UN U/SG EGELAND: HUMANITARIAN SECURITY, ACCESS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001115 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR D, AF/FO, AF/SPG, AND IO E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO PREF EAID AU UN SU SUBJECT: UN U/SG EGELAND: HUMANITARIAN SECURITY, ACCESS, AND RESOURCES AT RISK REF: A. KHARTOUM 00840 ¶B. KHARTOUM 00825 Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a May 9 briefing of the diplomatic community, UN U/SG for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland said that his visit to Darfur had demonstrated the importance of addressing the challenges that threaten the well being of its people: restrictions on humanitarian access, worsening security conditions, and dwindling resources. He said that he would continue to appeal for additional resources, and would target those who had so far not participated: China, Russia, and the Middle East. Diplomats challenged the UN to acknowledge their considerable contributions, and to provide specific information that would aid in obtaining further aid commitments. They also argued that the Sudanese Government needed to be brought to task for rendering assistance in Darfur so difficult. Charge Hume noted President Bush's personal interest in Darfur, and the dispatch of four vessels of additional food for Darfur. He also pointed out that the USG's primary interest in Sudan was humanitarian concern. End summary. -------------- -------------- UN U/SG Egeland: Post-Abuja Year Crucial for Sudan -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a briefing with the diplomatic community on May 9, UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland said the coming year would be crucial for Sudan in the post-Abuja peace talks time frame. Unlike his ill-fated attempt to visit Darfur in early April (reftels),he said that this visit had gone well, with visits to both Geraida and Nyala in South Darfur. Egeland said he had met with Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Kosti Manibe, NGOs, and UN offices, and planned to see Vice President Taha later the same day. -------------- Geraida: Attacks Spark Massive Displacements -------------- ¶3. (C) Geraida is marked by massive displacements, Egeland said, and is full of spontaneous settlements encompassing perhaps 90,000 ) 100,000 people. More than one-half of them are new; he said he had spoken to several recent arrivals and found their accounts of militia attacks with helicopter gunships and Antanov aircraft, with bombings in Joghana, to be consistent and unrehearsed. -------------- -------------- Security Concerns: Humanitarian Access Decreasing -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Egeland said that he was concerned about the growing problem of humanitarian access; alluding to the growing number of areas of no access. OXFAM, IRC, and others are doing good work, he noted, although the basic services offered an inadequate for the population. Although there is not malnutrition or rampant disease, the spiraling security crisis could easily lead to a humanitarian crisis. Darfur does not present a neutral scenario; it is bad and getting worse. There is less unity of command and control of forces, with a lack of clarity as to who is instigating attacks ) bandits, splinter groups, etc. Both the number of areas with no access or intermittent access is increasing. NGOs are retreating, as many parts of Darfur are potentially "free fire" zones, which may force them to leave. Darfur, however, does not present alternative coping mechanisms, and cannot provide for the needs of its people in the absence of the NGOS. -------------- -------------- Kalma IDP Camp: Protests Lead to Violence, Death -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The previous day's riots, which resulted in the death of an African Union interpreter, injuries to several AU civilian police, and extensive AU property damage, were examples of how dangerous and difficult it is to work in Darfur, Egeland said. He noted the signs of protesters, which said "Welcome UN, U.S.," "No to AMIS," "No to Abuja Peace Agreement," and We Demand Compensation." He said that there was no sign of a clash until he left after meeting with NGO and sheikhs. The OXFAM Director asked what the people were shouting. The interpreter apparently said the crowd was yelling things against the government and President Bashir, but the crowd seemed to hear the opposite in his translation. One screamed that the interpreter was a jinjaweed, where KHARTOUM 00001115 002 OF 003 they beat him with sticks. He was dragged into the CNN vehicle. By this time, however, Egeland had left the area, and learned that the mob subsequently went to the AU civilian police station and destroyed it, stealing the contents. He said the crowd had beaten to death the interpreter for no reason. He added that a spontaneous follow-up event similarly occurred in Zalingei. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is in a crisis, and needs to work to restore security and safety. Joint patrols to include AMIS, police, and the local populace would be helpful. -------------- Egeland to Share His Ideas with VP Taha -------------- ¶6. (C) Egeland said he had several ideas that he planned to share later that day with Vice President Taha: -- Humanitarian services are on the brink of being lost due to poor security. In El Geneina area alone, eight of last month's 25 security incidents were considered serious. The UN cannot carry out its functions without NGOs. The Sudanese Government has no excuse; its responsibility includes providing basic security. The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) must provide it in its areas of control. His message to the SLA was to stop hijacking UN and NGO vehicles; to do so makes the SLA as bad as the jinjaweed. -- Humanitarian access suffers due to bureaucracy. Egeland described the current situation as a return to the conditions of 2004. NGOs find it hard to bet visas; furthermore, stay permits are valid for a mere three months. The moratorium on NGO restrictions will last only until the end of January ¶2007. -- Kalma IDP Camp needs a competent coordinator. He said that he had had a difficult meeting with the deputy wali of South Darfur, even though he had tried to point out the symbolic importance of having a camp coordinator in place. If the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) could be kicked out, any other NGO could be. Their presence "might" have helped prevent the May 8 riots. He encouraged donors to ask the UN to restore the NRC. He said it was possible that the NRC might be reinstated with less authority. AMIS, the sheikhs, and the police must, however, ensure camp security. -- Humanitarian resources are at risk. Food rations are now cut in half, and will be until October. The Sudanese Government should be encouraged to release stored food from strategic reserves. He commended the "positive signal" sent by President Bush in announcing that five food-laden ships were en route to Sudan. The food dilemma will not be resolved immediately; it will raise tensions. Egeland said that he would tap into the $20 million Central Emergency response Fund to address displacements in Darfur. This fund, for new, sudden emergencies, ¶7. (C) Egeland reiterated that his message for Vice President Taha would be that his primary concerns in Darfur were humanitarian restrictions, access, security, and resources. He added that he hoped "diplomatic efforts would widen," and that China, Russia, and the Middle East would contribute as the nations represented at the briefing, saying, "You are our main proponents." -------------- Egeland Takes Questions: Donors Sound Off -------------- ¶8. (C) The British Ambassador noted that Egeland had mentioned the importance of a partnership with the UN. He said that reduced humanitarian space was threatened by the NRC expulsion order, with hundreds of thousands of IDPs bearing the consequences. He said that the current government has a different structure than it did in 2004, and that the Humanitarian Aid Commission had many National Intelligence and Security Services officials working in it, and the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, an SPLM member, was weak. It is important to stop problems as they "come down the track," to cut through the bureaucracy and get to the heart of difficulties ) the National Congress Party, which leads the government. The donors will work with the UN, he said, but the UN must work with the donors. ¶9. (C) The Dutch Ambassador said that the UN needed to build up support for further donations. The need is "abstract" to many, and donors remain ready to intervene. Although donors need to meet their pledges, the UN seemed to accuse the donors of being at fault. The UN should be precise, and provide specific advice on that is needed and how food gaps can be met. Many donors, particularly those present, have KHARTOUM 00001115 003 OF 003 contributed much. Their efforts should be recognized, and those who have not come forward should be targeted to provide assistance by the UN. ¶10. (C) The French Ambassador agreed that a "closer partnership was needed." She said that EU donors had recently met with the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs to discuss the impact of the new Voluntary and Humanitarian Work on NGO operations. She noted that a study of the cost of money going to the Humanitarian Aid Coordinator through visas and various permits would illustrate what a considerable sum of money is being diverted from services. ¶11. (C) Charge Hume said that President Bush had taken a personal interest in Darfur, and had ensured that four vessels were dispatched to transport more food to Sudan. He recalled that in meetings with Vice President Taha, he would consistently note that the U.S. Government's primary interest in Sudan was humanitarian concern. Visa problems and harassment of NGOs are detrimental to that objective. Although we are better off with a peace agreement in hand than without one, it in of itself will not make the conflict go away. The two rebel groups that had so far not agreed to sign the peace agreement were not benefiting from strong leadership. During his eight weeks in Abuja at the peace talks, no one asked about the security situation on the ground in Darfur; yet all wanted guarantees of peace. Despite their rhetoric, they were not focused on what actual steps it would take to create a climate of security. ¶12. (C) USAID Mission Director Ahlmquist noted that there was vegetable oil coming to Sudan from Dubai, with an additional 1,000 metric tons of sorghum coming in June. WFP/Rome is conducting an analysis of the effectiveness of the food pipeline, which should help streamline the complex process. ¶13. (C) A participant asked about the earnestness of the Sudanese Government, as noted by the Humanitarian Aid Coordinator's absence at three meetings. He also noted the Government's growing fund reserves, wondering why the Government did not purchase food commercially to meet the needs of its citizenry. More pressure is needed on the Sudanese Government, he concluded. ¶14. (C) The Japanese Ambassador asked about the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue process, as detailed in the Darfur Peace Agreement. Egeland said he long for a "piece of paper that would bring peace on the ground." He said UN Special Representative Jan Pronk was in Darfur working on the means to implement the accord. Anchoring peace is a long process, he added, with the alternative "one hundred times worse." ¶15. (C) Egeland closed with an admission that the concerns he raised were well known to the diplomatic community; at the same time, he argued that it was in his "job description" to appeal continuously for resources. He said he would keep pushing for "energy" among donors as well as ongoing contributions. HUME