DARFUR: WHO WILL APOLOGIZE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001015 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO KAWC UN AU SU SUBJECT: DARFUR: WHO WILL APOLOGIZE? Classified By: Political Officer Ron Capps for reasons 1.4 b and d. -------------- Introduction -------------- ¶1. (C) Introduction by Cameron R. Hume, CDA Embassy Khartoum. Everyone with an interest in Darfur should read this message. It is written by Ron Capps, the Foreign Service Officer who has the most comprehensive knowledge of Darfur. He is now completing with great distinction a tour as the deputy chief of the political /economic section in Embassy Khartoum. Previously he served as a U.S. military officer advising the African Union peace-keeping force in Darfur as well as with NATO forces and diplomatic missions in the Balkans, Rwanda, Afghanistan and Iraq. I have benefited greatly from his knowledge and analysis, even if I might not endorse his conclusions. At my urging he agreed to send this message in an open channel so that it would be available to a wider readership. -------------- Three Years On -------------- ¶2. (C) This week marked the third anniversary of the start of a large-scale armed rebellion in Darfur. Peace talks in Abuja are moving incrementally towards what may be a peace accord, and the United Nations has begun planning to supplant the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Meanwhile, all sides ignore a two year old Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement (HCA); the war has spread across the border into Chad and now clearly constitutes a threat to international peace and security. If there is an Abuja peace accord, and this is by no means certain, it will not be an end in itself. It will be the beginning of the hardest part of stopping the violence in Darfur. If there is no peace accord, things can only get worse. ¶3. (C) United Nations officials have described their worst-case scenario in assuming the AMIS mission in Darfur as one where the warring factions ignore the peace accord just as they have ignored the HCA. Unfortunately, that is also the most likely scenario. -------------- Insufficient Levels of Control -------------- ¶4. (C) An Abuja peace accord is unlikely to stop the violence in Darfur. There are several reasons why: (1) rebel field commanders have lost faith in the leadership of their movements. Nineteen SLA/Wahid commanders have publicly broken with Wahid. SLA/Minawi has splintered with open breaks by Sulieman Jamooz, Sharif Harir, Sulieman Marajan, Khamis Abdullah and 17 other commanders. Other commanders have defected to Wahid. At least one has joined the Government in fighting the SLA. Khalil comes to Abuja when it suits him and many of his fighters are in Chad acting as mercenaries. In short, rebel leaders do not have a sufficient level of control over rebel commanders to guarantee their compliance; (2) Government of Sudan negotiators do not represent the Arab tribal militias or the Janjaweit leaders, nor does the government have a sufficient level of control over those militias to guarantee their compliance; (3) fighting between the SLA factions will continue and could degrade into a tribal war which would eventually draw in the Arab tribes. ¶5. (C) A weak international force with a limited mandate will be powerless to stop the violence. In this scenario IDPs and refugees will be unable to return home, rebels and militias will continue to kill with impunity and all our work in Abuja will have been futile. -------------- Complex and Thorny Missions Ahead... -------------- ¶6. (C) AMIS has been a stop-gap. It was put in place in haste and because at the time it was the best solution. Seen in this light, AMIS has done well. But it has not met its mandate. Coalition task force operations of the type that are required in Darfur are complex beyond the experience of AMIS. I many cases the troops want to perform but simply do not have the experience to conduct a successful peace support operation in an area larger than Iraq. And neither the force as a whole nor many of the troops and units that make up the mission are capable of conducting the militarily complex and politically thorny missions that will face a post-Abuja international security force. ¶7. (C) Regardless of whether Abuja produces an enhanced KHARTOUM 00001015 002 OF 002 cease-fire agreement or a complete peace accord -- or even if the talks ultimately collapse -- rebel forces and militias will have to be mapped, counted, cantoned and disarmed. Given the lack of cohesion among the rebels and the lack of government control over the militias, it seems likely that the groups will resist these steps, particularly disarmament. In this event, the international peace support force will be required to militarily defeat them. This is not a Chapter VI mission. The force will require the combat power and prowess to enforce a peace accord if it is to provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the return of IDPs and refugees. It will also require the right mandate. Seven UN Security Council resolutions on Darfur have been issued under Chapter VII. This must be the starting point for the follow-on force. -------------- ... Require a First-World Response -------------- ¶8. (C) Stopping the violence in Darfur will require a military force with first-world leadership, first-world assets and first-world experience. U.S. and coalition experience in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq are relevant here. Putting together such a coalition and getting it into place to do its work will require that the United States government and our military take on the lead role, at least initially. Our NATO and other first-world military partners will not be keen to step forward without our participation, and many of the traditional UN troop contributing countries lack the military capability to successfully complete the mission. -------------- It Is Our responsibility -------------- ¶9. (C) We alone have called the atrocities in Darfur Genocide. We must lead the coalition that will stop it. We must demonstrate our resolve and determination to stop this Genocide and to never again let Genocide happen. We already lead the world in the provision of humanitarian aid to Darfur. We must not cede our leadership at the crucial moment. ¶10. (C) During the Rwandan Genocide the United States and others in the international community failed the Tutsis and moderate Hutus who were killed by the hundreds of thousands at the hands of the Interahamwe. In 1998 President Clinton went to Rwanda to apologize and said, "We must never again be shy in the face of evidence." In Darfur the evidence of Genocide is clear. The President of the United States has said so; two Secretaries of State have said so. -------------- Or Who Will Apologize? -------------- ¶11. (C) Some will say that the steps outlined here are impossible, but they are not. Certainly the Government of Sudan will resist. This will be a challenge to the nation's sovereignty and perhaps even to the survival of the government. Security Council members will resist. But if we fail to construct and mandate this force correctly, we will fail to stop the Genocide and more people will needlessly die. Yes, it will be hard. But being hard should not deter us from doing what is right. Otherwise, which American president will be the one to apologize for failing the dead of Darfur? STEINFELD