Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1018
2006-04-30 08:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF EAST SUDAN: VISIT TO
VZCZCXRO9120 PP RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #1018/01 1200856 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 300856Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2555 INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001018
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF EAST SUDAN: VISIT TO
KASSALA
Classified By: P/E CHIEF E. WHITAKER, REASON: SECTION 1.4 (B) AND (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001018
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF EAST SUDAN: VISIT TO
KASSALA
Classified By: P/E CHIEF E. WHITAKER, REASON: SECTION 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) Summary: From April 11-13, Poloff and AF/SPG
DeskOff met with government officials, opposition parties,
tribal leaders, NGOs, and UNMIS to discuss the political
and humanitarian situation in Eastern Sudan. This is the
first of two cables to discuss the political and tribal
dimensions of Eastern Sudan. Politically, the Government
continues to deny the seriousness of conditions in the
East; however, its heavy-handed approach to the opposition
and NGOs demonstrates that it is indeed worried.
Militarily, questions arose whether the SPLA would remain
on course with its scheduled withdrawal from Hamesh
Koreib. Most contacts believe that once the SPLA withdrew,
there would be conflict between the Eastern Front and Sheik
Suleiman BetaiQs militia. Betai, however, expressed his
confidence that there would be no violence following the
SPLA withdrawal. End Summary.
UNMIS Kassala Views
--------------
2. (C) The SRSG UNMIS representative in Eastern Sudan,
Abdel Dayem Mubarak, outlined that the government, despite
its rhetoric, recognizes the seriousness of the East
situation, as reflected by its heavy-handed approach to the
Eastern Front. Over the past month, Mubarak said, the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have substantially increased
military intelligence presence, increased the number of
military aircraft in Kassala, imported fifty Land Cruisers,
and reinforced positions around Hamesh Koreib and in
Southern Kassala. Furthermore, he highlighted that the GNU
had restricted NGO movement within Kassala. In MubarakQs
assessment, the GNU continues to speak with confidence
because it has bribed tribal leaders for support and
improved relations with Eritrea. Mubarak said that Eritrea
has improved relations with Sudan to counter its
deteriorating relationship with Ethiopia and to control the
Eritrean Democratic Alliance, an opposition group based in
Eastern Sudan. To emphasize the broader context of the
East, Mubarak quoted Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Kosti
Manibi as saying, "the East was politically and
strategically important; however, there are active actors
outside any control and not bound by the
CPA."
SPLM Withdrawal Plans
--------------
3. (C) In an April 11 meeting, UN Sector Commander for
Kassala Prem Thapa said that the SAF claimed that it was
prepared to enter Hamesh Koreib as soon as the SPLM
withdraw. Thapa estimated that there were about 168
Popular Defense Forces (PDF/militia) fighters two
kilometers outside of Hamesh Koreib. According to Thapa,
the SPLA has developed a three-step withdrawal plan: the
SPLM will begin withdrawing between the first and third
weeks of April, the second withdrawal will occur in the
last week of April through the third week of May, and the
final withdrawal will take place during the last week of
May through the third week of June. Thapa speculated that
there would be some "slippage" in the withdrawal schedule,
perhaps due to political factors. Another complicating
factor is the recent return of Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) troops to the area (Note: The estimated 333 DUP
troops are SAF who are former DUP soldiers for the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) returning from Eritrea after the
NDA-GNU signed an agreement in June 2005. End note.)
Courtesy Call on Governor: "We Can Solve the East"
-------------- --------------
4. (C) In a courtesy call on the Governor of Kassala State,
Ibrahim Hamid, he stated that "if the international
community were not involved, it would be easier for the
Eastern Front and the Government to negotiate. The
international community should instead focus on development
and rehabilitation projects in the East." Furthermore, he
added that the Eastern Front does not represent the East,
because the East people are more interested in development
than in wealth sharing.
NGO Roundtable
--------------
5. (SBU) Poloff and DeskOff met with international NGOs
operating in Kassala, who raised the issue of increasingly
restricted access for UN humanitarian agencies despite the
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The SOFA is a bilateral
agreement between the Sudanese government and UNMIS that
KHARTOUM 00001018 002 OF 002
allows access for all UN agencies to provide humanitarian
assistance without obstruction or impediments. As a result
of the confusion, only UNMIS personnel can move freely in
the area; all other UN agencies are required to submit
extensive paperwork before traveling. The representatives
added that over the past month there had been an increased
presence of military intelligence under the guise of the
"anti-smuggling police" in the area.
Suleiman Betai: "No Violence Expected in Hamesh Koreib"
-------------- --------------
6. (C) Suleiman Betai, the Hamesh Koreib tribal leader,
asserted that there were no Eastern Front troops currently
in the town. He denied that his militia was the
government-supported Popular Defense Forces (PDF),and
instead called them the "youths of Hamesh Koreib." These
"youths" respected the CPA, he said; however, when the SPLM
failed to withdraw from Hamesh Koreib on January 9, the
militia entered the town on January 11. Betai revealed
that he had signed a secret agreement with the Beja
Congress for its withdrawal from Hamesh Koreib; therefore,
he was surprised when the Beja Congress fought against the
"youths" on January 11. In his opinion, "the time had
arrived for him to provide goods for his people, since the
Beja Congress had not provided any goods."
7. (SBU) Betai asserted that the youths of the East follow
their tribal leaders, not the Eastern Front, asserting that
the Eastern Front did not represent the citizens of Hamesh
Koreib, since its leaders were not from that area. Betai
said confidently that the Beja Congress would not fight for
Hamesh Koreib after the SPLA withdrawal. He called for the
UN and NGOs to provide for his citizens, and also invited
senior USG officials to visit Hamesh Koreib.
Hamesh Koreib Commissioner: "The Beja Congress Should Not
be Here"
-------------- --------------
--------------
8. (C) The Commissioner for Hamesh Koreib, Ahmed Betai,
younger brother of Sheik Suleiman Betai, said that the
leaders of the Eastern Front do not represent Hamesh
Koreib. Therefore, they should not occupy that area. He
added that there were rumors that after the SPLA withdrew,
the Beja Congress would enter Hamesh Koreib with Eritrean
assistance. Betai appealed to the international community
to urge the Beja Congress and the Governors to solve this
impasse peacefully.
STEINFELD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF EAST SUDAN: VISIT TO
KASSALA
Classified By: P/E CHIEF E. WHITAKER, REASON: SECTION 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) Summary: From April 11-13, Poloff and AF/SPG
DeskOff met with government officials, opposition parties,
tribal leaders, NGOs, and UNMIS to discuss the political
and humanitarian situation in Eastern Sudan. This is the
first of two cables to discuss the political and tribal
dimensions of Eastern Sudan. Politically, the Government
continues to deny the seriousness of conditions in the
East; however, its heavy-handed approach to the opposition
and NGOs demonstrates that it is indeed worried.
Militarily, questions arose whether the SPLA would remain
on course with its scheduled withdrawal from Hamesh
Koreib. Most contacts believe that once the SPLA withdrew,
there would be conflict between the Eastern Front and Sheik
Suleiman BetaiQs militia. Betai, however, expressed his
confidence that there would be no violence following the
SPLA withdrawal. End Summary.
UNMIS Kassala Views
--------------
2. (C) The SRSG UNMIS representative in Eastern Sudan,
Abdel Dayem Mubarak, outlined that the government, despite
its rhetoric, recognizes the seriousness of the East
situation, as reflected by its heavy-handed approach to the
Eastern Front. Over the past month, Mubarak said, the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have substantially increased
military intelligence presence, increased the number of
military aircraft in Kassala, imported fifty Land Cruisers,
and reinforced positions around Hamesh Koreib and in
Southern Kassala. Furthermore, he highlighted that the GNU
had restricted NGO movement within Kassala. In MubarakQs
assessment, the GNU continues to speak with confidence
because it has bribed tribal leaders for support and
improved relations with Eritrea. Mubarak said that Eritrea
has improved relations with Sudan to counter its
deteriorating relationship with Ethiopia and to control the
Eritrean Democratic Alliance, an opposition group based in
Eastern Sudan. To emphasize the broader context of the
East, Mubarak quoted Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Kosti
Manibi as saying, "the East was politically and
strategically important; however, there are active actors
outside any control and not bound by the
CPA."
SPLM Withdrawal Plans
--------------
3. (C) In an April 11 meeting, UN Sector Commander for
Kassala Prem Thapa said that the SAF claimed that it was
prepared to enter Hamesh Koreib as soon as the SPLM
withdraw. Thapa estimated that there were about 168
Popular Defense Forces (PDF/militia) fighters two
kilometers outside of Hamesh Koreib. According to Thapa,
the SPLA has developed a three-step withdrawal plan: the
SPLM will begin withdrawing between the first and third
weeks of April, the second withdrawal will occur in the
last week of April through the third week of May, and the
final withdrawal will take place during the last week of
May through the third week of June. Thapa speculated that
there would be some "slippage" in the withdrawal schedule,
perhaps due to political factors. Another complicating
factor is the recent return of Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) troops to the area (Note: The estimated 333 DUP
troops are SAF who are former DUP soldiers for the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) returning from Eritrea after the
NDA-GNU signed an agreement in June 2005. End note.)
Courtesy Call on Governor: "We Can Solve the East"
-------------- --------------
4. (C) In a courtesy call on the Governor of Kassala State,
Ibrahim Hamid, he stated that "if the international
community were not involved, it would be easier for the
Eastern Front and the Government to negotiate. The
international community should instead focus on development
and rehabilitation projects in the East." Furthermore, he
added that the Eastern Front does not represent the East,
because the East people are more interested in development
than in wealth sharing.
NGO Roundtable
--------------
5. (SBU) Poloff and DeskOff met with international NGOs
operating in Kassala, who raised the issue of increasingly
restricted access for UN humanitarian agencies despite the
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The SOFA is a bilateral
agreement between the Sudanese government and UNMIS that
KHARTOUM 00001018 002 OF 002
allows access for all UN agencies to provide humanitarian
assistance without obstruction or impediments. As a result
of the confusion, only UNMIS personnel can move freely in
the area; all other UN agencies are required to submit
extensive paperwork before traveling. The representatives
added that over the past month there had been an increased
presence of military intelligence under the guise of the
"anti-smuggling police" in the area.
Suleiman Betai: "No Violence Expected in Hamesh Koreib"
-------------- --------------
6. (C) Suleiman Betai, the Hamesh Koreib tribal leader,
asserted that there were no Eastern Front troops currently
in the town. He denied that his militia was the
government-supported Popular Defense Forces (PDF),and
instead called them the "youths of Hamesh Koreib." These
"youths" respected the CPA, he said; however, when the SPLM
failed to withdraw from Hamesh Koreib on January 9, the
militia entered the town on January 11. Betai revealed
that he had signed a secret agreement with the Beja
Congress for its withdrawal from Hamesh Koreib; therefore,
he was surprised when the Beja Congress fought against the
"youths" on January 11. In his opinion, "the time had
arrived for him to provide goods for his people, since the
Beja Congress had not provided any goods."
7. (SBU) Betai asserted that the youths of the East follow
their tribal leaders, not the Eastern Front, asserting that
the Eastern Front did not represent the citizens of Hamesh
Koreib, since its leaders were not from that area. Betai
said confidently that the Beja Congress would not fight for
Hamesh Koreib after the SPLA withdrawal. He called for the
UN and NGOs to provide for his citizens, and also invited
senior USG officials to visit Hamesh Koreib.
Hamesh Koreib Commissioner: "The Beja Congress Should Not
be Here"
-------------- --------------
--------------
8. (C) The Commissioner for Hamesh Koreib, Ahmed Betai,
younger brother of Sheik Suleiman Betai, said that the
leaders of the Eastern Front do not represent Hamesh
Koreib. Therefore, they should not occupy that area. He
added that there were rumors that after the SPLA withdrew,
the Beja Congress would enter Hamesh Koreib with Eritrean
assistance. Betai appealed to the international community
to urge the Beja Congress and the Governors to solve this
impasse peacefully.
STEINFELD