by many international military visitors and duly reported. We are of the opinion that the international community needs to act quickly before the post peace accord enthusiasm subsides. The way forward is: -- Understand how the UN intends to proceed in terms of location of troops and requirements for support. We should initiate no construction or acquisition that does not advance these requirements; -- Get logistical support to combatants to ease compliance with security arrangements; -- Turn the strengthening of AMIS headquarters over to NATO with UNMIS direction. UNMIS should start building the headquarters it needs now; and, -- Deploy a small &technical team8 to Khartoum and Darfur to assess and develop plans for the independent monitoring and verification of the cease-fire and disarmament process. -------------- -------------- Political: Reinforcing the Value of the Peace Agreement -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Continuing to work with the signatories, particularly Minawi, should be our second priority. Minawi will need help getting his commanders and civil society engaged and fully supportive. A pubic diplomacy effort will help convince his faction members ) as well as much of Darfur's non-aligned populace - of the wisdom of supporting a good peace agreement rather than waiting for the elusive perfect one. Moving Minawi and his lieutenants around the region and providing them with communications and media to get their message out will help garner support for the signers rather than the potential spoilers. We should also engage the other rebel factions to gain their belated support for the peace agreement. ¶6. (C) Underscoring the value of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the importance of signing on would also benefit by getting others to speak out. Prominent Darfurian opinion leaders would be useful proponents; these might include: -- Lt. Gen. (retired) Sedeig M. Ismail, Secretary General of the Darfur Forum for Dialogue and Peaceful Coexistence, Umma, KHARTOUM 00001117 002 OF 003 Benihalba; -- Lt. Gen. (retired) Hussein Abdalla Jebreil, prominent leader in the Darfur Forum for Peace and Development, NCP, Rezeigat; -- Dr, Mohammed Bishara Dossa, Ministry of Justice, NCP, Zaghawa; -- Khalil Adam Abdul Karim, ex-Minister of Health for North Darfur State, Fur; -- Mohammed Issa Aliyo, Chairman of Shurra Council, Umma, Rezeigat; -- Mohammed Abdalla Addouma, Chairman of Darfurian Advocates Association, Umma, Massalit; -- Maryam Abdul Rahman Takas, Co-founder of Darfur Forum for Dialogue and Peaceful Coexistence, Communist, Maalia; -- Yahya Bolad, Assistant to the Sultan, Gimir; -- Fatima Alaagib, National Assembly member, NCP, Fellata; and -- Nasradin Mohamed Omar, National Constitutional Review Commission, NCP, Benihalba. ¶7. (C) Another mechanism to anchor the peace agreement might be to establish working group of interested states. A Sudan Sextet, for example, could involve Egypt, Libya, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK in ongoing consultations on supporting implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. -------------- -------------- Economic: Food Aid Deficit, Long-Term Development Key -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) In order to ensure stability, economic factors must also be addressed. In the short term, securing sufficient food supplies is essential to avoid protracted demonstrations that recently resulted in fatalities and extensive property damage. The announcement that rations would be halved from May until October points to several months ahead of hardship. For the long term, a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) is important to lay the groundwork for economic stability. As perceived, the JAM would involve Phase I ) recovery, and Phase II ) reconstruction and development. The UN would take the lead in Phase I, conducting a joint assessment of early recovery needs for the first 18 months following a donor conference (probably in The Hague in early October). The World Bank, with the African Development Bank as a junior partner, would then field sectoral exports for longer-term economic reconstruction and development efforts. -------------- Managing USG Support for Stability in Darfur -------------- ¶9. (S) Finally, managing the U.S. effort will require additional personnel and equipment assets - particularly personnel on the ground in Khartoum and Darfur. These requirements would include: -- A Contracting Officer's Technical Representative - a COTR dedicated exclusively to the Darfur PA&E contract would ensure it has the ongoing supervision and coordination it requires; -- A dedicated HUMINT collection capability - Darfur continues to be a black hole regarding real time intelligence. Our reporting should come from military attaches and Foreign Service Officers in Darfur and not MILOB contractors. We need a permanent reporting presence in Darfur that reports to the Embassy. The addition of several HUMINT collectors in Darfur collecting and reporting though the appropriate embassy offices in Khartoum should be a priority; -- Special Equipment - the protection of all U.S. personnel is paramount, and providing special protective equipment, survivability equipment, and weapons must also be considered; and -- A S/CRS Officer - oversight of process is equally important. This may be where S/CRS can make its biggest contribution: by placing one of its staff in the Embassy on a full-time basis to monitor the implementation of the DPA, de-bug challenges as they arise, and maintain close liaison KHARTOUM 00001117 003 OF 003 with other stakeholders. ¶10. (C) The USG should also begin a deliberate process of re-engaging with the Sudanese military. Starting with a General Officer visit, we should begin military cooperation in order to better understand, and hopefully shape, the Sudanese Armed Forces' actions during the Darfur peace agreement implementation period and beyond. This would pay dividends in other areas, as well as including continued implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the creation of Joint Integrated Units as a part of that process. HUME