Sudan - Avian Flu Sitrep No. 4, May 8, 2006

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001089

SIPDIS

AIDAC
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, M/MED, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, RMO, AND FAS
USMISSION UN ROME
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
NAIROBI FOR SFO
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY
USUN FOR TMALY
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT: Sudan - Avian Flu Sitrep No. 4, May 8, 2006

REF: Khartoum 1025

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) On May 4, 2006, the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) office in Khartoum received positive
test results from the World Organization of Animal Health
(OIE) in Italy which confirm that the recent outbreak of
avian influenza (AI) in Sudan is indeed the highly
pathogenic H5N1 strain of avian influenza.
On May 3, the FAO hosted a meeting to brief the donor
community in Khartoum about the avian influenza (AI)
outbreak in Sudan and to share the findings and
observations of the FAO consultant who has recently
assessed the AI situation in Sudan (Reftel). The high
rate of bird deaths and the symptoms associated with the
disease indicate a highly pathogenic AI outbreak in
Khartoum and Gezira States. Donors pushed the U.N. to
proactively appeal for funds needed to respond to the
outbreak and to establish a weekly meeting in Khartoum to
inform donors on the developing situation. Preparations
to contain an AI outbreak in Southern Sudan are in their
early stages, but the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)
has imposed a ban on importation of poultry, eggs, and
other products from Khartoum and other infected areas.
End Summary.

-------------- --------------
FAO: Serious Outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Flu Underway
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) On May 4, 2006, FAO/Khartoum received
notification that animal tissue samples taken from
chickens in Khartoum had tested positive for H5N1 avian
influenza at the OIE reference laboratory in Italy. FAO
informed USAID of positive test results through informal
channels, and it is imperative that USG personnel protect
this sensitive information. FAO has informed Sudan's
Government of National Unity (GNU) of the positive test
results which confirm an outbreak of H5N1 AI in Khartoum
and Gezira States. However, the GNU has not yet
officially acknowledged presence of the H5N1 strain of AI
in Sudan nor released this information to the general
public.


3. (U) On May 3, 2006, FAO/Khartoum convened a meeting
to brief the donor community in Khartoum about the AI
outbreak in Sudan, and to share the findings and
observations of an FAO consultant who recently completed
an initial assessment of the AI outbreak in Sudan. Many
donors participated in the FAO meeting, including the
United States, the European Commission, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, France, and Japan. The
meeting was also attended by representatives from the
offices of the Humanitarian Coordinator and U.N. Special
Representative to the Secretary-General for Sudan, the
U.N. World Health Organization (WHO),the U.N. Children's
Fund (UNICEF),FAO, and several international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).


4. (U) The FAO expert, a U.S. national, gave a
PowerPoint presentation that included a short
introduction to the biological structure of the avian
influenza virus, described the mechanism of viral
transmission, and stressed the likelihood that wild bird
migrations played a causative role in precipitating the
AI outbreak in Sudan. She also gave a broad overview of
the recent history of AI disease epidemiology in other
parts of the world, explaining how the various strains of
AI have devastated bird populations and caused human
cases of H5N1 AI since the beginning of the recent global
outbreak.


5. (U) Prior to receiving official scientific
confirmation of H5N1 AI in Sudan, the consultant
concluded that the AI strain in Sudan was highly
pathogenic based on her direct observation of affected
birds during field visits to local poultry farms. The

KHARTOUM 00001089 002 OF 003


consultant showed a number of archive photographs of
diseased birds and indicated that these symptoms were
similar to those she observed on farms in Khartoum and
Gezira States. She identified the main constraints to
implementing AI control measures in Sudan to be the lack
of government capacity to manage the situation and the
lack of local capacity for laboratory testing and
analysis. Furthermore, she observed that many Sudanese
lack basic information about the disease, its impact on
Sudan's poultry industry, and how to deal with the
consequences of the outbreak. Though the outbreak has
seriously affected the local poultry industry, there are
no plans to compensate farmers. The culling of infected
birds is still being carried out in a crude fashion,
exposing workers to the AI virus.

--------------
Agency Updates
--------------


6. (U) The FAO country representative reported that weak
government capacity to respond to the AI outbreak made
the launching of disease control measures extremely
challenging. He appealed to donors to fund FAO's
response efforts and asked for the immediate deployment
of additional human resources to augment the government's
capacity to respond to the outbreak by offering technical
assistance to the Ministry of Animal Resources (MoAR).
USAID noted that is has provided personal protective
equipment (PPE) to the MoAR and has an expert arriving
next week, and urged the FAO to make its requirements
known to a broader audience.


7. (U) A representative from WHO reported that although
the first human cases tested proved negative for H5N1,
WHO is continuing to work with the Ministry of Health
(MoH) on preparedness initiatives. He expressed his
concern over the slow implementation of AI response plans
which had been prepared weeks earlier. WHO has also
deployed a PCR machine through U.S. Naval Medical
Research Unit Number 3 (NAMRU-3) in Cairo to establish an
in-country capacity to test for the H5N1 strain of the AI
virus at the MoAR in Khartoum. (Note: The MoAR refused
to send samples to the MoH for testing, apparently
insisting that the PCR machine be delivered to the MoAR
lab instead. End note.)


8. (U) UNICEF has taken the lead on developing an AI
public information campaign, and is developing a number
of products in Arabic to communicate personal protective
measures for poultry farm workers and safe ways to handle
poultry products in the home. UNICEF is also
collaborating with the MoH to develop a manual designed
to assist health workers in reporting possible cases of
AI infection in humans. UNICEF anticipates that this
information campaign will cost approximately $135,000.
To date, UNICEF has allocated $35,000 of its own funding
to the project. Unless additional funding is received,
UNICEF will only be able to produce and distribute a
limited number of posters and pamphlets.


9. (U) U.N. agencies called on donors to provide funding
for their AI operations. One donor representative
pointed out that this was the first general briefing the
donor community had received on the AI response, and that
until now donors had not known the extent of U.N. funding
needs to deal with this crisis. USAID announced its
contributions of PPE and the forthcoming consultant, and
noted that only USAID had received a funding request and
that other donors should be approached as well. It was
agreed that weekly meetings would commence immediately
and that U.N. agencies would prepare funding requirements
for additional donor appeals.


10. (U) Comment: There were tense exchanges during the
meeting as the FAO country representative launched into a
speech blaming donors for their lack of funding as the
reason for the delayed FAO and MoAR response to the
outbreak. Participants responded that FAO had not
briefed donors, had not convened meetings, and moreover

KHARTOUM 00001089 003 OF 003


had not even kept the U.N. Country Team apprised of the
extent of the outbreak. WHO also noted that they had
dipped into other resources to start the process moving
forward, hinting that FAO should have done the same
rather than just waiting for the commitment of additional
financial resources. Despite the atmosphere of finger-
pointing that occurred during those moments, the meeting
served to focus attention on the outbreak, the extent (or
lack thereof) of preparedness here in Sudan, and the need
to work together to achieve a coordinated response to AI
in Sudan. End comment.


11. (U) In Southern Sudan, USAID reports that Dr. Agol
Malak, South Sudan Director of Vet Services, MOA/LS has
consulted with the USAID office concerning AI
preparedness and coordination. The ministry has not yet
formed an AI task force due to the lack of financial
resources needed to convene stakeholders. Within the
GoSS, the MOA/LS Director of Planning and the MOA/LS
Director of Research have been named as focal points to
lead the AI response. A preparedness plan for the south
is under preparation. In the meantime, the GoSS has
imposed a ban on importation of poultry products from
northern Sudan. (Comment: Donors must improve efforts
to establish a dialogue between GoSS AI officials and the
federal-level Government of National Unity (GNU) AI task
force to ensure coordination of country-wide AI response
strategy. End comment.)


12. (U) Note: On May 3, Minister of Animal Resources
and Fisheries Deng thanked Embassy Khartoum Pol/Econ
Chief for USAID's timely support in responding to the AI
outbreak in Sudan and for USAID's donation of PPE to
support local containment efforts. He reiterated the
government's interest in conducting rapid testing in-
country, followed by international laboratory analysis
for confirmation purposes. He indicated that donors can
now import testing materials directly or through the FAO.
He noted that his Under Secretary was currently in Paris
obtaining more detailed information about handing the
epidemic from the OIE. He also mentioned that a WHO team
from Cairo had arrived with additional testing kits.
Finally, Minister Deng reported that the government is
focusing on compensation for poultry farmers and is
forming a committee composed of FAO, UNICEF, the U.N.
Development Program (UNDP),the MoH, and his own ministry
to address this funding need.

STEINFELD