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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 000767 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2016 TAGS: PTER PGOV PREF PHUM NP SUBJECT: HOME MINISTER OFFERS PARTIES LITTLE SPACE REF: A. KATHMANDU 690 ¶B. KATHMANDU 752 ¶C. KATHMANDU 762 ¶D. 04 KATHMANDU 1795 ¶E. KATHMANDU 482 ¶F. KATHMANDU 751 Classified By: CDA John Schlosser. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a March 20 meeting, the Charge urged Home Minister Thapa to release the ten remaining civil rights and political leaders in detention since January 19. The Charge also argued that His Majesty's Government of Nepal (HMGN) should allow the political parties to conduct their planned peaceful movement on April 8. Thapa "took note," but was not particularly receptive, instead hinting that HMGN might take action against the Parties for their cooperation with the Maoists. He also indicated HMGN would likely arrest the political party representatives who traveled to India for talks with the Maoists upon their return. Thapa commented that while HMGN's "Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy" (ref A) was essentially a restatement of past policy that he claimed had been successful, the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) policy (ref B) was new, and he hoped the international community would help support it. Thapa also stressed that Tibetan issues were "sensitive," but expressed hope that the government's review of the issue could move ahead in the near future. End Summary. Government Compelled to Act Against Terrorism -------------- ¶2. (C) In a March 20 meeting with Kamal Thapa, Minister of State for Home Affairs, the Charge pressed HMGN to release the ten political and civil society activists (ref C) that the government had detained since January 19. The Charge also urged HMGN to give political parties space for their peaceful demonstration planned for April 8. The Charge noted that the international community was already quite critical of HMGN's record on human rights and that the U.S. and others were very interested in seeing the Nepali people's freedom of assembly and speech upheld. Thapa "took note" and appreciated U.S. caution to the Parties over the Maoist-Parties 12-point understanding, pointing out that the understanding did not support unification of constitutional forces or the positive "long term development" of Nepal. He explained that it made no difference to HMGN that the Parties and the Maoists had signed separate but identical statements, as the Parties had joined with the Maoists to carry out "so called peaceful agitation" in a joint program. As the Maoists had failed to give up arms, there could be no guarantee that any action supported by the Maoists would be peaceful. Therefore, under Nepal's anti-terrorism legislation, the government had "no choice" but to act against both the Parties, and the Maoists. Threatens Action Against Parties -------------- ¶3. (C) Thapa posited that there were four principal actors in Nepal: the King, Parties, Maoists, and the international community. While the Maoists were "far away" from joining the democratic process, the Parties could be "taken aboard," but the international community should support "the democratic process" whatever that process yielded. When the Charge again urged HMGN to release politicians and civil society activists to facilitate dialogue with the parties, Thapa countered that the government had to follow anti-terrorism legislation and jail "those people who meet and have direct contact with the Maoists." He commented that it was "unfortunate" that the court had released some of these people. (Note: The Supreme Court has been actively hearing habeas corpus cases and ordering the release of political activists. End note. ) Thapa noted that CPN-UML General Secretary MK Nepal had publicly admitted to meeting with Maoists, and given that the Maoists were in a state of insurrection against HMGN, "how can the government not act?" "I don't have any option, I am sorry to say," he added. He said that the government would be compelled to take action against Party leaders who had held recent talks with the Maoists in New Delhi once the leaders returned to Nepal. He also stated that the parallel statements by the Maoists and Parties, while technically separate, really amounted to a joint statement which "makes it very difficult" for HMGN not to act against the Parties. Preemptive Action Necessary -------------- ¶4. (C) In making a case on the necessity of preemptive action by the state, Thapa explained that HMGN could not risk waiting for violence to occur before acting. Thapa cited the rioting following the September 2004 death of Nepalis in Iraq (ref D). He commented that violence broke out all over Kathmandu and the government had been unable to control the rioting. He explained that the government had information that the Maoists would have infiltrated the January 20 party demonstration, forcing security forces to use force to suppress it. Thapa stated, "I am really worried" about upcoming party action being infiltrated by Maoists using violence. Reconciliation Remote Unless Parties Join Election -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The Home Minister maintained that the King wanted to hand power over to the Parties, but Thapa did not "see the possibility of reconciliation" as the Parties had reacted negatively to the King's Democracy Day statement (ref E),and had instead renewed their 12-point understanding with the Maoists. Thapa further noted that he was "quite optimistic" that in a period of three months, the government by intensely focusing on security, could provide the minimum level needed to hold elections. Party participation in the elections would solve the constitutional crisis in the country. However, instead of supporting new elections, the Parties had instead chosen "agitation over dialogue," aiming to "topple the government from the street." It was the responsibility of the government, he quickly added, to stop such actions. Thapa stressed that the Maoists "can't be trusted" and stated it was "unfortunate" that the Parties failed to realize the "gravity and seriousness" of linking with the Maoists. ¶6. (C) Thapa suggested that the international community "should pressure all actors" to participate in a forthcoming election called by HMGN. If such an election were "credible," he added, then the international community should endorse it and press the Parties who had not participated to accept that the people had expressed their will through the ballot box. Instead of welcoming the opportunity for elections, however, second tier Party leaders had told Thapa that the Parties needed to bring the Maoists into the political fold before elections. Thapa inferred that if the Parties needed Maoist permission to participate in elections, then the Parties and the Maoists were already united. Thapa dismissed Party calls to reinstate Parliament, explaining that the Supreme Court had ruled it illegal. Relaunching the "Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy" -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Thapa explained that the "Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy" (ref A),which he launched on March 13 was a restatement of a government policy from 2004, with higher levels of funding attached. Claiming that the old policy had produced "quite encouraging results," especially at the workers level, Thapa stated that the recently adopted policy was targeted at those who had been "deceived" and had "mistakenly" joined the Maoists, but now wanted to "return to the mainstream." He explained that the government would build a new rehabilitation center in Kathmandu to provide training opportunities to those who surrendered. The new center would operate in addition to the Dhakaltar facility, which currently held a few dozen former Maoists (ref F). Thapa commented that HMGN was attempting to disseminate information about the program to the target lower-level Maoist cadre, but acknowledged the difficulty since senior Maoist leadership did not allow members any access to independent media or contact "with the outside world." New IDP Policy -------------- ¶8. (C) In response to a question, Thapa commented that the government's IDP Policy (ref B),which he also launched on March 13, was new and responded to requests from the United Nations and donors that HMGN formulate a clear policy. He noted that while the policy tried to incorporate all IDPs, the main focus was on people displaced by the conflict. The policy, he said, incorporated the government's current activities to assist IDPs and added new mechanisms. He hoped the international community would support the government's efforts to assist IDPs and promised to distribute an English translation of the full policy to embassies and international organizations. Tibetan Refugees -------------- ¶9. (C) The Charge mentioned recent positive signals from Foreign Minister Pandey regarding Tibetan refugee processing. Thapa said HMGN was still reviewing its policy on exit permits for Tibetan refugees, noting that it was a "sensitive" issue, and that Nepal was in a "very difficult situation." He explained that Nepal's relationship with the international community was "not that good" at present, but China had supported Nepal. That said, Thapa acknowledged that the Tibetan refugee center was overcrowded and hoped that HMGN would "be able to move ahead" on its Tibetan refugee policy in the "near future." Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Thapa's hard-line, antagonistically anti-Party stance is deeply worrisome. By declining the Maoists' demand for a joint statement and issuing parallel statements instead, the Parties moderated their stance in hopes of leaving the door open for reconciliation with the government. If the King's government cracks down on the Parties as Thapa indicated, and does not allow them to hold their planned peaceful demonstration in Kathmandu on April 8, the rift between the Parties and the King will widen even further. At the very least, the King's announcement of nationwide Parliamentary elections (expected in his April 14 Nepali New Year's Message) will be poorly received, and if it occurs while the government is detaining many political leaders, it will be farcical. SCHLOSSER